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This thesis is about how we develop as moral agents and come to realise the virtuous activity on 
which flourishing depends. Aristotle’s account of how this is eﬀected is familiar: we become 
virtuous through practice of the actions in which virtue finds its expression. But how should we 
understand the diﬀerence between the doings of the learner and the activity of the virtuous agent, 
and what is it that happens when a learner does these things that results in her realisation of 
virtuous activity?  
Whilst both agents perform virtuous actions, the two are engaged in diﬀerent activities: one 
is in the process of acquiring a disposition, the other is engaged in its exercise. But we can also see 
each as related to the actions they perform in diﬀerent ways. The learner is not yet the author of 
her actions in the strict sense that the virtuous agent is, who chooses these actions as an expression 
of a settled way of seeing and valuing things; indeed, the learner’s actions stand in the relation of 
copy to those of the virtuous agent, or so I argue. How, then, does the learner’s practice of these 
alienable actions result in her becoming an author of virtuous actions in the strict sense? 
I argue that by seeing the learner as engaged in the imitation of a virtuous agent we can begin 
to explain this transition. In imitating a virtuous agent and adopting her perspective, the learner 
is positioned so as to perceive the value of virtuous action, and thus to discover its attraction. With 
the aid of Aristotle’s psychological works, I oﬀer a picture of the learner’s habituation which shows 
how it is that through acting, her perceptions, desires and other capacities are shaped in such a 
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A NOTE ON PRONOUNS 
Throughout this thesis I refer to the student of virtue and the mature virtuous agent using the 
female pronoun. I am of course aware that for Aristotle the development of virtue proper was 
restricted to men (Pol. 1 13), and that the male pronoun would perhaps to this extent be more 
appropriate. I hope, however, that the reader will see this use of the female pronoun not as a textual 
inaccuracy but, as it is intended, as a small attempt to liberate Aristotle’s account of flourishing 
and our development as moral beings from one of the less attractive aspects of his philosophy.1  
                                                             
1 An alternative perhaps would be ‘they’, used in the gender neutral singular; this, though, is awkward when put 
in reflexive form (‘themselves’, ‘themself '?), so I opt instead to speak of the virtuous agent herself. 
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Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is a deeply practical work. Its famous opening line points to a 
concern about the good,1 but we soon discover that the good in which Aristotle is interested is 
the human good, and that his inquiry is undertaken in order to discover how we may lead a 
flourishing human life. Such a life, Aristotle argues, depends on our excellent activity as rational 
beings, and an examination of the human excellences takes up much of the rest of the work. The 
picture he presents both of eudaimonia and of virtuous activity is in many ways highly attractive, 
particularly in its suggestion that how well our lives go is importantly determined by what we do 
and in its emphasis on our own activity in the constitution of our happiness.  
The practical focus of this investigation becomes more evident still in Book II, where Aristotle 
makes clear that the end of ethical inquiry is not to know what virtue consists in, but that we 
become good (1103b26-29). It is a claim that is repeated in the final chapter of the work when he 
writes again that: 
the aim in practical things is not to study and know each thing, but rather to do them. Hence 
knowing about virtue is not suﬃcient, rather we must try to possess and to use it, or to 
become good in any other way? 
οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς τέλος τὸ θεωρῆσαι ἕκαστα καὶ γνῶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ πράττειν 
αὐτά: οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἱκανὸν τὸ εἰδέναι, ἀλλ᾽ ἔχειν καὶ χρῆσθαι πειρατέον, ἢ εἴ πως ἄλλως 
ἀγαθοὶ γινόμεθα; (1179a35-b4). 
Indeed, the topic of moral development is one that eﬀectively bookends the work. After the 
programmatic discussion of Book 1 it is with this topic that Aristotle begins his examination 
afresh in Book II, and with this again that he concludes the work in X 9, as a segue to the Politics. 
The issue of our becoming virtuous is, I submit, a central concern of Aristotle’s. 
                                                             
1 “Every craft, and inquiry, and likewise every action and decision seems to seek some good; that is why people 
were right to declare that the good is what everyone seeks (πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξίς τε καὶ 
προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ: διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τἀγαθόν, οὗ πάντ᾽ ἐφίεται)” (1094a1-3).  
Translations from Nicomachean Ethics are based loosely on Irwin (1999), with modifications. 
INTRODUCTION 
 14 
Aristotle holds, as we discover in NE II 1, that virtue is not something possessed by nature,2 
but which must be developed; nature however makes it possible for us to develop the virtues 
(1103a25). We are beings, it seems, born with a certain nature, but whose perfection and well-being 
consists not, as in the case of plants and other animals, in a life lived according to what might be 
referred to as our ‘first’ nature, but in the acquisition and exercise of a ‘second nature’. Unlike 
plants, but like animals, we are beings who perceive, who have bodily appetites and who are thus 
capable of voluntary action (111a26), seeking out and pursuing those things in our environment 
which will satisfy our appetites. This characterises both our behaviour as children, when we act 
almost entirely, it seems, on the basis of pleasures and pains (1105a2-7) and also the behaviour of 
those who have not undergone the moral education Aristotle recommends.3 But unlike animals, 
we are also capable of a distinctive kind of action – that is, praxis – action which expresses our 
settled values. We are beings whose perceptions, desires, beliefs and so on can be educated in such 
a way that we come to see, and to value, what is in fact good, and to act on this basis. It is in coming 
to be in this state and to engage in its corresponding activity that we achieve perfection as moral 
beings, and thus eudaimonia too.4 Our becoming virtuous, and the process by which this takes 
place, is the topic of this thesis.  
So how is it that we come to acquire this second nature and to act in this distinctive way? 
Aristotle’s answer to the question of how we become virtuous and to realise mature virtuous 
activity is familiar to many: we become good through a process of habituation. The account he 
oﬀers, however, is also one that may strike us as frustratingly incomplete, and my aim in this thesis 
is to understand what this process consists in and how it eﬀects the kind of transformation 
Aristotle claims that it does. 
                                                             
2 As Lawrence notes (2012, p.245), Aristotle does not explain whether having virtue ‘by nature’ would entail that 
we are born with it fully formed, like our capacity for sight, or that it is something that develops, but does so ‘naturally’, 
like physical growth. In any case, it is evident that virtue is not possessed by nature, since nothing ‘natural’, Aristotle 
tells us, can be habituated (ἐθίζεται) into another condition: stone, no matter how many times it is thrown upwards, 
will always continue to fall down, whilst fire cannot be made to move downwards (1103a19-23), but it is evident that 
legislators do make citizens good by habituating them (1103b3-4). 
3 These people live according to feeling, pursuing their proper pleasures and the sources of them, and avoiding 
the opposing pains (πάθει γὰρ ζῶντες τὰς οἰκείας ἡδονὰς διώκουσι καὶ δι᾽ ὧν αὗται ἔσονται, φεύγουσι δὲ τὰς 
ἀντικειμένας λύπας, 1179b13-14). 
4 Aristotle of course famously argues in Book X that the life of morally virtuous activity takes second place to 
the life of intellectual contemplation (NE X 7-8); a fully eudaimon life would seem then to depend ultimately on our 
realisation of this intellectual activity, and indeed it remains an interesting and yet largely unexamined question how 
this is to be achieved. My concern in this thesis is with our development as moral beings, on which Aristotle is almost 
entirely focused, and the process by which this is eﬀected. A further topic would be to examine our development in 
the sphere of intellectual contemplation, and indeed the question of how this relates to the moral development I 
discuss in this thesis. Some interesting thoughts can be found at the end of Whiting (2002).  
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NICOMACHEAN ETHICS II 1  
Book II opens with the distinction, introduced in I 13, between what Aristotle calls ‘virtue of 
thought’ or ‘intellectual virtue’ (ἡ διανοητικὴ) and ‘virtue of character’ or ‘moral virtue’ (ἡ ἠθικὴ); 
the virtues of thought comprising both practical and theoretical wisdom, and a further list of 
excellences detailed in Book VI, the virtues of character comprising courage, temperance and 
justice, as well as the more minor virtues of Book IV. Whilst the distinction between the two 
forms of virtue was drawn in I 13 in terms of a certain division of the soul (see Ch.1, §1.2.1), the 
distinction is now, in Book II, drawn in terms of their modes of acquisition. Intellectual virtue, 
Aristotle tells us, arises and grows for the most part from teaching,5 and thus it requires experience 
and time (1103a15-17).6 Virtue of character, however, results from habit (ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται), 
hence the name ‘ethical’, slightly varied from ‘ethos’ (1103a17-18).7 Indeed, that Aristotle begins his 
examination with the question of development rather than definition speaks again to the practical 
focus of the work.8 
                                                             
5 Certainly it is worth noting that here Aristotle only claims that the intellectual virtues are acquired ‘mostly’ 
through instruction (τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας), which might allow for one of two things. Either he means that the 
intellectual virtues are mostly acquired through instruction, but that other modes of learning may also contribute to 
their development, or he means that most, but not all, intellectual virtues are acquired through instruction. In either 
case, this might allow for the interesting possibility that practical wisdom is acquired not (only) through instruction 
but also/rather through the process of doing just things that produces the moral virtues.   
6 As Broadie notes, the claim that the acquisition of intellectual virtue involves ‘experience and time’, appearing 
as it does in the distinction between the character and intellectual virtues, would suggest that it is intended as a point 
of contrast between the two. If this is so, the claim surely cannot be that the student of virtue needs experience and 
time as a learner to acquire the intellectual virtues, for Aristotle would surely allow that it takes experience and time 
to acquire the character virtues as well (see also Hardie, 1968, p.100). Indeed, the fact that training in virtue starts 
from childhood (1103b24) and is not complete until maturity, in addition to the claim that the old and the wise see 
correctly, thanks to experience (1143b11-14), supports this thought. Broadie suggests, then, that Aristotle must instead 
mean that for the virtues of intellect, experience and time are required before the instruction can begin, whilst as we 
know from 1103b24, the character virtues must be inculcated from the earliest moments (Broadie, 1991, p.73). 
Both Broadie (1991, p.73) and Taylor (2006, p.60) note the contrast between this passage and 1142a12-15, in 
which Aristotle explains that young people may excel in mathematics and certain sciences, but not have practical 
wisdom, since the latter requires experience. Broadie suggests that we should then take Aristotle to be referring at 
1103a only to practical, and not to theoretical wisdom; Taylor instead presumes that Aristotle is speaking of what is 
true hōs epi to polu, allowing for the idea that there may be intellectual prodigies, but that ‘for the most part’ mastering 
a theoretical discipline requires a long period of instruction.  
7 EE 1220a39-b3: “Character exists, as the name signifies, because it develops from habit, and a thing gets 
habituated as a result of a pattern of conduct that is not innate, by repeated movement of one sort of another, so that 
it is eventually capable of being active in that way (ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ ἦθος, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα σημαίνει ὅτι ἀπὸ ἔθους ἔχει 
τὴν ἐπίδοσιν, ἐθίζεται δὲ τὸ ὑπ᾽ ἀγωγῆς μὴ ἐμφύτου τῷ πολλάκις κινεῖσθαι πώς, οὕτως ἤδη τὸ ἐνεργητικόν)” (trans. 
Inwood & Woolf ). 
8 Moreover, that the modes of acquisition are introduced here as that which distinguishes the virtues, indicates 
that understanding these should play as much of a role in our understanding of the nature of the virtues as his account 
of the parts of the soul and their functions. Compare with Aristotle’s remark at Pol I 2, where he writes that “he who 
considers things in their first growth and origin, whether a state or anything else, will obtain the clearest view of them” 
(1252a24, trans. Jowett). This I believe is recognised by Gauthier & Jolif: “Nous verrons que l’exposé sur la nature de 
INTRODUCTION 
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This process of habituation by which virtue of character is developed is not positively 
characterised at first, but rather contrasted with teaching and, following that, what is possessed 
‘by nature’ (1103a18-19).9 Aristotle does not make clear, at this point, what he takes ‘teaching’ to 
involve, nor whether he takes these modes of acquisition to be exclusive or not; these are questions 
to which we will return in Chapter 1. By contrast with that which is possessed by nature, however, 
Aristotle explains that whilst ‘natural’ capacities such as sight are first possessed as a capacity, and 
subsequently exercised (1103a26-31), the virtues as with the technai, we acquire by having acted 
first (ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον). We do not acquire our capacities for seeing and hearing through 
frequent seeing and hearing, but in the case of the crafts and the virtues:  
For the things we must do having learned, we learn by doing these things: men become 
builders, for instance, by building, and lyre-players by playing the lyre. Similarly, then, we 
become just by doing just things, temperate by doing temperate things, brave by doing brave 
things. 
ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μανθάνομεν, οἷον οἰκοδομοῦντες οἰκοδόμοι 
γίνονται καὶ κιθαρίζοντες κιθαρισταί: οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα, 
τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονες, τὰ δ᾽ ἀνδρεῖα ἀνδρεῖοι (1103a30-b3).  
And as he continues some lines later: 
For, acting as we do in our dealings with men, some of us become just, some unjust; by acting 
as we do in terrifying situations, and accustoming ourselves to fear or to be confident some 
become brave, some cowardly. Likewise, with regards to things involving appetites and anger: 
for some become temperate, and mild, others intemperate and irascible, one lot through 
behaving in one way in these situations, the other by behaving in another way. To sum it up 
in one phrase: like states come about through like activities.  
πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γινόμεθα οἳ μὲν δίκαιοι οἳ 
δὲ ἄδικοι, πράττοντες δὲ τὰ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς καὶ ἐθιζόμενοι φοβεῖσθαι ἢ θαρρεῖν οἳ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι 
οἳ δὲ δειλοί. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ὀργάς: οἳ μὲν γὰρ σώφρονες 
καὶ πρᾶοι γίνονται, οἳ δ᾽ ἀκόλαστοι καὶ ὀργίλοι, οἳ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ οὑτωσὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναστρέφεσθαι, 
οἳ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ οὑτωσί. καὶ ἑνὶ δὴ λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνοντα (1103b14-22). 
Hence, he concludes, we must engage in the right activities and acquire the right sorts of habit 
right from youth. For this makes no little diﬀerence, but rather all the diﬀerence (1103b21-25). 
                                                             
la vertu, qui commence au chapitre 4, ne peut être détaché de l’examen de [la] question [‘comment acquiert-on la 
vertu morale?’]” (1959, Tome II.1, p.101). 
9 The contrast between teaching, habit and the possession of a capacity by nature echoes the opening lines of the 
Meno (70a). It is worth considering whether Plato himself saw these as exclusive modes of acquisition, or whether 
the Meno discussion is set up to show the ways in which all three modes of acquisition or possession contribute to the 
formation of the virtues. 
 17 
This account, in outline, will strike many readers as true; it is surely by engaging in certain 
sorts of actions or activities, conducting ourselves in one way or another, that we eventually 
become the sort of person who does the one thing or the other.10 Yet despite the seemingly evident 
nature of the account in outline, what Aristotle does not make clear is just what is involved in the 
practice of virtuous actions and how it is by engaging in such activity we acquire the moral virtues. 
Moreover, beyond the claim that the process by which we become good consists in our ‘doing just 
and temperate things’, Aristotle does not tell us what it is for something ‘to come about from 
habit’ (ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται) or what kind of process ‘habituation’ (ἐθισμός) is and just what it 
eﬀects. Thus we may ask: what is this process of ‘habituation’, consisting in the practice of virtuous 
actions, and how does this result in the development of moral virtue? It is this question that I seek 
to address in what follows. 
CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The first chapter ‘Becoming a Virtuous Agent’ is concerned with what we are seeking to explain 
and from where, and with what assumptions, we should begin our investigation. I submit that too 
often accounts of moral habituation in the Ethics are coloured by presuppositions about the 
nature of the terminate state: scholars tend to begin their investigations from one of two deeply 
entrenched views about the nature of the state of moral virtue, and to read the account of moral 
development in light of this, often with quite diﬀerent results. One problem with this approach 
is that the developmental accounts that result from each view respectively will be deemed to have 
little merit by proponents of the opposing view, and owing to the deeply entrenched nature of the 
debate, a stalemate is quickly reached. Moreover, this approach tends to result in the foreclosure 
of many important questions, and on either side leads to the adoption of views that may be 
regarded as variously problematic. 
As a way of making progress in developing an account of moral development through 
habituation, I propose that we reflect on what we are seeking to account for in producing such an 
account. I propose in Chapter 1 that we reframe our question, and ask not ‘how is the state of 
moral virtue acquired?’ but rather ‘how do we become virtuous agents and to realise mature 
virtuous activity?’ This shift in focus oﬀers, I argue, a more neutral starting point and a picture of 
the end of habituation that can be more readily agreed upon by scholars. At the same time, it 
                                                             
10 Bostock, indeed, writes that “the main outline of his doctrine here is … suﬃciently clear, [that we may] pass 
over it in order to come at once to his account of what a virtue of character is, which begins in II.5” (2000, p.36). 
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better reflects our interest in Aristotle’s picture of human flourishing insofar as it emphasises the 
importance of our own agency and activity, as discussed above. 
Having encouraged this shift in focus, in the final parts of the chapter I argue that we should 
not at the outset of our investigation foreclose the question of what kind of process habituation 
is, and I encourage the reader in particular to see that the commonly held assumption that this 
process is ‘non-rational’ is not decisively supported by Aristotle’s remarks in the Ethics. I argue 
not, as some do, that habituation must be in part an intellectual process, but rather that it is 
plausible that Aristotle had a quite expansive view of the process of ‘doing just and temperate 
things’; in the absence of textual evidence to the contrary, we should not assume at the outset of 
our investigation that this process could not include, for example, various forms of guidance, 
reflection, and so forth. Our task is to consider just what this process of doing just things might 
involve, and what it is about doing these things that eﬀects the kind of change described above.  
Chapter 2, ‘Practice and Praxis’, takes a closer look at the distinction between the actions of a 
learner and the activity of a virtuous agent. I approach this question via a reading of Aristotle’s 
famous (hypothetical) challenge to his virtue acquisition thesis and subsequent defence in NE II 
4. I argue that certain assumptions about the nature of this challenge, and so the form that the 
solution takes, have obscured the insights this discussion aﬀords, and argue that if the nature of 
the challenge is reconsidered, we can see Aristotle’s discussion as much more relevant to our 
concerns. Aristotle’s argument reveals that whilst both the learner and the virtuous agent perform 
virtuous actions, only the virtuous agent performs these virtuously, which depends on her 
knowing, her choosing such actions for their own sake, and her being in a stable state. I argue that 
this reveals the virtuous agent to be an author of her actions in a very strict sense, and moreover 
that the virtuous agent and her activity have a certain conceptual priority for Aristotle in thinking 
about virtuous action. Developmentally, however, the learner begins from actions that are in a 
sense alienable and must come to meet the conditions of virtuously performed action through the 
practice of these actions. Our task is then to explain how practice of alienable actions can result 
in the kind of strict authorship described by Aristotle. 
In the third chapter, ‘Development and Continuity’, I turn from consideration of the activity 
of the mature agent to the action of a learner, and ask how we ought to conceive of this. I approach 
this via a demand that has been placed by various commentators on our conception of the learner’s 
action, namely that it be seen as continuous with that of the virtuous agent. In the face of a concern 
recently raised about Aristotle’s solution to the challenge in NE II 4 and the distinction between 
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the learner’s action and that of a virtuous agent there defended, I argue not only that we have good 
grounds to defend this distinction, but that it does not entail the problems that this criticism 
supposes. To act virtuously is the end towards which the learner’s practice is directed, and to say 
that a learner does not act in this way is to say that she has not yet achieved this end; as yet, we 
know very little about the learner’s action itself.  
In what follows, I consider more concretely how we should conceive of the learner’s not yet 
virtuously performed action, and track a development in conceptions of her action in modern 
scholarship. I note first that it is now commonplace to suppose that the learner’s action cannot be 
‘mindless’ or ‘mechanical’, and instead must be seen to engage various of her cognitive capacities, 
and then examine a more recent proposal, according to which we should grant that a learner can 
and must act for the sake of the noble if the development of virtue is to be in any way intelligible. 
In response to this suggestion I show that this view is not mandated by the text, before raising a 
number of concerns both about the picture of what happens in the course of the learner’s 
habituation that it assumes, and its failure to furnish an explanation of one of the phenomena we 
are seeking to explain. For it merely stipulates that the learner acts from a motivation, the 
development of which we are meant to be accounting for.  
In Chapter 4, ‘Imitating Virtue’, I begin to develop a more positive account of the learner’s 
habituation. I suggest that the explanatory challenge, as I have framed it, itself points to a way of 
understanding the learner’s activity such that the development of virtuous agency and realisation 
of virtuous activity are intelligible. I argue that by seeing the learner as engaged in the imitation 
of the virtuous agent and the mature activity in which she engages, we can see first how she comes 
to acquire knowledge of virtuous action (in its particularity and variety), and the situations to 
which it is a response. But moreover, I argue that in imitating the virtuous agent the learner must 
adopt the perspective of this agent, a perspective which over time she comes to inhabit. From this 
perspective she is able to see the morally relevant features of situations and virtuous actions as a 
response to these, which I argue in the next chapter is essential to her coming to perceive the value 
of virtuous action. Finally, in imitating the virtuous agent by acting as she would in a given 
situation, the learner also begins to develop a conception of herself as the agent of virtuous actions.  
In the fifth chapter, ‘Perceiving the Fine’, I focus more directly on the question of what it is 
that happens when a learner does just and temperate things, and argue that in doing these things 
she comes to perceive their fineness. In NE III-IV, discussion of the choice of virtuous actions for 
their own sake appears to be replaced by talk of choosing for the sake of the fine, and I suggest 
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that in examining how a learner comes to grasp the fineness of virtuous actions we are oﬀered a 
more concrete route into the question of how she comes to choose virtuous action for its own 
sake. I argue that fineness is a feature of virtuous actions themselves, an objective property there 
to be discovered, which is perceptible in the doing of such actions. Moreover, I argue that to 
discriminate something as fine is, for Aristotle, to find it attractive or desirable; thus in perceiving 
the value of virtuous actions an agent is at the same time motivated to perform them. I argue, 
however, that one needs to be appropriately positioned in order to perceive the fineness of 
virtuous actions, and that it is this that the learner’s imitation of a virtuous agent, and in particular 
the adoption of her perspective, enables her to do. 
In the final chapter, ‘Action and Aﬀordances’ I extend this account of what happens during 
the learner’s practice of virtuous actions, by turning from the ethical to the psychological works. 
Taking Aristotle’s account of the production of action in De Motu Animalium and De Anima as 
a starting point, and noting the important role he assigns in these texts to the capacity of phantasia 
in the ‘preparation’ of desire that motivates action, I examine a number of recent attempts to 
explain what this role might be, before developing an account of my own. I argue that phantasia 
contributes to the preparation of desire and production of action by preserving perceptions of 
virtuous action and its fineness when an agent acts, and then representing these to the agent on 
occasions in the future. Thanks to phantasia, an agent ‘sees’ objects and situations as aﬀording 
these action possibilities, which are apprehended as desirable. The picture I present, then, is one 
in which the agent sees the world in terms of action aﬀordances, whilst at the same time her 
perception of the world, and the desires she has, are shaped by the way in which she acts.  
The account that I oﬀer, then, takes seriously Aristotle’s claim that we become virtuous by 
performing virtuous actions, and oﬀers an explanation of how it is that in actually doing these 
things a learner comes to discover their value and to perceive things just as the virtuous agent does. 
Whilst allowing that Aristotle might have a quite expansive view of what our practice of just and 
temperate things consists in – a view which allows for others to contribute to this process, for 
reflection on our doings and for progress to be made between occasions of acting – I take seriously 
the importance for Aristotle of our own agency and activity not just in our mature moral life, but 
in eﬀecting our moral development. In essence, virtue – both in its mature form and its 
development – is something that must be enacted.
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1 BECOMING A VIRTUOUS AGENT 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
We are seeking to understand how it is, according to Aristotle, we develop as moral beings. We 
saw in the Introduction that his answer is in one respect very clear: we become virtuous through 
a process of habituation (1103a170), or as he goes on to explain, “we become just by doing just 
things, temperate by doing temperate things, brave by doing brave things (τὰ μὲν δίκαια 
πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονες, τὰ δ᾽ ἀνδρεῖα ἀνδρεῖοι)” (1103b1-2). What 
he does not make clear, however, is precisely what this involves, and how it is that in so doing an 
agent becomes virtuous.  
This chapter is concerned with what it is we are trying to explain when we undertake an 
investigation of Aristotelian moral development, and with what assumptions we should begin this 
investigation. More specifically, I want to call attention to the fact that certain ways of thinking 
about the explanadum typically determine the kind of account of the developmental process that 
is then oﬀered, and in a way that it often limiting. I will show that the way in which the 
explanatory project is typically framed, which takes our task to be to explain the process by which 
a certain state of character is acquired, occasions disagreement about how we should understand 
the nature of the developmental process, owing to a more deep-rooted disagreement about the 
nature of the state that is to be acquired. I will argue that presuppositions about the nature of this 
state tend to colour the accounts of the developmental process that are oﬀered, and that the 
answers to many questions about the nature of this process and what it eﬀects are thus decided in 
advance. If we adopt this framework, we are required, it seems, to take a position in this 
entrenched debate from the outset, and even if we attempt not to foreclose the various questions 
raised above about the developmental process, we nevertheless face the likely fact that proponents 
of the alternative position will be unconvinced by the developmental story then told.  
Thus I will propose instead a diﬀerent way of framing the explanatory task, putting the 
question in terms not of how a certain state of character is to be acquired, but how we become 
agents of a certain sort and to realise the virtuous activity on which our flourishing depends. This 
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new way of framing the explanatory project not only oﬀers, I hope, a more neutral starting point 
for our investigation, but since Aristotle is clear that happiness consists not simply in being in a 
state, but in activity, our question is more closely tied to what is of importance to Aristotle with 
respect to achieving eudaimonia. Having motivated this shift in focus, I return to the question of 
the nature of the process through which virtue is developed, and argue that we should not 
foreclose the question of the nature of this process at the outset of our investigation.  
1.2 THE ACQUISITION OF A STATE OF CHARACTER 
It might reasonably be supposed that an account of the process by which we come to be morally 
virtuous will require us to first have a view of what it is, the development of which, we are trying 
to explain. Commentators seeking to oﬀer an account of Aristotelian moral development tend 
then to focus on Aristotle’s characterisation of moral virtue as a state (ἕξις) of character,1 and thus 
suppose that the question that needs to be answered, when asking how it is we develop as moral 
beings, is how we come to acquire this state. With a conception of what kind of state moral virtue 
is in hand, commentators then approach Aristotle’s discussion of development in NE II and 
elsewhere, and stipulate what kind of process would be necessary to eﬀect this kind of state.  
Later, I will propose an alternative way of thinking about what it is we should be trying to 
account for. But I should make clear at the outset that the traditional approach to the explanatory 
project – asking how we acquire the state of moral virtue and what kind of state this is – is not in 
itself an unreasonable approach. Indeed, one might consider this approach to be licensed precisely 
by Aristotle’s own characterisation of moral virtue as a hexis in NE II 5 and his repeated references 
to hexeis in the course of his discussion in Book II.2 When we ask ‘how do we become virtuous?’, 
it is perfectly reasonable to think that, since moral virtue is a state, what we want to know is how 
we come to acquire this particular state.  
The diﬃculty, we will see, is that there is a profound disagreement about how we should 
understand the nature of this state, what the state consists in, and thus just what it is we need to 
account for when explaining its development. This disagreement leads in turn to disagreement 
about how we should conceive of the process. I will suggest in due course that by framing our 
question in a diﬀerent way, by asking, that is, not how we acquire a certain state, but how we 
                                                             
1 Hutchinson (1986) notably centres his treatment of the virtues around Aristotle’s concept of a hexis. 
2 We saw in NE II 1 Aristotle claims that “like states arise from like activities” (ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις 
γίνοντα, 1103b21-22), which might license our asking how it is that a particular state comes to be through particular 
kinds of activities, and to consider then what must be involved in such activities that they give rise to such states.  
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become agents of a certain sort and to realise the mature virtuous activity Aristotle describes in 
Books II-IV, we can find more neutral ground within this debate, whilst also taking seriously 
Aristotle’s insistence that the achievement of eudaimonia depends on our acting in a distinctive 
way. First, however, let us look at the traditional approach to the topic of Aristotelian moral 
development, and the disagreement that is found therein. 
1.2.1 VIRTUE AS A NON-RATIONAL STATE 
In seeking to understand just what kind of state moral virtue is, the majority of commentators 
take the natural starting point to be Aristotle’s division of the virtues in accordance with the parts 
of the soul as set out in NE I 13; a chapter introduced, indeed, as addressing the question of just 
what virtue is (1102a5-6). The virtue we must examine, Aristotle tells us, is human virtue, and by 
human virtue, he adds, we mean virtue of the soul, not virtue of the body (1102a16-17). Aristotle 
begins with what he takes to be a familiar distinction between a part of the soul that is rational 
and a part that is non-rational (1102a27-28), and adds that whether these parts are to be 
distinguished as parts of the body are, or whether these are only two in definition, does not matter 
for his present purposes (1102a27-32).  
Of the non-rational part Aristotle puts to one side a part that is responsible for nutrition and 
growth, which is possessed by all living things; this part is active even in sleep and since in sleep a 
good and bad person are least distinct, the activity of this part would seem to have nothing to do 
with determining whether a life is lived well or not (1102a32-b12).3 There is, however, a part of the 
soul that is non-rational but nevertheless shares in reason in a way (ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς 
ψυχῆς ἄλογος εἶναι, μετέχουσα μέντοι πῃ λόγου, 1102b13-14). This part is distinct from the rational 
part, since enkratic and akratic persons demonstrate that an agent may possess right reason, but 
have in her some other part of the soul which clashes with this reason. Nevertheless, this part still 
shares in reason to the extent that it is obedient to reason in the enkratic person, and listens better 
still to reason in the virtuous agent (1102b26-28).4 What this division of the soul amounts to, and 
                                                             
3 Lorenz suggests that “the reason for this… is that the nutritive part is not responsible for the generation of 
voluntary behaviour that flows from the operations of cognition and desire. (Cf. 6 12, 1144a9-11)” (2009, p.181).  
4 This part is initially characterised as non-rational, and Aristotle reiterates after this discussion that “it seems 
then that the non-rational [part] has two parts. For while the plantlike [part] shares in reason not at all, the appetitive 
[part] and generally desiring [part] shares in reason in a way (φαίνεται δὴ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον διττόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φυτικὸν 
οὐδαμῶς κοινωνεῖ λόγου, τὸ δ᾽ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικὸν μετέχει πως)” (1102b28-31). He continues, however, 
to consider “if we ought to say that this [part] also has reason, then the [part] that has reason also will have two parts. 
One will have reason fully, that is, in itself; the other just like listening to the reason of a father (εἰ δὲ χρὴ καὶ τοῦτο 
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whether it accords with other divisions made in the psychological works is of course a matter of 
contention, but we are told at least that the part which can listen to reason is the seat of “appetites 
and in general of desire (τὸ δ᾽ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικὸν)” (1102b30).5 
Having distinguished these parts of the soul, at the end of NE I 13 Aristotle then goes on to 
claim that “the virtues are divided in accordance with this diﬀerence (διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ 
κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην)” (1103a3-4). The claim in the Eudemian Ethics is stronger still, for 
there Aristotle states that the moral virtues ‘belong to’ (ἔχοντος) the non-rational part of the soul 
(1220a10-11). For this reason, many commentators take moral virtue to be a state of the non-
rational part of the soul (which can listen to reason), a state that can, as such, be characterised as 
non-rational itself.6 More specifically, since Aristotle writes in I 13 that this part of the soul is the 
seat of (most) desires, moral virtue is taken to be the excellent condition of a subject’s desiderative 
soul (orektikon).7  
For a subject’s desiderative soul to be in an excellent condition, commentators then suppose, 
is for her desires to align with the values endorsed by reason. This alignment might be conceived 
of in one of two ways: on the one hand, one might suppose that the alignment requires merely 
that a subject’s desires (whether dispositional or occurrent) are in fact those that reason would 
endorse; what right reason determines to be good and what is desired are the same, and no conflict 
arises between the two. On this view, there need not be any implication of a causal interaction 
between the two; they might simply be in harmony.8 Alternatively, one might suppose that there 
is closer relation between a subject’s desires and the prescriptions of her rational faculty, such that 
her desires are responsive to these prescriptions.9 A good desiderative soul on this view waits for 
and follows the prescriptions of the rational part of the soul. 
                                                             
φάναι λόγον ἔχειν, διττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὑτῷ, τὸ δ᾽ ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι)” 
(1103a1-3). For a discussion of the rationality of the non-rational part of the soul, see Sherman (1989, p.162ﬀ ).  
5 For a discussion of this division as contrasted with the divisions of the soul in terms of functions in De Anima, 
see Whiting (2002). 
6 See for example Burnet (1900, p.64), Joachim (1951, p.69), Cooper (1988), Hutchinson (1986, p.12; 1995, p.213), 
Bostock (2002, p.35), Taylor (2006, p.xv, 106), Moss (2012, p.163-174). 
7 See especially Burnet (1900). 
8 Certain remarks of Grönroos might be taken to suggest this picture: “[habituation is] the process or mechanism 
by which the non-rational part is made to agree with reason” (2007, p.264); we can achieve virtue, he claims, because 
“the non-rational part can be transformed to strive for values endorsed by reason” (p.260).  Cf. Kraut (2012, p.536). 
9 Cooper, for example, writes: “virtues of character and traits of character in general (i.e., ethe) are qualities 
(poiotetes) (that is, relatively fixed and longlasting ways of being qualified) belonging to the non-rational part, insofar 
as that part is capable of following reason; in fact, these qualities require and depend essentially upon a prescriptive 
judgment of the reason of the person whose soul is in question” (1988, Appendix). More recently, Leunissen writes: 
“Together these practices [which constitute habituation] aim to change the appetitive soul-capacities of men in such 
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When Aristotle writes in NE II 1, then, that moral virtue is acquired ‘by habit’, it is thus 
typically supposed that what Aristotle must be referring to is a process directed towards the 
training of the desiderative soul, bringing it into a state either of alignment with reason, or of 
obedience to reason and readiness to follow its prescriptions. The project of explaining how moral 
virtue is acquired through habituation is conceived as the project of explaining how the 
desiderative soul comes to be in such a condition as to share the values of, or be obedient to, the 
rational part of the soul.   
Hand in hand with this picture of the explanatory project goes a conception of the nature of 
the process by which the non-rational soul comes to be in this good condition, whereby the 
process too is regarded as non-rational in nature, and hence appropriate for the training of the 
non-rational part of the soul.10 It is worth noting, indeed, that the claim that moral virtue is a state 
of the non-rational soul is often appealed to in order to justify the claim that habituation is a non-
rational process, and vice versa. So, for example, Moss (2011; 2012), assumes that habituation is 
non-rational (or ‘non-intellectual’), and takes this as evidence for the claim that virtue is itself 
non-intellectual: “if habituation is suﬃcient for virtue, virtue must be a state of the non-rational 
soul alone” (2012, p.217). Note that such arguments reveal a third assumption, namely that there 
is an isomorphism between the nature of the process and the nature of the resulting state. 
Accounts of just what this process of habituation consist in and how it in fact works are varied 
in the details oﬀered, but commentators tend either to emphasise the need to train a subject’s 
emotional dispositions through practice in correct feeling,11 and/or to suppose that it will involve 
the training, in some sense, of a learner’s sense of pleasure and direction of this onto appropriate 
objects.12 We will take note of some of these attempts at explaining the development of virtue in 
subsequent chapters; for now let this suﬃce as a sketch of the traditional picture. 
                                                             
a way that thy become correctly disposed towards undergoing the appropriate aﬀections and obedient to the rational 
part of the soul” (2015, pp.225-226). See also Hutchinson (1986) 
10 Engberg-Pedersen defines habituation as “a non-rational process that results in a desiderative state (of the 
orektikon) and a non-rational cognitive state (of the faculty of perception)” (1983, p.160); Moss too claims that we 
become good “through the non-rational habituation of the non-rational part of the soul” (2011, p.205), and makes 
explicit the strong correspondence she thinks must hold between the nature of the training and the part of the soul 
towards which it is directed. 
11 See Joachim: “The passage from the indeterminate δύναμις (the mere capacity) to the determinate ἕξις is 
eﬀected by ἐθισμός (habituation), by constantly reacting rightly to feeling in particular cases” (1951, p.72) 
12 See for example Burnet (1900, pp.68-69), Engberg-Pedersen (1983).  
That the process of becoming virtuous importantly involves a subject learning to take pleasure in the appropriate 
objects is strongly supported by Aristotle’s discussion in II 3, though the role such learning plays and how it is achieved 
will remain a matter for subsequent discussion. 
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1.2.2 VIRTUE AS A RATIONAL OR INTELLECTUAL STATE 
The above remains the dominant view of moral virtue and its development, but that is not to say 
it has been without detractors. Various commentators, notably within the last half century, have 
registered a certain dissatisfaction with the picture it presents both of moral virtue and so, as a 
result, of the process by which it is acquired. Such challenges are by and large motivated by the 
feeling that the traditional view fails to take into consideration certain distinctive features of 
moral virtue as it appears to be described by Aristotle, and so to be inadequate as a picture both 
of moral virtue and its development.  
The main criticism levelled at the traditional view focuses on the picture of moral virtue it 
assumes, and more specifically the supposition that moral virtue is a state of the non-rational part 
of the soul alone. Irwin, for example, writes that: 
Aristotle’s allocation of the virtues of character to the non-rational part of the soul… is at least 
misleading. It is fair to claim that the virtues of character involve the nonrational part and 
the virtues of intellect do not (except for the ambiguous virtue of practical wisdom). But it 
would be wrong to infer that the training of the nonrational part alone produces virtues of 
character. It is not clear that Aristotle makes this mistaken inference. But he ought to have 
said that virtue of character involves both parts of the soul, virtue of intellect only one (1975, 
p.576). 
More recently Lorenz argues that “Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics conceives of the virtues of 
character as rational states, states partly constituted by a well-informed, thoughtful quickness to 
grasp suitable reasons for acting in certain ways if and when such reasons arise”, thus opposing the 
view that “the virtues of character are wholly constituted by excellent conditions of the part or 
aspect of the human soul that is not itself capable of reasoning, deliberating, thinking” (2009, 
p.178).13  
Commentators who advocate this more inclusive view of moral virtue, as a state of both the 
non-rational and the rational part of the soul, tend to point to two broad considerations to 
support this contention. Some appeal to Aristotle’s claim that moral virtue is a ‘prohairetic’ state 
(ἕξις προαιρετική) (1106b36) – a state that is ‘deciding’ –  and argue that since prohairesis involves 
both reason and thought (1112a15-16), it thus involves the rational part of the soul.14 The claim 
                                                             
13 See also Sorabji (1973-4), Sherman (1989). 
14 This is by no means a complete discussion of the considerations to which commentators appeal in support of 
the claim that the moral virtues are in part states of the rational soul or ‘belong’ also to this part. As will soon become 
apparent, my intention is neither to reject or not defend this claim, but to propose a diﬀerent starting point which 
allows us to remain neutral on the question of the part of the soul to which moral virtue belongs.  
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that moral virtue is a prohairetic state may of course be taken merely to suggest that it is a state 
that makes one capable of making decisions, but one which need not itself involve decision and so 
the intellectual capacities on which decision depends. Lorenz, however, has notably argued for a 
stronger reading (2009, p.197-198), on which moral virtue is a state that issues in decision, and to 
that extent involves capacities of the rational part of the soul.  
Alternatively, commentators may appeal to Aristotle’s discussion of the intimate relation 
between moral virtue and the apparently intellectual virtue of phronēsis in Book VI. There 
Aristotle distinguishes between the state of natural virtue and ‘strict’ (κυρία) moral virtue, and 
famously writes that “strict virtue cannot be acquired without phronēsis (ἡ κυρία οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ 
φρονήσεως)” (1144b16-17). Later in the chapter, moreover, he discusses moral virtue’s relation to 
correct reason (ὀρθὸς λόγος), and claims that moral virtue “is not only a state in accordance with 
correct reason, but a state involving correct reason (ἔστι γὰρ οὐ μόνον ἡ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, 
ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ἕξις ἀρετή ἐστιν)” (1144b26-7).15 Thus, if ‘strict’ moral virtue cannot 
be had without phronēsis and is a state involving correct reason, moral virtue cannot belong to the 
non-rational part of the soul alone.16 
If moral virtue is a state of both the rational and non-rational parts of the soul, it is thought 
that in accounting for its development we need then to account not only for the development of 
a subject’s desiderative soul, but also the development of various of her intellectual capacities, 
including the subject’s beliefs, deliberative skill, and so on. As a result, commentators who adopt 
this more ‘intellectualist’ view of moral virtue take there to be important implications also for 
how we should conceive of the process by which moral virtue is brought about. 
                                                             
15 See Sherman (1989, p. 158); Vasiliou (1996, p.779); Cf. Moss (2012, pp.167-8). 
16 Commentators who seek to defend such an account of moral virtue are of course faced with the challenge of 
explaining Aristotle’s division of the soul and the virtues in NE I 13, which traditionalists have taken to indicate clearly 
that moral virtue is a non-rational state. The rationalist response is to suggest that to draw such a conclusion is to 
‘over-read’ the passage: the purpose of the passage, McDowell for example suggests, “is to introduce an architectonic 
structure for expository purposes, and the subsequent development itself shows that we should not take the structure 
too rigidly” (1998, p.40); (cf. Coope, 2012, p.144 n.4). Lorenz meanwhile explains that by dividing the moral and 
intellectual virtues in accordance with the division of the soul:  
he may only have in mind that the distinction between the virtues of thought and the virtues of 
character depends importantly on the distinction between reason strictly speaking and the obedient 
part of the soul, in that the virtues of thought simply are states of reason strictly speaking, whereas the 
virtuous of character crucially involve, and in fact are constituted by, certain good, properly habituated 
states of the obedient part of the soul (2009, p.193). 
Hence objectors to the traditional view suppose that the division of the soul and corresponding division of the virtues 
in NE I 13 is by no means decisive evidence in favour of the traditional view. 
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We saw that on the traditional view moral virtue, conceived of as a non-rational state, is 
thought to be acquired through a putatively non-rational process of habituation, which to this 
extent is thought to be appropriate for training the non-rational part of the soul. Indeed, 
traditionalists tend to suppose that whatever this process involves, it will be suﬃcient to bring 
about moral virtue. But intellectualist commentators argue that if moral virtue consists in more 
than a state of the non-rational, desiderative part of the soul, and involves in some way the agent’s 
reason, it is unclear how an entirely non-rational process could be suﬃcient to produce this kind 
of state. Thus intellectualist commentators typically adopt one of two positions. Those who 
maintain that habituation is a non-rational process argue that, despite Aristotle’s remarks in NE 
II 1, it cannot be suﬃcient to bring about moral virtue. Such commentators may grant, in 
agreement with traditionalists, that habituation is suﬃcient to bring the subject’s orektikon into a 
good condition, but will maintain that a further intellectual process is required to develop other, 
more intellectual, features of virtue.17 Alternatively, commentators may take Aristotle at his word 
when he writes that moral virtue is produced through a process of habituation, but argue that if 
habituation is suﬃcient for the acquisition of moral virtue, it cannot be a purely non-rational 
process.18 Indeed, this choice is set out explicitly by Irwin, who writes that: 
Aristotle’s account of moral education as habituation by practice in right actions and learning 
to enjoy them is incomplete; for this training will produce only promising raw material that 
requires practical wisdom to become virtue. Either habituation is not enough, or it includes 
more than Aristotle mentions in Book II. If it produces the virtues of character that include 
wisdom, it must involve training in good deliberation, to produce wisdom; and Aristotle has 
not stressed this in Book II. Moral education requires a diﬃcult transition from unreflective 
enjoyment of virtuous action to the wise man’s understanding of the virtues and their role in 
happiness (1975 p.576-7).  
In light of the foregoing discussion, it is worth noting that ‘habituation’ is treated in the 
literature in two ways: it can be conceived of narrowly, as a non-rational process directed at the 
training of the non-rational part of the soul, or more widely as a process involving both non-
rational and rational or intellectual elements, and directed towards the training of both parts of 
the soul. Later in this chapter I will caution against assuming that when Aristotle talks about that 
which comes ἐξ ἔθους or of ἐθισμός he has in mind the narrow sense, and suggest that we ask 
instead what might be involved in the practice of virtuous actions without any prejudice about 
the nature of the process. 
                                                             
17 See Sorabji (1973-74, pp.126-129), Kraut (2012, p.539). 
18 See for example Vasiliou (1996, pp.779-780). 
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1.2.3 A STALEMATE 
Challengers to the traditional, non-rational view of moral virtue are right, I believe, to maintain 
that the phenomena they point to – the agent’s knowledge, her deliberated choice, her possession 
of right reason, and so on – are, at the very least, intimately associated with moral virtue, and that 
a picture of moral virtue that does not account for these phenomena seems to miss out much of 
what we take being a morally virtuous person to consist in. They are right, too, I believe, to be 
sceptical of accounts of the developmental process which assume from the outset what I will 
suggest is an overly narrow view of the nature of the process by which moral virtue is achieved 
(according to which habituation is a purely non-rational process, which trains only the subject’s 
orektikon).19  
Yet challenges of the sort sketched above have met with resistance from defenders of the 
traditional view, who argue simply that the textual evidence overwhelmingly supports their view. 
Moss notably argues that “the interpretation on which virtue is wholly a state of the non-rational 
soul is so straightforward that we should only abandon it if there is clear textual evidence against 
it” (Moss, 2012, p.165).20 She argues much the same for the process by which virtue is brought 
about, which she takes to be unequivocally non-rational.21 On this view, the phenomena to which 
intellectualists point are simply not within the purview of the state of moral virtue, and thus not 
among that which is to be accounted for in providing an account of the development of moral 
virtue through habituation.22  
To this extent the debate reaches a stalemate. Both sides can adduce textual evidence in 
support of their view of the nature of moral virtue, and I suspect that each side remains unmoved 
by the textual considerations adduced by the other simply because each accords more weight to 
                                                             
19 It is worth noting, however, that certain intellectualists are reacting against a picture of habituation which is 
not held by all supporters of the traditional view. Sorabji, for example, presents his view as an antidote to a picture 
which takes habituation to be “a mindless process suﬃcient for making men good” (1973-74, p.201). As we will see in 
Chapter 3, certain commentators have assumed such a picture in the past, but in arguing that habituation is non-
rational, the traditionalist need not be committed to the view that it is non-cognitive or mindless. This view turns on 
a false equation of the non-rational with the non-cognitive. Habituation may, as Moss has recently argued, involve 
the training of non-rational cognition (2012, p.158ﬀ ).  
Nevertheless, granting even that to conceive of habituation as non-rational is not necessarily to conceive of it as 
non-cognitive or mindless, I will argue in §1.5 below that the assumption that habituation is non-rational is not-clearly 
warranted, and may limit our resources for explaining the learner’s development. 
20 She goes on to argue that the phenomena to which intellectualists point can be accommodated within the 
traditional view (2012, pp.166-169). 
21 Though not, as she argues, non-cognitive, since it involves thought in the form of perception and phantasia, 
both of which are ‘cognitive’ capacities. 
22 For criticism of intellectualist accounts, see also Smith (1996). 
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one kind of evidence over the other. For traditionalists it is irrefutable that Aristotle divides the 
virtues in accordance with the division of the soul, and they take it that this provides 
insurmountable evidence that the moral virtues are non-rational. Intellectualists or other 
detractors of the traditional view, meanwhile, take it that – whatever Aristotle says of the division 
of the soul and the virtues in NE I 13 and EE II – his subsequent discussion of moral virtue clearly 
reveals moral virtue to consist in far more than the good condition of an agent’s non-rational 
desires; this, they take it, is far more important and worthy of our consideration than his brief, 
introductory remarks concerning the division of the virtues in accordance with the division of the 
soul. The positions are so entrenched it is diﬃcult to see how one side could ever persuade the 
other of the need to account (only or also) for the phenomena they take to constitute moral virtue, 
and how these develop. 
This would seem then to present a problem if we are attempting to produce an account of the 
development of virtue, for how do we know what must be accounted for in light of such strong 
disagreement? Must we simply adopt a position within this debate, and accept that proponents 
of the opposing view will remain unconvinced by the developmental account thus proposed? And 
must the developmental account assume a picture of habituation either as non-rational or rational 
from the outset, depending on the picture of moral virtue that has been adopted? 
1.3 BECOMING A VIRTUOUS AGENT, ENGAGING IN VIRTUOUS ACTIVITY 
Given the importance that attaches to the topic of moral development, but also in light of the 
stalemate that is easily reached within the traditional framing of the question, I suggest we can 
make progress by reconsidering what it is we wish to account for when producing an account of 
how, for Aristotle, we develop as moral beings. The approach I propose involves a shift of focus, 
away from thinking about how we come to acquire a certain sort of state, towards the question of 
how we come to be agents of certain sorts, and to engage in the kind of activity on which Aristotle 
insists our flourishing importantly depends. For the human good, for Aristotle, depends not 
simply on our being in a certain sort of state, but on the exercise of that state in action.  
1.3.1 THE HUMAN GOOD AND VIRTUOUS ACTIVITY 
Take, for example, the following passage from Book 1, in which Aristotle makes an important 
proviso before embarking on his discussion of virtue. He writes, here, that it presumably makes 
no small diﬀerence:  
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whether we suppose that the best [good] consists in possessing or in using, that is, in a state 
or in activity. For it is possible for the state to be present, but to produce no good, such as 
when sleeping, or when inactive in some other way, but the same is not true of the activity; 
for it will necessarily act and act well. And just as in the Olympics it is not the finest and 
strongest who are crowned, but those who are competing – since it is only these who win – 
the same is true in life; among the fine and good people, only those who act correctly become 
winners. 
διαφέρει δὲ ἴσως οὐ μικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἢ χρήσει τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν, καὶ ἐν ἕξει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ. 
τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἕξιν ἐνδέχεται μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν ὑπάρχουσαν, οἷον τῷ καθεύδοντι ἢ καὶ 
ἄλλως πως ἐξηργηκότι, τὴν δ᾽ ἐνέργειαν οὐχ οἷόν τε: πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ εὖ πράξει. 
ὥσπερ δ᾽ Ὀλυμπίασιν οὐχ οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι στεφανοῦνται ἀλλ᾽ οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι 
(τούτων γάρ τινες νικῶσιν), οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν κἀγαθῶν οἱ πράττοντες ὀρθῶς 
ἐπήβολοι γίνονται (1098b31-99a7). 
The aim of the Ethics, as we have already seen, is that we become good and achieve eudaimonia, 
and Aristotle here makes clear that this depends not simply on our possessing a certain state, but 
in our using it; that is, in a certain kind of activity. It is, I think, a great insight of Aristotle’s that, 
unlike not only plants but in an important sense non-human animals too, we are by nature 
practical beings, and that our flourishing thus depends importantly on our perfection as agents, 
capable of a distinctive type of practical activity. If we take seriously Aristotle’s thought that the 
human good depends on activity and not just the possession of a state, when we ask how we are 
to become good, we should be concerned then not simply with how we come to be in a certain sort 
of state, but how we can engage in the activity in which the human good consists. 
As Aristotle turns from the discussion of eudaimonia in general in Book 1 to the more specific 
topic of moral virtue, examining what this consists in and how it is developed, it becomes clearer 
still that moral virtue itself is something deeply related to action and activity: it is a disposition 
towards feeling and action (1106b24-25); it finds its exercise in actions (1104a29b3); choice and 
deliberation are concerned with the practical (1111b4-1113a15) and the character sketches of NE 
III and IV make repeated references to the kinds of actions that such agents perform. Indeed, the 
importance of activity continues to be asserted even in the closing book of the Ethics when 
Aristotle returns to the topic of moral development in NE X 9. Here he reiterates the claim of the 
earlier books that “knowing about virtue is not suﬃcient, rather we must try to possess and to use 
it, or to become good in any other way (οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἱκανὸν τὸ εἰδέναι, ἀλλ᾽ ἔχειν καὶ 
χρῆσθαι πειρατέον, ἢ εἴ πως ἄλλως ἀγαθοὶ γινόμεθα)” (1179b2-4) and continues again to 
emphasise the importance of our engaging in certain forms of activity and conducting ourselves 
in a certain way. He writes, for example that: 
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living temperately and hardily is not pleasant to the many, especially not the young. That is 
why it is necessary for upbringing and practices to have been organised by laws; for it will not 
be painful to them when they have become accustomed to them (my emphasis). 
τὸ γὰρ σωφρόνως καὶ καρτερικῶς ζῆν οὐχ ἡδὺ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἄλλως τε καὶ νέοις. διὸ νόμοις δεῖ 
τετάχθαι τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα: οὐκ ἔσται γὰρ λυπηρὰ συνήθη γενόμενα (1179b32-
35). 
Once again, the passage stresses the importance not of our being in a certain sort of state, but of 
our conducting ourselves in a particular sort of way. And that such conduct is what our good 
consists in is emphasised again some lines later when he writes that “someone who is to be good 
must have been finely brought up and habituated, and then live in decent practices, doing base 
things neither unwillingly nor willingly” (τὸν ἐσόμενον ἀγαθὸν τραφῆναι καλῶς δεῖ καὶ ἐθισθῆναι, 
εἶθ᾽ οὕτως ἐν ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἐπιεικέσι ζῆν καὶ μήτ᾽ ἄκοντα μήθ᾽ ἑκόντα πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα, 
1180a14-17). Both passages moreover point to an important connection between our upbringing 
and habits, and the practices we are thus able to engage in later as a result of this.  
Thus, given Aristotle’s repeated emphasis on the need to exercise virtue in action, and his 
recognition that our flourishing depends importantly on our activity as practical beings, it seems 
not only reasonable, but in many ways a pressing question, to ask not simply how we come to 
acquire a certain state, but how we come to be agents of the sort Aristotle describes and to engage 
in the activities that are exercises of virtue and on which our flourishing depends. This, I am 
claiming, is the question to ask in attempting to understand Aristotle on moral development.  
So what does the activity of the mature virtuous agent look like? 
1.3.2 THE ACTIVITY OF THE VIRTUOUS AGENT 
The activity of the mature agent, and the diﬀerence between this and the activity of the learner, 
will be the focus of the next chapter. But it will be helpful nonetheless to give a brief sketch here 
of what the activity of the mature agent looks like. First, and perhaps obviously, the mature 
virtuous agent performs virtuous actions;23 indeed her virtue makes her “most capable” (μάλιστα 
δυνάμεθα) of doing these things: 
For abstaining from pleasures we become temperate, and having become temperate, we are 
most capable of abstaining from these. It is similar with bravery; habituating ourselves to 
scorn frightening things and to stand firm against them, we become brave, having become 
brave we shall be most capable of standing firm against frightening things. 
                                                             
23 We will discuss what is meant by virtuous action further in the next chapter. 
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ἔκ τε γὰρ τοῦ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν γινόμεθα σώφρονες, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνάμεθα 
ἀπέχεσθαι αὐτῶν: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας: ἐθιζόμενοι γὰρ καταφρονεῖν τῶν φοβερῶν 
καὶ ὑπομένειν αὐτὰ γινόμεθα ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνησόμεθα ὑπομένειν τὰ 
φοβερά (1104a29-b3). 
The actions that the virtuous agent performs accord with right reason (κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον) 
(1103b32), and hit what Aristotle calls in NE II 6 ‘the mean’. The brave person, for example: 
[is one who] stands firm against and fears what he should, for the right end, in the right way 
and at the right time, and is likewise confident; for the brave person acts and feels according 
to worth and as reason prescribes. 
ὁ μὲν οὖν ἃ δεῖ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ 
θαρρῶν, ἀνδρεῖος: κατ᾽ ἀξίαν γάρ, καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος, πάσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος (115b17-
20). 
To anticipate our discussion in the next chapter, however, it is not simply that the virtuous agent 
performs these actions, but she does so knowingly, she chooses them and chooses them for their 
own sake, and she acts from a stable and unchanging state (1105a31-33). We can add to this that 
the virtuous agent deliberates well and she is able herself to discern what is required of her by way 
of action in the particular situations with which she is confronted (1104a8-9). But this 
discernment with regards to action is not a matter of applying a principle or rule to a particular 
situation; the morally virtuous agent is able to read the details of particular situations correctly 
(1143a33-34), she sees particular details as morally salient and this perception of situations is part 
of what it is to be a morally virtuous agent.  The virtuous agent has a developed moral perception 
(1142a27-30), and what is true and good appears so to her (1113a29-b1, 1176a15-19). 
Aristotle’s discussions reveal that the virtuous agent is a lover of the fine (1099a13). The actions 
that are expressions of the virtues are fine, and she aims at the fine (1120a24). Aristotle makes 
explicit that the generous agent, for example, will act for the sake of the fine (τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα) in 
her giving and will give correctly (1120a24-25). Not only that, but she will do this with pleasure 
(1120a27), and the pleasure and pain that a virtuous agent takes in action is a sign of her character 
(see NE II 3). Action in accordance with virtue is pleasant, and the morally virtuous agent indeed 
has a proper conception of what is truly pleasant (1104b3-34; 1179b15). 
Importantly, unlike the enkratic person, who abides by her reasoning and acts correctly in 
spite of her base appetites (1145b13-14), the virtuous agent’s non-rational appetites and spirited 
desires are good (1146a12), being directed towards the right objects and admitting of neither 
excess nor deficiency. The morally virtuous agent also experiences emotions “at the right times, 
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about the right things, toward the right people, for the right end, and in the right way” (1106b21-
22); as with her actions, in feeling she hits the mean. 
This then is the activity of the mature virtuous agent. It is a highly demanding picture of 
mature moral activity but also, I believe, an attractive one. And I submit that it is how we become 
agents of this sort and to engage in this activity, in this way, that we should be attempting to 
account for in developing an account of Aristotelian moral development. 
1.3.3 A MORE NEUTRAL STARTING POINT 
To put our question in this way is not to deny that there is value in investigating what kind of state 
moral virtue is, nor to claim that the development of virtuous agency and realisation of virtuous 
activity are unrelated to the question of how a virtuous state of character is acquired. Indeed, our 
being virtuous agents and engaging in virtuous activity depends importantly on our having correct 
desires, settled ways of valuing, and so forth; actions, Aristotle makes clear, flow from characters.24 
And to the extent, as we will discover, that virtuous agency and activity importantly depends on 
the agent’s choice, in asking how we develop as virtuous agents we will cover much the same 
ground as traditional approaches, asking for example how an agent develops the disposition to 
choose as a virtuous agent does. But our question demands that we keep in mind that an agent’s 
choices are choices with respect to action (see esp. 1105a32), and that she must not only value the 
right things, but be able to act well in the relevant situations in which she finds herself. Putting 
our question in this way takes seriously Aristotle’s central concern that we must learn to act 
virtuously and thus to engage in virtuous activity, a concern that is in danger of being overlooked 
if our focus is restricted merely to how we come to acquire a certain state. 
My hope, moreover, in putting the question this way, is that we may avoid the stalemate that 
traditional approaches to the topic are apt to arrive at, for I suggest that the concepts of virtuous 
activity and agency present a less controversial starting point than does the question of what sort 
of state moral virtue is and what part of the soul it belongs to.25 Aristotle’s discussions of virtuous 
activity from Book II-IV provide concrete evidence of what this consists in, and the above sketch 
of the activity of the virtuous agent ought to be a picture about which both traditionalists and 
                                                             
24 For discussion of this see Lawrence (2011, p.236-7). 
25 To the extent that actions flow from characters, the question of what character consists in may still loom, 
although a traditionalist who maintains, for example, that ‘character’ refers to a subject’s desiderative and not 
intellectual states, could still allow that an agent must be in a certain intellectual state if she is to engage in virtuous 
activity, and that the development of intellectual capacities as well as desiderative capacities (if those are assumed to 
be distinct) needs to be explained if we are to explain how we come to engage in the relevant sort of activity.  
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their detractors can agree. Regardless of whether moral virtue is thought to belong only to the 
non-rational part of the soul or to the rational part as well, and so whether it is thought to be a 
non-rational or partly rational state, both groups should be able to agree that the above sketch is 
how Aristotle presents the activity of the mature virtuous agent.26 I want now to return to the 
question of the process by which Aristotle claims that virtuous agency and activity are realised. 
1.4 VIRTUOUS ACTIVITY IS REALISED THROUGH PRACTICE 
We are trying to understand how, according to Aristotle, we become virtuous and to realise the 
virtuous activity on which our flourishing as moral beings depends. We saw in the Introduction 
that Aristotle’s explanation of how this is eﬀected is that we become virtuous through a process 
of habituation, which itself consists in the doing of just and temperate things (1103a17-b25). Our 
task, I explained, is to consider precisely what happens when a learner does these just and 
temperate things and how this results in the realisation of virtue.  
In this chapter so far, I have encouraged a shift in focus in what we are trying to explain, away 
from the question of how the state of moral virtue is acquired, to the question of how we become 
virtuous agents and come to engage successfully in virtuous activity. Given this shift in focus, one 
might wonder whether we can thus begin from the same starting point, namely Aristotle’s claim 
that moral virtue comes about through habituation and, specifically, the doing of just and 
temperate things. The reason one might be reticent, is that Aristotle’s discussion in NE II 1 is 
phrased in terms of the acquisition of a state, rather than the realisation of an activity (see esp. 
1103b21-22). Why think that the activity described in §1.3.2 is realised entirely through the practice 
of just and temperate things? 
Now in one sense, this worry is unwarranted if it is the worry that one could possess the state 
but stand in need of something further if one is to engage in its corresponding activity, for to 
                                                             
26 There may be a temptation to characterise this activity as either non-rational or rational; I take it that 
intellectualists or other detractors from the traditionalist view would argue that the role of knowledge and reason in 
this activity render it in part rational, and the activity is thus evidence that moral virtue is a rational state. I suggest, 
however, that it will be helpful to resist characterising virtuous agency and activity in terms of being non-rational, 
rational or intellectual. For whilst virtuous activity may involve the exercise of capacities of one or both parts of the 
soul, to characterise it as rational or non-rational may encourage a certain prejudice with regards to how we conceive 
of the process by which our virtuous agency is developed, a prejudice it is my intention to avoid.  
That is not to say, of course, that certain kinds of processes are not more suited to the development of certain 
kinds of capacities. But we need not assume at the outset that what we are describing, for example, is the development 
of a non-rational state, and that this needs to be explained by appeal to a purely non-rational process. 
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possess the state of moral virtue is to have the capacity to engage in virtuous activity.27 In this 
respect, virtuous activity can be regarded as the actuality to which the state is a potentiality.28 If 
the state of moral virtue is acquired through the habituation process described in NE II 1, then so 
too is the capacity to engage in virtuous activity.  
Indeed, as we saw in §1.3.2. above, at the end of NE II 2 Aristotle stresses that the actions that 
are the sources both of the emergence and growth of the virtues, and of their ruin, are also those 
in which the virtues find their exercise, informing us that when we are temperate and brave, we 
will be most capable of abstaining from pleasures and standing firm against frightening things 
(1104a29-b3). Indeed, the passage indicates not only that one who has the moral virtues is then 
capable of virtuous activity, but also points to the connection between being properly habituated 
and having practised certain sorts of actions, and being able to engage in the relevant activity.  
But there is another sense in which this worry requires a little more attention. For a 
traditionalist might argue that the activity described in §1.3.2 is in fact a composite activity and 
involves the active exercise of two states: moral virtue and practical wisdom. In the case of acting 
justly, a traditionalist might argue that the various non-rational desires, pleasures and pathē that 
are active at the time are to be identified with the exercise of the agent’s state of moral virtue, 
whilst the agent’s knowledge of what to do in those particular circumstances, her good 
deliberation and so forth, are to be identified with the exercise of her practical wisdom.29 And 
furthermore, the traditionalist may argue, it is only the former which are developed through 
habituation. The agent’s knowledge of what to do and capacity to deliberate well must be 
developed in some other way. Thus, she might conclude one of two things. If we are seeking to 
explain how this composite activity is realised, we need to consider what other processes in 
addition to habituation contribute to its realisation, and cannot focus only on Aristotle’s remarks 
                                                             
27 This is setting aside the question of whether certain external goods may need to be present to enable the 
virtuous agent to act virtuously.  So long as external factors do not prevent an agent from acting, she will be able to 
realise virtuous activity if she possesses the state of moral virtue.  
28 Of course, Aristotle makes clear in NE II 5 that virtue is a hexis, not a dunamis, but in this context he means 
by dunamis “what we have when we are said to be capable of feelings [such as anger, fear etc] – capable of being angry, 
for instance, or of being afraid or of feeling pity (δυνάμεις δὲ καθ᾽ ἃς παθητικοὶ τούτων λεγόμεθα, οἷον καθ᾽ ἃς δυνατοὶ 
ὀργισθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἢ ἐλεῆσαι)” (1105b23-15). This does not prevent us from understanding the possession of the 
state of moral virtue in terms of thus having the potential to engage in virtuous activity, which is its actualisation.  
29 Moss comes close to making this point in §7.3 of her (2012; see especially n.40, p.169). See also Joachim (1951, 
p.76). Cf. Lorenz (2009, p.203). 
One might respond to this by saying that the actions and activities described in Books II-IV are clearly presented 
as the activity of moral virtue. And thus the intellectualist might argue that the fact that such activity includes far 
more than an agent’s having certain non-rational desires and passions only supports their contention that moral virtue 
is more than the good state of the agent’s orektikon. 
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on habituation.30 Or alternatively, if our interest is really in the development of moral virtue 
through habituation and the practice of virtuous actions, we need only think about how the 
practice of these actions moulds an agent’s non-rational desires and feelings. We are back to the 
position outlined in §1.2.1.  
Whether or not the activity of the mature agent described in §1.3.2 should be regarded as 
consisting in the exercise of one state or of two, there are good reasons for thinking that it is 
through the process of habituation, consisting in the practice of virtuous actions, that mature 
virtuous activity is realised. We have already seen that moral virtue is a disposition towards action 
and not merely towards feeling (1106b24-25), and it would be somewhat strange if by this 
Aristotle meant only that it is a disposition to experience certain emotions and non-rational 
desires, and that the other features of the virtuous agent’s virtuously performed actions were not 
included in this ‘disposition towards action’. Moreover, when Aristotle produces his character 
sketches in Books III-IV (prior, indeed, to the discussion of phronēsis in Book VI) and points to 
the kinds of actions and activities in which morally virtuous agents are engaged, these are clearly 
presented as the outcome of the process described in NE II 1. Nowhere does Aristotle say that the 
practice of virtuous actions is necessary but not suﬃcient for an agent to engage in such activity. 
The implication is rather than if an agent has been well habituated and practiced well, then she 
will be such as to successfully engage in these various activities.  
Finally, in NE II 4 the topic under consideration is clearly moral virtue and what it is to act 
virtuously. And there Aristotle makes clear that an agent’s acting virtuously consists in her 
knowing and choosing, as well as her being in a certain stable state. And it is through doing just 
and temperate things that one comes to be in this condition.31 Again, at no point in this passage 
does Aristotle write that the practice of just and temperate things is merely necessary but not 
                                                             
30 This conclusion would then be close to the intellectualist position discussed in §1.2.2, where we saw that certain 
intellectualists argue that since moral virtue consists in more than a state of the non-rational part of the soul, 
habituation cannot be suﬃcient to bring it about, and it must thus be supplemented by another intellectual process. 
31 Admittedly, when Aristotle writes that “these things come about through doing and temperate things many 
times (ἅπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις πράττειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα περιγίνεται)” (1105b4-5), the ‘ἅπερ’ might be supposed to 
refer only to the second two conditions of virtuously performed action, namely the choice and stability conditions, 
which were the subject of the previous line. But the context of the previous line also reveals that Aristotle’s intention 
here is to emphasise the importance of the choice and stability conditions with respect to acting virtuously (by 
contrast with acting skilfully), so his emphasis here on these two conditions coming about through the practice of 
virtuous actions need not be taken to indicate that the knowledge condition does not come about through practice. 
Alternatively, one might follow Bywater and Burnet in amending the text to εἴπερ. Burnet thus takes the subject 
of περιγίνεται to be τό τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν (1900, p.87). 
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suﬃcient to act in this way and so for the realisation of mature virtuous activity; the strong 
implication of the passage is rather that it is suﬃcient.  
The clear implication of these discussions is that the activity of a mature virtuous agent, 
consisting in virtuously performing virtuous actions, is realised through the process of habituation 
and practice of virtuous actions outlined in NE II 1. What we do not yet know, of course, is just 
what is involved in the practice of virtuous actions, and how it is that such practice leads to our 
becoming agents of certain sorts and realising mature virtuous activity. Our task from now 
onwards is to consider what concretely this ‘habituation’ process amounts to, just what it is the 
learner does and how such a process enables her to achieve the end of virtuous agency and activity.  
1.5 THE NATURE OF THE PROCESS REVISITED  
In the final part of this chapter I want to address a remaining preconception that may be had, 
concerning the nature of the habituation process. For even if one accepts my proposed change in 
focus, and also agrees with the conclusion of the previous section, that virtuous agency and 
activity are realised through the practice of virtuous actions, one may nevertheless argue that one 
assumption of the traditional view is surely well-founded, namely that habituation is non-rational. 
And yet just as I argued that we should not foreclose the question of what is eﬀected through the 
practice of virtuous actions, by assuming that all that is eﬀected is a good state of the orektikon, I 
believe that we should not foreclose the question of the nature of this process by assuming at the 
outset that it is non-rational. Indeed, as I will presently show, it is by no means clear that this 
assumption is in fact supported by the text.  
First, however, let me be clear that my worry is not, as some have implied, that to characterise 
the process as non-rational is thus to assume also that it is non-cognitive and thus in some sense 
‘mindless’.  As Moss (2012, 158ﬀ) has recently and forcefully argued, it simply does not follow from 
the fact that a process is non-rational, that it is also non-cognitive, for it may involve the shaping 
of non-rational cognition. My worry is rather that in characterising the process as non-rational, 
we are in danger of excluding from our account of what happens in the course of the learner’s 
practice the involvement of any form of reason – on the part of the developing subject and those 
by whom she is guided – and with it a number of potential sources of learning.  
It is certainly not implausible to suppose that part of the developmental process will involve 
the learner forming beliefs and reflecting on her actions and own psychological states (a reflection 
that can take place both in the course of her acting, but also between occasions of acting). Our 
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capacity for reflection may be diﬃcult to place within Aristotle’s schema of the soul and its parts, 
but I submit that by insisting that habituation is non-rational many commentators are led to 
exclude from this process a role for belief formation and reflection. Likewise, it is plausible to 
suppose that the habituation process could involve certain promptings, encouragements and 
explanations from a more developed agent in the course of a learner’s practice. And yet again, the 
insistence that the developmental process is non-rational discourages many from attributing any 
role for promptings and explanations in eﬀecting the learner’s psychological development.  
Given the plausibility of the thought that promptings, explanations, reflections and so on 
might be involved in the learner’s practice of virtuous actions, I submit that in the absence of 
strong textual evidence to the contrary, it is desirable to leave it an open possibility that these 
might be included in the habituation process, at least as we begin our investigation. 
1.5.1 WE SHOULD NOT ASSUME THAT HABITUATION IS NON-RATIONAL 
But is it not simply obvious, our objector may argue, that the habituation process is non-rational? 
Many commentators take it to be so (see esp. Moss 2012, Curzer 2012). But it is worth noting, 
first, that Aristotle does not himself describe it as non-rational (alogon) in NE II 1 or thereafter. 
He merely contrasts what comes about from habit with what is acquired by teaching on the one 
hand, and what is had by nature on the other, without calling these ‘logon’ or ‘alogon’.  
Nevertheless, there are two pieces of evidence to which commentators have pointed to 
support their contention that habituation is non-rational; in the final part of this chapter I will 
show that these pieces of putative evidence do not in fact support this contention, with a view to 
beginning our investigation with a more open view of the developmental process. 
1.5.1.1 ‘ACTION AND FEELING AS WHAT DOES THE WORK’ 
In support of the thought that the habituation process is non-rational, Moss points out that 
Aristotle’s discussion not only makes no mention of an intellectual component of habituation, 
but “explicitly present[s] the repetition of actions and passions as what does the work” (Moss, 
2012, p.171). In support of this thought, she cites both Aristotle’s claim that it is “by acting as we 
do in terrifying situations, and accustoming ourselves to fear or to be confident some become 
brave, some cowardly (πράττοντες δὲ τὰ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς καὶ ἐθιζόμενοι φοβεῖσθαι ἢ θαρρεῖν οἳ μὲν 
ἀνδρεῖοι οἳ δὲ δειλοί)” (NE 1103b16-17), and his discussion of the involvement of pleasure and 
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pain in habituation (NE 1104b8-12; EE 1237a1-7). Thus, she argues, we have good reason to regard 
the process as non-rational.  
Now, Moss is right that Aristotle’s remarks in the early chapters of Book II do not make any 
explicit reference to there being intellectual aspects of habituation. She is right too that ‘acting in 
dangerous situations’ and ‘feeling fear and confidence’ are not what we would automatically 
consider to be ‘intellectual’ activities; if, at least, we take as a paradigm of intellectual activity 
something like engaging in argument or giving a mathematical demonstration. But whilst 
Aristotle’s insistence that habituation consists in performing virtuous actions and experiencing 
appropriate feelings means that an account of how we develop as moral agents must have at its 
centre the idea that we develop by acting and feeling in certain ways, this does not tell us anything 
about what is involved (or not involved) in the course of practising virtuous actions and 
experiencing the corresponding feelings. Why should we assume that the practice of virtuous 
actions, at least, is something that should be regarded as ‘non-rational’? By way of contrast with 
the paradigm of intellectual activity, I suspect that when Moss argues that ‘doing the actions’ 
cannot be intellectual, the paradigm of action she has in mind is something like running: when 
we become fit by running, we clearly do not think that we become fit by some rational means. But 
why think that virtuous action is anything like running? 
Our purpose (though admittedly not Moss’) is precisely to understand what the thesis that 
‘we become virtuous by performing virtuous actions’ amounts to, and we cannot assume at the 
outset anything about the nature of such performance from the statement of that thesis alone.  
Aristotle is certainly clear that the student must herself perform the relevant actions and 
experience the relevant passions, but this does not in itself exclude the idea that the student’s 
practice could involve the formation of, or appeal to, beliefs; modes of reflection; the promptings 
or explanations of a parent and the internalisation of these; nor indeed that the student may make 
moral progress between occasions of acting.  
1.5.1.2 THE CONTRAST WITH TEACHING AND LOGOS 
Even so, Moss and others argue that the way in which the concept of habituation is introduced at 
the start of NE II 1 – that is, as contrasted with teaching – gives us reason to suppose that the 
habituation process is non-rational, and moreover that it cannot involve any form of teaching or 
explanation as I have suggested it might.  
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Now, as I have already maintained, these two processes are not characterised as rational or 
non-rational in NE II 1, so the distinction itself does not give us reason for supposing that 
habituation is entirely non-rational. There is, however, a passage later in the work in which 
habituation is contrasted not only with teaching, but with logos too, implying that the habituation 
process should thus be regarded as alogon. This passage is found in NE X 9 when Aristotle returns 
to the topic of moral education and having revived the distinction from NE II 1 between teaching, 
habit and nature goes on to claim that: 
Logos and teaching do not have power in all cases, but the soul of the listener must have been 
prepared beforehand by habits to rejoice and to hate in a fine way, like the ground that is to 
nourish the seed. For he who lives according to feeling would not even listen to logos turning 
him away nor would he understand it. How could someone living in such a state be persuaded 
to change? For generally it seems that passion yields not to reason but to force. 
ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ μή ποτ᾽ οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἰσχύει, ἀλλὰ δεῖ προδιειργάσθαι τοῖς ἔθεσι τὴν 
τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ μισεῖν, ὥσπερ γῆν τὴν θρέψουσαν τὸ σπέρμα. 
οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσειε λόγου ἀποτρέποντος οὐδ᾽ αὖ συνείη ὁ κατὰ πάθος ζῶν: τὸν δ᾽ οὕτως 
ἔχοντα πῶς οἷόν τε μεταπεῖσαι; ὅλως τ᾽ οὐ δοκεῖ λόγῳ ὑπείκειν τὸ πάθος ἀλλὰ βίᾳ (1179b20-
29). 
The apparent contrast here between logos and teaching on the one hand, and habit on the other, 
Moss takes as evidence that habituation cannot involve reason or teaching; Curzer too claims on 
the basis of this passage that “habituation must precede ‘argument and teaching’ …The two 
activities are not mingled” (2012 p.323). And yet I submit that the context of the passage does not 
allow us to draw such a conclusion. Let us take a look at this context. 
Aristotle begins this passage by asking whether the decision to investigate happiness, virtue 
and other topics has reached its end, and immediately reminds us that the goal in ethics is not 
simply to know but to possess and exercise virtue, and become good in any way (1179a33-b4). He 
then reflects that if ‘logoi’ alone were suﬃcient to make people decent, their rewards would be 
many and great (1179b4-7). But it seems in fact that these have the power to stimulate and 
encourage only the well-born who truly love what is fine; they are unable to turn the many toward 
being fine and good (1179b7-10). He then writes that: 
For the many do not obey shame but fear, and nor do they keep away from shameful things 
because of disgrace but because of punishments: for living by passion they pursue their proper 
pleasures and the sources of these, and avoid the opposing pains, having no idea of the fine 
and truly pleasant, having no taste of it. What logos could reform these? For it is impossible 
or not easy to change by logos that which has long been seized by habits.  
οὐ γὰρ πεφύκασιν αἰδοῖ πειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ φόβῳ, οὐδ᾽ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν φαύλων διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν 
ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας: πάθει γὰρ ζῶντες τὰς οἰκείας ἡδονὰς διώκουσι καὶ δι᾽ ὧν αὗται ἔσονται, 
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φεύγουσι δὲ τὰς ἀντικειμένας λύπας, τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡδέος οὐδ᾽ ἔννοιαν ἔχουσιν, 
ἄγευστοι ὄντες. τοὺς δὴ τοιούτους τίς ἂν λόγος μεταρρυθμίσαι; οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἢ οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὰ 
ἐκ παλαιοῦ τοῖς ἤθεσι κατειλημμένα λόγῳ μεταστῆσαι (1179b11-18). 
And concludes that we will be happy to achieve some share of virtue if we have what we seem to 
need to become decent (1179b18-20). It is at this point, then, that Aristotle returns to the question 
of the contributions to goodness made by nature, habit and teaching (1179b20-21) and having 
claimed that the contribution of nature is clearly not up to us (1179b21-23), goes on to claim that 
logos and teaching do not have power in all cases, but that the soul of the student must have been 
prepared by habits to enjoy and hate finely, as we saw in the passage above.  
Now, what this context reveals is that in the passage quoted (1179b20-29), Aristotle is not 
contrasting habituation with logos and teaching per se, he is rather concerned with the fact that 
logos and teaching alone are not suﬃcient to make someone good; we need to have tasted fine 
things and learned to love and to hate finely if logoi are to be persuasive. Indeed, if we are not 
taught to love and hate finely, and instead live only kata pathos, logoi will certainly not have the 
power to transform us if our characters have already been formed in a particular way.  
The passage is thus not intended to contrast habituation with teaching and logos per se, and 
thus does not support the contention that habituation is a non-rational process; it is rather 
intended to show that teaching and argument will be ineﬃcacious unless a person also gains 
experience of the fine, which is compatible with the thought that her habituation might involve 
some element of logos.32 
1.5.1.3 PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL TEACHING 
I have argued so far that the texts do not support the contention that the habituation process is 
alogon, and have claimed that it is plausible to suppose that the learner’s practice of virtuous 
actions could be accompanied by descriptions or explanations on the part of her parents or other 
guides. In the absence of textual evidence to the contrary, we should leave this possibility open in 
developing our account. This view is shared, amongst others, by Sherman who writes that: 
                                                             
32 In fact, there is positive evidence in this chapter that Aristotle does envisage some role for logoi in the course 
of the child’s training. First, as we saw, he does acknowledge the power of logoi to stimulate and encourage the well 
born (1179b7-10).  And later in the passage, when he turns to the question of whether individuals or the community 
should be responsible for the moral upbringing of the young, Aristotle notes that “just as in a city, laws and characters 
have power, so too in the home do a father’s words (λόγοι) and habits, or even more because of kinship and 
beneficence” (1180b3-6). The context of the discussion makes clear that Aristotle has in mind early education, rather 
than the later stage of education in which a student might attend his lectures, and thus that in this early stage, the 
logoi of a parent do play a role. 
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Aristotle would probably object to the practice of the parent who says, ‘Do this, don’t do that’ 
without further descriptions or explanations. The child can legitimately ask ‘why,’ and some 
description and explanation will be in order. […] This is included as a part of habituation 
(1989, 172–3).  
And yet certain commentators, notably Curzer, have remained resistant to this thought, and have 
supposed that there is strong textual evidence to discredit this view. In response to Sherman, 
Curzer writes that whilst she is right to maintain that descriptions and explanations are crucial to 
the overall process of moral development:  
there is no reason to think that Aristotle would include them within the notion of 
habituation. Description and explanation are teaching, and Aristotle insists that successful 
teaching presupposes successful habituation. He denies that descriptions and explanations 
should accompany parental commands and exhortations (2012, p.322).33 
The claim that Aristotle denies that descriptions and explanations should accompany parental 
commands is very strong, and not one that to my knowledge is supported by any text (nor does 
Curzer cite any text in support of this claim). Not only that, but there is in fact positive evidence 
in both NE II 1 and X 9 to suggest that Aristotle does grant a role for teaching in the student’s 
practice of virtuous actions. We have already seen the evidence in NE X 9 that a father’s habits 
and logoi have power in the development of his children (1180b3-6), but there is an even earlier 
indication of the need for teachers in a learner’s habituation in Aristotle’s analogy with skills in 
NE II 1. Having told us that we acquire the moral virtues through practice of actions in accordance 
with the virtues, Aristotle notes that as with skills, virtues and vices arise from the same kinds of 
activities. In the case of building, it is by building well that we become a good builder, and by 
building badly, that we become a bad builder; if this were not the case, he tells us, there would be 
                                                             
33 Curzer’s primary target is Burnyeat, who, having shown that for Aristotle our knowledge of virtuous actions 
comes about through habituation, claims that:  
If the student is to have ‘the that’ for which the doctrines in Aristotle’s lectures provide the explanatory 
‘because’, if he is to be starting out on a path which will lead to his acquiring that educated perception, 
the emphasis had better be on his knowing of specific actions that they are noble or just in specific 
circumstances. I put it as a matter of emphasis only, of degree, because often, no doubt, moral advice 
will come to him in fairly general terms; a spot of dialectic may be needed to bring home to the young 
man the limitations and imprecision of what he has learned. But even where the advice is general, this 
need not mean he is taught that there are certain rules of justice, say, which are to be followed as a 
matter of principle, without regard for the spirit of justice and the ways in which circumstances alter 
cases (1980, p.72).  
In response to this, Curzer writes:  
But this is teaching. To call it anything else would be misleading. So although Burnyeat says that he is 
attributing to Aristotle the view that learners acquire the that by habituation, Burnyeat’s description 
of guided habituation reveals that he actually takes Aristotle’s view to be that learner’s acquire the that 
by habituation plus teaching (2012, p.322). 
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no need for teachers (οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τοῦ διδάξοντος) (1103b6-14). The case of skills, in this instance, 
is meant to be analogous with that of the virtues (οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἔχει (1103b13-14)), 
thus indicating that Aristotle does envisage some role for teaching in the course of the learner’s 
practice of virtuous actions.34 
So why then does Curzer claim that Aristotle denies a role for descriptions and explanations 
in the learner’s habituation? These, Curzer takes to fall under the category of ‘teaching’ and he 
supposes that habituation cannot include teaching, and so descriptions and explanations, on the 
assumption that teaching must be preceded by successful habituation (2012, p.322); if habituation 
is a pre-requisite for teaching, supposes Curzer, it cannot then involve teaching.  
The thought that habituation must precede teaching, and therefore cannot include any form 
of teaching, Curzer takes to be established in two passages. One is the NE X 9 passage we 
discussed above, where Aristotle claims that we must have been taught to love finely if logoi are to 
be eﬃcacious, the other is Aristotle’s claim in NE 1 4 that “this is why we need to have been well 
brought up in habits if one is to listen adequately to [lectures on] fine and just things and political 
things in general (διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἦχθαι καλῶς τὸν περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλως τῶν 
πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμενον ἱκανῶς)” (1095b4-6). But why suppose that when Aristotle claims that 
habituation is a prerequisite for teaching, or when he appears to contrast teaching with 
habituation, that he has is talking about teaching simpliciter, and thus implying that no form of 
teaching could be involved in habituation, as Curzer claims? Why not suppose that the contrast 
in NE I 4 and X 9 (and indeed at the start of II 1) is between habituation and a particular form of 
teaching, and likewise that good upbringing in habits is a prerequisite only for a particular kind 
of teaching?35 
                                                             
34 Hardie notes the significance of this passage too, and remarks further that in the Metaphysics flute playing is 
said to be acquired by habituation (1047b32): “Again, the trainer in moral virtues does not rely on habituation only, 
but also gives verbal instruction, the word itself being used later in the chapter (1103b12 tou didaxontos) in connection 
with moral virtue” (1968, p.100). 
35 Interestingly, Curzer does acknowledge that those authors who suggest that some teaching may be involved in 
habituation could have in mind a distinction between two sorts of teaching. Curzer takes the implicit distinction to 
be between “one sort of teaching [that] occurs early in the learning process and consists of telling learners which acts 
are right… [and a] second sort of teaching [that] occurs late in the learning process and consists of explaining why 
right acts are right. The former sort guides habituation; the later sort presupposes proper habits” (2012, p.323). 
Moss’ discussion suggests that it is a teaching of the latter sort that she has in mind when she dismisses a role for 
teaching in habituation. Moss presents her view as opposed to the intellectualist view that “[habituation] involves 
learning explanations of why certain actions and reactions are appropriate, why they are good” (2012, p.171), and this 
might suggest that her target is a view of teaching where the content of that teaching is explanations of why things 
are the case. As an example of an intellectualist view, Moss cites Cooper, who writes that “habituation must involve 
also (though Aristotle does not explain how it does so) the training of the mind. As the trainee becomes gradually 
used to acting in certain ways, he comes gradually to understand what he is doing and why he is doing it” (1975, p.8). 
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That Aristotle has in mind a particular form of teaching when he claims that habituation is a 
pre-requisite for teaching is supported by the contexts of the passages. I suggest that we can 
distinguish between what we might call ‘theoretical teaching’ and a form of teaching we might 
call ‘practical’.36 Theoretical teaching is the kind of teaching that occurs in lectures, dealing in 
abstract concepts, that involves the transmission of facts outside of a practical context, whilst 
practical teaching is the kind involved in the teaching of a skill, and consists in guiding a learner, 
prompting her action, imparting certain concepts in the course of the learner’s practice, and so 
on.37 And I suggest that it is the theoretical kind that Aristotle has in mind when he draws the 
contrast between teaching and habit in the passages cited above. Consider again the context of 
Aristotle’s remarks in X 9: the chapter begins with the question “if about these things and the 
virtues, and moreover about friendship and pleasure, enough has been said in outline, are we to 
suppose that we have reached our end? (ἆρ᾽ οὖν εἰ περί τε τούτων καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ φιλίας 
καὶ ἡδονῆς, ἱκανῶς εἴρηται τοῖς τύποις, τέλος ἔχειν οἰητέον τὴν προαίρεσιν;)” (1179a33-5), to which 
Aristotle’s response is that “in the practical realm, the end is not to theorise about each thing and 
to know, but rather to do them (οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς τέλος τὸ θεωρῆσαι ἕκαστα καὶ γνῶναι, 
                                                             
The reference to understanding in this remark of Cooper’s might suggest too that Cooper takes habituation to involve 
learning explanations and grasping reasons, but it is worth noting that Cooper says nothing here about the source of 
that understanding. Yet Moss, like Curzer, moves from this more specific target to the more general claim that no 
teaching of any kind is involved in habituation. 
In response to the suggestion that Aristotle might have had in mind a distinction between two sorts of teaching, 
Curzer writes: 
Aristotle does not distinguish between these two sorts of teaching. He does not mention a type of 
ethics teaching that is somehow exempt from the prerequisite of proper habits. He does not say that 
habituation must precede teaching about the because, but not teaching about other aspects of ethics. 
His claim is quite general: proper habits are a prerequisite of teaching about ethics. Unfortunately, 
Burnyeat’s interpretation of guided habituation makes habituation kick in during or after learners are 
taught which acts are virtuous. Burnyeat’s suggestion is that learners are told which acts are virtuous 
“in fairly general terms [with] a spot of dialectic.” And this contradicts Aristotle’ s claim that successful 
ethics teaching presupposes both knowledge of the that and good habits. (2012 p.323).  
Whether all teaching does indeed presuppose knowledge of the that and good habits I address directly below.  
36 This is not the same as the distinction between theoretical, or rather scientific, and practical subject matters, 
where the theoretical or scientific is concerned with universal truths, whilst the practical is to do with what can be 
otherwise (see e.g. 1140a33). For as Aristotle’s lectures demonstrate, there can be theoretical instruction about 
practical matters. My point, importantly, is that practical teaching should not be considered to be theoretical teaching 
with practical content, just as we recognise that for Aristotle practical reasoning is not simply theoretical reasoning 
with practical content.  
37 It’s worth noting that Curzer takes Burnyeat to attribute to Aristotle “the view that habituation begins with 
the learner being taught which acts are virtuous and which vicious” (2012, p.322, my emphasis), where the ‘element’ 
of teaching is prior to and independent of the learner’s habituation. But it is not clear that this is Burnyeat’s view. 
Phrases such as “what you may begin by taking on trust you can come to know for yourself ” (1980, p.81) may, 
uncharitably, be taken to imply a certain separation and ordering of instruction and habituation, but Burnyeat’s claim 
that a learner needs to be guided in their conduct indicates rather that he takes this kind of instruction to be something 
simultaneous with and inseparable from the student’s practice of virtuous actions.  
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ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ πράττειν αὐτά) (1179a35-b2). The opening lines make clear that when he is talking 
of logoi here, Aristotle is talking of the subject matter of his lectures, and that when he speaks of 
the need to have been well brought up for these to be eﬃcacious, he means that one needs to be 
well brought up in order to understand and be moved by the content of his lectures. The claim is 
not that any form of teaching or any explanations will be ineﬃcacious without some prior 
habituation. It is rather that we cannot think that citizens will become good simply by listening 
to his lectures; they need instead to engage in virtuous conduct.38 
The same is true of the NE I 4 claim. It is clear that Aristotle is speaking here of the need to 
have been well brought up and to love fine things in order to listen to lectures on politics (τῶν 
πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμενον, 1095b5). Habituation, which imparts ‘the that’39 is not a pre-requisite for 
(and so distinct from) all forms of teaching, but rather it seems for lectures on political science. 
And Aristotle would grant, I submit, that there is a distinction to be made on the one hand 
between the ability to listen adequately to and understand Aristotle’s lectures, which may indeed 
require a student to be habituated towards virtuous action, and on the other, the ability to 
understand the kind of guidance and explanation oﬀered by a parent when educating a child, 
which does not depend on the child’s already having been habituated. 
Curzer’s argument was that Aristotle regards proper habits as a pre-requisite for all forms of 
teaching about ethics, and that on these grounds we cannot suppose that habituation involves any 
form of teaching or explanation on the part of a guide, since good habits are necessary in order to 
understand such explanation. But this, I have shown, is mistaken. Aristotle not only does not 
claim that proper habits are a pre-requisite for all teaching; rather, the context of his discussion 
indicates that he regards good habits as a pre-requisite specifically for lectures on ethics, and not 
other more practical forms of teaching and explanation.  
                                                             
38 That no person has any hope of becoming good without engaging in virtuous action is stressed at 1105b11-16, 
where Aristotle concludes his argument by stating that “it is well said that the just person becomes so by doing just 
things and the temperate person by doing temperate things: and no one would ever stand a chance of becoming good 
without doing these things (εὖ οὖν λέγεται ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια πράττειν ὁ δίκαιος γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ σώφρονα ὁ 
σώφρων: ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ μελλήσειε γίνεσθαι ἀγαθός)”. The contrast he then draws with the 
many who “do not do these actions [but] taking refuge in arguments think that they are doing philosophy and that 
in this way they will become excellent people (ἀλλ᾽ οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες 
οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι)” clearly shows that Aristotle is strongly concerned about the doing 
(or not doing) of actions, and the impotence of arguments in lieu of good action to make a person good. 
39 By the ‘that’, Aristotle is typically thought to mean knowledge of virtuous actions. See Burnyeat (1980). 
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1.6 WHAT HAPPENS WHEN WE DO JUST AND TEMPERATE THINGS? 
What I have attempted to show, then, is not that habituation must involve teaching and logos – 
although the analogy with skills strongly indicates that Aristotle does envisage some role for 
teaching in habituation – but that Aristotle does not obviously conceive of the process by which 
we develop as virtuous agents as a wholly non-rational process, nor hold that it could not involve 
any sort of teaching. And for this reason, in developing our account, we should not suppose that 
any form of reason or teaching are excluded from the process.  
What is certainly clear, however, is that Aristotle regards as the most important thing in the 
developmental process that the learner herself performs virtuous actions; not only do we become 
just by doing just things, but, as he stresses at the end of NE II 4, we have no hope of becoming 
good without doing these things. Thus whilst there may be a role for teaching or reflection in the 
course of the student’s habituation, our account of how the student becomes a virtuous agent and 
capable of virtuous activity must take seriously the importance for Aristotle of her doing virtuous 
things. The question now facing us is: what is it that happens when we do these things? What is 
involved in the course of our doing, that eventually results in our becoming virtuous agents and 
to realise the virtuous activity in which our flourishing importantly consists? 
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2 PRACTICE AND PRAXIS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
At the heart of Aristotle’s account of our habituation into virtue is the thought that we become 
virtuous agents through practice of the actions in which virtue finds its expression:  
The virtues we acquire by having acted first, just as we do various sorts of skills. For the things 
we must do having learned, we learn by doing these things: men become builders, for 
instance, by building, and lyre-players by playing the lyre. Similarly, then, we become just by 
doing just things, temperate by doing temperate things, brave by doing brave things. 
τὰς δ᾽ ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν: ἃ γὰρ δεῖ 
μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μανθάνομεν, οἷον οἰκοδομοῦντες οἰκοδόμοι γίνονται καὶ 
κιθαρίζοντες κιθαρισταί: οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα, τὰ δὲ 
σώφρονα σώφρονες, τὰ δ᾽ ἀνδρεῖα ἀνδρεῖοι (NE 1103a31-b2).  
The question we are investigating is: what happens when we perform such actions, and how is it 
that in so doing we become virtuous agents and to realise the virtuous activity on which 
flourishing depends? To answer these questions requires, of course, that we have some conception 
of the kind of activity towards which this developmental process is directed, and how this is to be 
distinguished from the doings of a learner. It is to this issue that this chapter is addressed.  
My investigation proceeds via a reading of Aristotle’s noted argument in NE II 4, in which 
Aristotle raises a challenge for the account of virtue acquisition proposed in the preceding 
chapters of Book II. This he proceeds to defend against the imagined challenge in the rest of the 
passage and for this reason alone the passage is central to any understanding of Aristotle’s picture 
of virtue acquisition. I believe, however, that the full significance of this discussion and the 
particular insights it oﬀers are often overlooked. Typically, Aristotle is thought to be concerned 
in this chapter to defend the possibility of performing virtuous actions prior to the possession of 
virtue, as is required by the virtue acquisition thesis. Through close examination of Aristotle’s 
argument in the passage, however, I will suggest instead that Aristotle’s interest is closer to our 
own concerns: his intention, I will argue, is precisely to show what our practice of virtuous actions 
is directed towards, to reveal just what is distinctive about the activity of a virtuous agent, and to 
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indicate just why practice of virtuous actions is necessary for our becoming virtuous. The actions 
of a learner are revealed to be similar to those of a virtuous agent in certain important respects, 
but in others remain importantly distinct; nevertheless, by performing certain sorts of actions the 
learner can develop in such a way as to act as the virtuous agent does. As a result of reading this 
passage, I submit, we will have not only a better view of what it is the practice of virtuous actions 
is directed towards, but will also be in a better position to think about the nature of the learner’s 
practice in subsequent chapters, and to see what this must involve if it is to be successful.   
2.2 NICOMACHEAN ETHICS II  4 
Having presented his virtue acquisition thesis as relatively straightforward in NE II 1 -3, Aristotle 
interrupts his account at II 4 and raises a challenge for his thesis that we become virtuous by doing 
virtuous things: 
(a) One may be puzzled about how we say that (1) people must become just by doing just 
things, and temperate, temperate things, for (2) (i) if they do just and temperate things, 
they are just and temperate already. (ii) Just as if [they do] grammatical and musical 
things, they are grammatical and musical  
ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις πῶς λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ 
σώφρονα σώφρονας: εἰ γὰρ πράττουσι τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα, ἤδη εἰσὶ δίκαιοι καὶ 
σώφρονες, ὥσπερ εἰ τὰ γραμματικὰ καὶ τὰ μουσικά, γραμματικοὶ καὶ μουσικοί (1105a17-21). 
But what, we should ask, is the nature of this puzzle and what is Aristotle’s purpose in raising 
it? To understand the nature of the argument that follows and what it is Aristotle is seeking to 
establish, we need to understand the nature of the concerns that motivate him here. A certain 
picture of the challenge has been assumed in the literature, but with little reflection on whether 
this picture makes the best sense of what then follows. In the following section, I will challenge 
this assumption about the nature of Aristotle’s concern and argue that by reading the challenge in 
a diﬀerent way we can make better sense of the argument in the rest of the passage. First, however, 
we should have in view the argument that Aristotle presents.  
Having raised the challenge against his virtue acquisition thesis, Aristotle’s initial response is 
to consider whether the claim that if one does F things, one is F already is true in the case of skills, 
since these, he has just implied, are relevantly analogous to the virtues. He asks: 
(b) Or is it not so in the case of skills; for it is possible to do something grammatical either 
by chance or under the instruction of another  
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ἢ οὐδ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτως ἔχει; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ γραμματικόν τι ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ 
ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου (a21-23). 
And continues: 
(c) And so he will be grammatical, then, if he does something grammatical and 
grammatically: that is, in accordance with the grammar inside him  
τότε οὖν ἔσται γραμματικός, ἐὰν καὶ γραμματικόν τι ποιήσῃ καὶ γραμματικῶς: τοῦτο δ᾽ 
ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὑτῷ γραμματικήν (a23-26). 
To what extent this constitutes a solution to the puzzle, not only in the case of skills but also in 
the case of virtues, we will consider in what follows. Importantly, however, having initially treated 
virtues and skills as analogous, Aristotle then proceeds to point out an important disanalogy 
between the two cases:  
(d) yet the case of the skills is not like the case of the virtues, for what is produced by skill has 
its good in itself: and so it is suﬃcient that these things are produced having a certain 
quality  
ἔτι οὐδ᾽ ὅμοιόν ἐστιν ἐπί τε τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν 
γινόμενα τὸ εὖ ἔχει ἐν αὑτοῖς: ἀρκεῖ οὖν ταῦτά πως ἔχοντα γενέσθαι (a26-28). 
(e) but the things that are produced in accordance with the virtues are not justly or 
temperately done if they (simply) have a certain quality in themselves, but only if the 
agent acts having a certain quality  
τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα οὐκ ἐὰν αὐτά πως ἔχῃ, δικαίως ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται, 
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ὁ πράττων πῶς ἔχων πράττῃ (a29-31). 
(f) First, if they (act) knowingly, next if they are choosing and choosing for its own sake, and 
third if they act from a firm and unchanging state  
πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰδώς, ἔπειτ᾽ ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι᾽ αὐτά, τὸ δὲ τρίτον 
ἐὰν καὶ βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττῃ (a31-33). 
(g) with regards to the other skills, these do not count for anything, except for knowing, but 
with regard to the virtues, knowing is of no or of little worth, but the others are not of 
little significance, but of all significance  
ταῦτα δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἔχειν οὐ συναριθμεῖται, πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ εἰδέναι πρὸς 
δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν ἰσχύει, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν 
δύναται (a31-b4). 
 51 
Many discussions of this passage treat Aristotle’s argument as finished by this point, but it is not 
in fact until (k) that Aristotle takes himself to have responded fully to the issues raised in (a), or 
so I will argue. First, Aristotle explains how a person comes to be in such a condition: 
(h) These (conditions) come about through doing just and temperate things many times  
ἅπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις πράττειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα περιγίνεται (b4-5). 
And continues to make further claims both about the actions we call just (and temperate), and the 
just (and temperate) person: 
(i) and so things are called just and temperate, when they are such as the just and temperate 
person would do  
τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματα δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα λέγεται, ὅταν ᾖ τοιαῦτα οἷα ἂν ὁ δίκαιος ἢ ὁ 
σώφρων πράξειεν (b5-7). 
(j) But the person who does these things is not just or temperate, but only if they act as just 
and temperate people act  
δίκαιος δὲ καὶ σώφρων ἐστὶν οὐχ ὁ ταῦτα πράττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὕτω πράττων ὡς οἱ δίκαιοι 
καὶ σώφρονες πράττουσιν (b7-9). 
The result is that Aristotle can now conclude that the virtue acquisition thesis, challenged in (a), 
can be upheld after all: 
(k) And so it is well said that the just person becomes so by doing just things and the 
temperate person by doing temperate things: and no one would ever stand a chance of 
becoming good without doing these things  
εὖ οὖν λέγεται ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια πράττειν ὁ δίκαιος γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ σώφρονα ὁ 
σώφρων: ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ μελλήσειε γίνεσθαι ἀγαθός (b9-12). 
Let us turn our attention, then, to the original challenge posed, and ask what the challenge 
amounts to and why it is that Aristotle raises this against his virtue acquisition thesis. 
2.3 THE CHALLENGE AND THE FORM OF THE SOLUTION 
Text (a), to which I will refer as ‘the challenge’, comprises two main claims, which for brevity’s 
sake I will call ‘Claim 1’ and ‘Claim 2’. Claim 1, the claim that “people must become just by doing 
just things, and temperate by doing temperate things (δεῖ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους 
γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονας)” is the thesis first advanced by Aristotle in NE II 1 (1103a34-
b2) and which has formed the basis of his discussion in the preceding chapters of Book II. In these 
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chapters the thesis was presented as relatively straightforward, but Aristotle now signals the need 
for closer inspection of the thesis, acknowledging that “one might be puzzled about how we say” 
or “what we mean when we assert” (πῶς λέγομεν) this thesis.  
Before we examine Claim 2 – the claim that “if they do just and temperate things they are just 
and temperate already (εἰ γὰρ πράττουσι τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα, ἤδη εἰσὶ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες)” 
– it is worth noting that the question ‘what do we mean when we say it is necessary to do just 
things in order to become just?’ is a question that could be asked without the introduction of this 
second claim, and which may already have been on the mind of a reader of NE II 1-3. For whilst 
the virtue acquisition thesis is presented there as relatively uncontroversial, a reader may already 
wonder what Aristotle means by “doing just things” (τὰ δίκαια πράττοντες): how should we 
understand the nature of these doings prior to the possession of virtue, how are such doings 
related to the virtue of justice, and so on? That Aristotle pauses in his account of virtue acquisition 
and asks ‘πῶς λέγομεν’ of his thesis signals, I believe, recognition of the need for further clarity 
and precision in explaining how we become virtuous through the practice of certain actions.  
But Aristotle does not simply ask ‘πῶς λέγομεν’ of the virtue acquisition thesis; rather he poses 
a challenge to the thesis in the form of Claim 2. Aristotle sees the thesis as not simply in need of 
elucidation, but as vulnerable to a particular kind of challenge. But what is the nature of this 
challenge and what kind of threat does it pose to the virtue acquisition thesis? Only if we 
understand the nature of the challenge can we understand what it is that Aristotle must show in 
order to defend his account of virtue acquisition.  
There is of course a further claim in text (a), designed to support Claim 2, namely the claim 
that “if [people do] grammatical and musical things, they are grammatical and musical (εἰ τὰ 
γραμματικὰ καὶ τὰ μουσικά, γραμματικοὶ καὶ μουσικοί)”. The analogy with skills clearly plays an 
important role in the passage, for skills are compared and contrasted with the virtues not only in 
the challenge, but also in the argument that follows. Understanding the role that this analogy 
plays in the challenge is thus important not only for understanding the nature of the challenge 
and Aristotle’s motivation for asserting it, but also for understanding the way in which Aristotle’s 
argument subsequently proceeds.  
Now certain commentators take it that Aristotle raises a challenge for his virtue acquisition 
thesis – whatever the challenge amounts to – on the basis of the supposed analogy with skills.1 The 
                                                             
1 This seems to be how Irwin and Broadie take the challenge to work: “The objector’s argument (1) rests on an 
alleged feature of the crafts, and hence (2) assume that virtues are analogues to the crafts in the relevant way” (Irwin 
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thought is that Aristotle has drawn a number of comparisons between the virtues and skills in the 
preceding chapters (1103a32, 1103b8-22, 1104a9-10) but he now recognises that a certain 
assumption concerning skills, if true in the case of the virtues too, might present a certain problem 
for his virtue acquisition thesis. Thus, in his response, Aristotle needs to show either that the 
assumption in the case of skills is false and/or that the cases of virtues and skills are not strictly 
analogous, and thus that there is no such problem in the case of the virtues after all.   
Alternatively, one might suppose that the challenge to the virtue acquisition thesis is one that 
could be levelled independently of the analogy with skills, and that the analogy with skills is 
intended to support or illustrate the thoughts that motivate the challenge, rather than as 
generating the challenge as such. I believe there is more philosophical interest in reading the 
challenge in this way, and indeed that this reading of the challenge is supported by Aristotle’s own 
presentation of the challenge, for the ‘ὥσπερ’ that introduces the analogy with skills at 1105a20 is 
more naturally read as bolstering or providing another example of Claim 2, rather than as 
generating the claim as such.2 Nevertheless, by thinking about the case of skills alongside the case 
of virtues, we can surely make progress in understanding the challenge that Aristotle here poses.  
2.3.1 SOME DESIDERATA 
Whatever our interpretation of the challenge is, it should be able to meet the following desiderata. 
First, it ought to be worth entertaining as a challenge to the thesis advanced thus far; it should 
not be a straw man. This requires us, in particular, to understand what might lead Aristotle to 
assert Claim 2, for on first glance this claim appears immediately to be denied in text (b); how can 
we understand this claim in such a way that it is not the straw man it appears to be? Second, and 
relatedly, the challenge – or at least whatever leads Aristotle to assert it – must be of suﬃcient 
substance that it is not until text (k) that Aristotle takes himself to have resolved the puzzlement 
of (a), and to conclude that the thesis is well said. An interpretation of the challenge that sees it 
dealt with prior to (k) does not make sense of the structure of this passage. Finally, since (k) is 
clearly a conclusion, this clearly indicates that what precedes it is an argument, and thus 
statements (b)-(j) should be interpreted in such a way that they form an argument, and are 
                                                             
1999, p.195); “The argument weaves about in a manner not uncharacteristic of Aristotle. The first sentence, posing 
the problem, assumes (1) that virtues are analogous to skills; (2) that doing what is grammatical is a suﬃcient 
condition for being proficient in grammar. Aristotle responds by denying (2), which is all he needs for his main point; 
but then as if to be on the safe side, he takes this opportunity to argue against (1)” (Broadie 1991, p.119, n.17). 
2 If Aristotle wished to show that Claim 2 in the case of the virtues is generated because of the analogy with skills, 
he could have expressed this with stronger causal language.  
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relevant to responding to the challenge as it is posed and establishing the conclusion that the 
virtue acquisition thesis is well said in the face of this challenge.  
2.3.2 THE ‘POSSIBILITY’ READING 
The dominant reading of this passage takes Aristotle to be concerned with the possibility of 
performing virtuous actions prior to the possession of virtue. Irwin summarises the passage 
“Puzzle: how can we do right actions without being in the right state?” (1999, p.195); more 
recently Jimenez writes:  
Concretely, Aristotle himself admits, in NE 2.4, 1105a17-21, that the claim that learners 
perform virtuous actions before having virtue gives rise to a potential objection concerning 
the priority of actions over dispositions: how can learners perform virtuous actions unless 
they are already virtuous? In other words, how can learners become virtuous by doing 
virtuous actions if being virtuous must be prior to doing virtuous actions? (2016, p.3).3 
In short, Jimenez takes it that having asserted in NE II 1 that we become just by doing just things, 
Aristotle now acknowledges that one might doubt the possibility of doing such things prior to 
being just, on the assumption that being just is a necessary requirement on being able to do just 
things. If, as Jimenez puts it, “one needs to have a disposition if one is to be able to perform the 
activities characteristic of that disposition” (2016, p.13), it is hard to see how a learner could ever 
practise virtuous actions if she is not yet in the state that is a necessary requirement for performing 
such actions.  
Commentators who interpret the challenge in this way take it that Aristotle’s solution consists 
in showing that it is after all possible to perform virtuous actions without being virtuous, which 
he does through the analogy with grammar at (b). We can easily acknowledge, in the grammatical 
case, that people can do grammatical things either through luck or under instruction, and so 
without possessing grammatical skill – showing that it is not after all necessary to be a grammarian 
in order to be able to do grammatical things.4  
                                                             
3 See also Ross: “How can we do good acts if we are not ourselves good?” (1949, p.194); Hardie: “We are inclined 
to say both (a) that we become virtuous by doing virtuous actions and (b) that, unless we are already virtuous, we 
cannot do virtuous actions” (1968, p.104); Williams: “Aristotle raises the question of how it can be true, as he claims 
it to be, that someone becomes (e.g.) just by doing just things: for how can someone do virtuous things without 
already having the appropriate virtue?” (1995, p.13); Vasiliou: “How can repetition of like actions give rise to a 
particular state, if possession of that state is necessary before one can perform such actions? (2007, p.50-51), “If 
repetition of similar actions gives rise to a corresponding state of character, but the state of character in question is 
necessary in order to perform actions of the relevant type in the first place, then it is unclear how habituation can 
occur (2011, p.173). 
4 Note, indeed, that we do not even need to know the conditions for being a grammarian (which we discover in 
(c)) to know that it does not follow from a person’s doing grammatical things that they are a grammarian. 
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With regards to the initial challenge in the case of the virtues, this analogy provides a solution 
in one of two ways. For those who take the initial challenge to be generated on the basis of the 
analogy with skills, the response in (b) provides a solution by showing that the assumption 
concerning skills (that ‘being F is necessary to do F things’) is false, thus undermining the very 
basis of the objection in the case of virtues. Those, meanwhile, who maintain that the challenge in 
the case of the virtues need not itself rely on the analogy with skills, nevertheless assume that since 
Aristotle has treated the cases as analogous thus far, that we should then “follow this same line of 
reasoning to attempt to solve the priority puzzle in relation to the virtues” (Jimenez, 2016, p.12). 
As Jimenez puts it: “we are familiar with examples of people who are not virtuous but are able to 
act ‘according to the virtues’—i.e. to produce outcomes that are stereotypical of the virtues” (2016, 
p.12), and thus we should not assume that ‘being virtuous must be prior to doing virtuous 
actions’.5 It is possible to perform the actions characteristic of a given state or disposition prior to 
the possession of that state or disposition, and hence, in defence of Claim 1, it is after all possible 
to perform virtuous actions prior to the possession of virtue.  
2.3.2.1 CHALLENGES TO THE POSSIBILITY READING 
The first thing worth noting with regard to this reading, is that whilst the challenge is often 
paraphrased in the ways quoted above, this is not in fact how Aristotle presents the challenge in 
text (a). The above quotations suggest Aristotle to be asking “how can we become just and 
temperate by performing just and temperate actions, since we must be just and temperate in order 
to be able to perform just action temperate actions”. But this is not what Aristotle writes. He asks 
rather ‘how we can say’ or ‘what we mean by saying’ that “it is necessary to do just and temperate 
things to become just and temperate”, given the thought that “if they do just and temperate things, 
they are just already”. No question is asked about the possibility of performing just and temperate 
actions, or claim made about the necessity of being just and temperate in order to perform just 
and temperate actions. The possibility reading is not mandated by the text.  
A defender of this reading could, however, argue that the thought that it ‘is necessary to be 
just in order to do just things’ is an assumption that underpins Aristotle’s claim that “if they do 
just things, they are just already”. For if it is necessary to be just in order to do just things, then if 
a person could do just things, she must already be just. Thus only the person who is just already 
                                                             
5 By which she means that we should not assume that having a disposition is necessary in order to be able to 
perform the actions characteristic of that disposition.  
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could practice just things – and her practice would be redundant, since she is already just – whilst 
the learner who is not just would be unable to perform the actions that Aristotle has claimed we 
must practice in order to become just.6  
Now, taken in isolation this is a perfectly natural reading of these lines, and plausible as the 
kind of assumption that would lead Aristotle to assert Claim 2. Indeed, one might argue that 
Aristotle is aware that certain of his previous remarks may be taken to suggest that he endorses 
this assumption, since the virtue acquisition thesis was introduced in the wake of a discussion of 
capacities (δυνάμεις) such as sight, and the activities these enable us to engage in. Moreover, what 
follows in (b) seems to fit too with this being Aristotle’s concern since, as we saw, (b) can be taken 
to show that since it is possible to perform characteristic actions either by luck or under 
instruction, it is not necessary to possess a given state or disposition in order to perform its 
characteristic actions. But in terms of the passage as a whole, this reading is more problematic.  
In violation of our first desideratum, the challenge appears to be something of a straw man, for 
if Aristotle is merely concerned about whether it is possible or not to perform virtuous actions prior 
to the possession of virtue, on the assumption that the possession of a given state is a necessary 
requirement of being able to perform its characteristic actions, this issue seems immediately to be 
resolved in text (b), and through a counterexample which should strike us as fairly obvious no less. 
Aren’t we perfectly familiar with the fact that people do things characteristic of a state or 
disposition without possessing the corresponding state or disposition?7 So why did we think that 
possessing a given state was necessary for performing actions of a given type, and thus worry that 
it wouldn’t be possible to perform such actions without being in the state?  
Moreover, since commentators take text (b) to be suﬃcient to respond to this worry, it makes 
it diﬃcult to understand why Aristotle continues as he does. Why, first, does he not conclude his 
argument here, or go on to show that the same is true of the virtues? 8 And why, in particular, does 
he make claim (c), which, recall, informs us that “he will be a grammarian if he does something 
                                                             
6 In this way the challenge would be similar to Meno’s paradox of learning (Meno 80d-e); a number of 
commentators see a parallel between these texts. See Stewart (1892, p.183), Irwin (1999, p.195); Broadie and Rowe 
(2002, p.300). 
7 More commonly under instruction than by chance. 
8 Cf. Jimenez, who argues that the first response from skills shouldn’t be taken as Aristotle’s full response to the 
challenge raised in (a) (since it is unclear in this case why Aristotle proceeds to discuss the disanalogy between skills 
and virtues from (d) onwards), but who grants that (b) constitutes Aristotle’s formal solution to the puzzle (by 
showing that it is possible for one to perform characteristic actions without the corresponding disposition).  
My argument is that to interpret even Aristotle’s formal solution in the way Jimenez does, does not account for 
why Aristotle goes on to state even (c), let alone what follows. 
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grammatical and does it grammatically”. For this claim seems simply irrelevant if Aristotle is 
concerned about the possibility of performing actions prior to the possession of virtue, and wishes 
to expose as false the assumption that it is necessary to be in a given state in order to perform its 
characteristic actions. If this is the nature of the challenge, then this would appear to invite 
reflection on the requirements for performing certain sorts of actions: is it or is it not the case that 
we need to be virtuous in order to perform virtuous actions? (c), however, is about the conditions 
on being an agent of a certain sort, not the conditions for performing actions, and thus, it seems 
irrelevant to the concerns that are at play in the challenge. And yet as per our third desideratum, 
since it is not until (k) that Aristotle asserts his conclusion, we should reasonably expect that what 
comes before the conclusion should be relevant to addressing whatever the challenge to the virtue 
acquisition thesis was supposed to be, and be required in order for Aristotle to assert his 
conclusion that the thesis is well said.  
For these reasons, I suggest we should resist seeing Claim 2 as arising from an assumption 
about what is required in order to be able to perform certain actions and the challenge in (a) as 
concerned with the possibility of performing virtuous actions prior to the acquisition of virtue. We 
should look instead for an alternative reading of the challenge. 9  
                                                             
9 A somewhat diﬀerent interpretation is proposed by Taylor (2006), who takes the puzzle to arise on the basis 
of Aristotle’s claim in II 1 that “we acquire the virtues of character by first exercising”, which he takes to entail the 
diﬃculty that “the exercise of the skill or virtue apparently supposes that one already has it, whence it is impossible 
that one comes to have it by exercising it” (p.81). If this, however, is the problem, then Taylor argues that the grammar 
example does not address the ‘crucial problem’. If the claim that we acquire skills or virtues by first having exercised 
them is still his problem in this chapter: 
he does not solve it by distinguishing between exercising a skill and doing the things prescribed by that 
skill without possessing it. For the latter is not exercising the skill; hence the distinction contributes 
nothing to the question ‘How is it possible to acquire a skill by exercising it?’ (p.82) 
Taylor considers whether Aristotle’s conception of the problem may have changed between chapters 1 and 4, such 
that he now wonders how it is that we can acquire a skill through the performance of unskilled acts of the type 
prescribed by the skill, but claims that (1) he gives no signal that his conception of the problem has changed in that 
way, and (2) that this latter problem is inferior to the first. On this latter point Taylor writes: 
The later conception loses sight of Aristotle’s central insight that the acquisition of skills is cumulative, 
so that we do acquire fully mature skills via a process of development in which the exercise of those 
very skills at a more primitive level is progressively refined and elaborated. Even the apprentice builder 
builds ‘in accordance with the building skill which is in him’. The crucial point is that building skill is 
in the apprentice in a less developed form than that in which it is in the master (p.82-3). 
In response to Taylor’s first point, it is worth noting that in the ‘problem’ posed in II 4, no reference is made to the 
thought that we acquire the virtues by ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον; the problem rather appears to lie in the idea that we 
become just by τὰ δίκαια πράττοντας. He is, however, right to draw our attention to the fact that Aristotle originally 
claimed that we do acquire the virtues by ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον and to wonder just what this claim amounts to. 
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2.3.3 THE ‘PROCESS’ READING 
I believe there is an alternative account to be oﬀered of Aristotle’s concern in this passage, and 
specifically the thought that would lead him to assert Claim 2. I suggest that underlying this claim 
is a thought about the relation one might suppose to obtain between types of persons and types 
of actions. This relation, however, isn’t the causal relation presupposed on the previous reading, 
according to which states play a necessary causal role in our producing certain sorts of actions; it 
is based on the more prosaic thought that we count as people of certain sorts in virtue of what we 
do. So for example, if someone does grammatical things, we call them a grammarian – and not, 
that is, because we think that being a grammarian is a requirement for doing grammatical things, 
but rather because we take ‘the doing of grammatical things’ to be what ‘being a grammarian’ 
consists in. Likewise, we might suppose that being a just person consists simply in doing just 
things. Indeed, Aristotle himself has stressed that the moral virtues find their exercise in such 
things. Thus we would say that if someone does just things, they are a just person.  
If this is the thought that motivates the challenge to the virtue acquisition thesis, we might 
wonder where it originates from, and why Aristotle would be concerned that such a challenge 
might be raised against his virtue acquisition thesis. There are a number of possible sources for the 
claim. It might, on the one hand, have the status of an endoxon, a claim that Aristotle thinks is 
widely held and so would be likely to be assumed by his audience.10 No doubt we do think there 
is an important connection between the things we do, and the kinds of people we are, and 
Aristotle recognises that this might lead us to assume that someone who does things of a certain 
sort will thus count as a person of that sort.11  
                                                             
10 If the claim has this endoxic status then I suggest for Aristotle this places certain requirements on the kind of 
response he is to give: it is a thought to be taken seriously, and even if the claim, or the conclusions to which it leads 
are ultimately mistaken, there may well be a truth in the claim that is worth preserving or clarifying. And this is 
precisely what I believe he does in his response, by disambiguating the phrase ‘doing just things’ (ta dikaia prattontes). 
11 I thank Joachim Aufderheide for bringing to my attention a remark in NE 3.5 which might seem to cast doubt 
on the thought that this claim has an endoxic status. Here, Aristotle writes that: 
but we are responsible ourselves for having become people of this sort by living carelessly, and for being 
unjust or intemperate, by having acted wickedly and having been drunk and living life in that sort of 
way: for each activity produces a person of this sort. This is clear from those who practise from any 
competition or action, for they go on actually doing [these things]. Only a totally insensible person 
would not know that a given activity is the source of the corresponding state (ἀλλὰ τοῦ τοιούτους 
γενέσθαι αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκους ἢ ἀκολάστους εἶναι, οἳ μὲν κακουργοῦντες, οἳ δὲ ἐν πότοις καὶ τοῖς 
τοιούτοις διάγοντες: αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνέργειαι τοιούτους ποιοῦσιν. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν μελετώντων 
πρὸς ἡντινοῦν ἀγωνίαν ἢ πρᾶξιν: διατελοῦσι γὰρ ἐνεργοῦντες. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν περὶ 
ἕκαστα αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται, κομιδῇ ἀναισθήτου) (1114a5-14).  
The fact that Aristotle acknowledges that only an insensible person could deny that a given activity is the source of 
the corresponding state might suggest that it cannot be an endoxon that all there is to being a virtuous person is 
performing virtuous actions. In response, however, we could take the endoxic claim to amount simply to the thought 
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But he might also be concerned that some of his own previous remarks could be taken to 
suggest this kind of picture. For Aristotle has stressed in NE II 1 that not only are the virtues both 
created and destroyed through the same things, but they also find their exercise in those same 
things. If the exercise of virtue consists in the performance of virtuous actions, this might lead one 
to wonder what more there is to be being virtuous and what more there could be to aim at, than 
simply doing these things.  
Now the particular challenge that this thought would pose to the virtue acquisition thesis 
doesn’t concern the possibility of performing actions prior to being just, it is rather that it makes 
puzzling why we would say that we need to practice doing just things; that is, why we would think 
there is anything like the temporally extended process of becoming virtuous by practicing virtuous 
actions that Aristotle has claimed there is in the previous chapters.12 For if being just consists 
simply in doing just things, then if someone does such things, she counts as just already; there is 
nothing more that needs to happen. On this reading, then, when Aristotle writes that “they are 
just already (ἤδη εἰσὶ δίκαιοι)”, the ‘ἤδη’ is intended to signal not that the agent is just prior to 
performing those just actions, but rather to signal that one is thereby just. In so far as one ‘becomes’ 
just by doing just actions, it is something that is immediate; if one performs a just action one is 
immediately just.13  
Not only does it make little sense to say that there could be any temporally extended process 
of becoming just by doing just actions of the sort Aristotle has alluded to, but the relation between 
types of persons and types of actions that is assumed on this reading (according to which being a 
person of a certain sort consists simply in the performance of certain characteristic things) also 
makes it diﬃcult to see what there could be to aim at over and above our doing these just things 
                                                             
that there is an intimate relation between the types of people we are, and what we do, or that we are who we are in 
virtue of what we do (not yet articulated as the claim that if we do F we are F already) – a claim that, indeed, is 
supported by just this passage. Aristotle recognises, however, that if we do not reflect on this claim, and distinguish 
between the mere doing of a deed and the doing of it in a certain way, one might be led to suppose that the connection 
between who we are and what we do concerns merely our deeds.  
12 He has notably insisted on the importance of beginning this process from the earliest moments of childhood, 
as Plato did too(1104b12-13). 
13 This reading of ἤδη is briefly canvassed, but not adopted, by Lawrence (2011, p.265), who writes: 
For simplicity I assume ‘ēdē’ is a temporal ‘already’; if we understood it as ‘thereby’ this would allow 
the possibility also of a reductive puzzle: that all there is to a skill/capacity or disposition is the doing 
of an act (see the Megarian claims of Meta. 9.3). The possibility that by doing a single V or T act one 
might acquire the skill or disposition would be a limiting case of Aristotle's position: one would not 
be exhibiting one's skill or disposition in that single performance, but acquiring it. (Perhaps this might 
be possible for example in learning to ride a bicycle, but not intelligible with the kind of skills and 
dispositions Aristotle is here concerned with) (2011, p.265). 
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if our aim is to be a just person. If we are just in virtue of doing just things, what further thing 
could the learner have to aim at beyond doing these just things – isn’t it enough that she is doing 
them? 
To try to make the contrast between this and the possibility reading of the challenge 
perspicuous then: the possibility reading takes Aristotle to be concerned about whether we can 
perform virtuous actions before being virtuous, a concern that is generated by the thought that being 
in a state is necessary in order to be able to perform actions of certain sorts. It invites reflection on 
the requirements for performing actions of certain sorts, and takes him to respond by showing 
that the possession of a state isn’t necessary in order to be able to perform such actions, and that 
it is therefore possible to perform the actions before being in the state. My reading, meanwhile, 
sees Aristotle as keen to defend the thought that we become just by doing just things, that there is 
a temporally extended process of becoming virtuous and something to aim at over and above 
performing the actions that must be performed according to the virtue acquisition thesis. It is a 
picture that would make little sense if we thought that being a just person consists simply in doing 
just things. 
I propose, then, that what follows is not a demonstration of the possibility of performing 
certain actions prior to the possession of virtue – this I’m suggesting was never at issue – but rather 
an investigation into the relation that holds between the kinds of persons we are and what it is 
that we do, an investigation that will require us to be much more precise in how we think about 
action, and in particular to unpack the somewhat ambiguous phrase used so far - ‘doing just 
things’ (τὰ δίκαια πράττοντας).   
2.3.3.1 THE SOLUTION: DISAMBIGUATING ‘τὰ δίκαια πράττοντες’ 
Aristotle’s response to the challenge begins with the case of skills, and through this he sets up the 
distinctions he will employ in the case of the virtue. As we will see though, there are certain 
important qualifications which have to be made before the original worry about becoming 
virtuous can be fully dealt with.   
In texts (b) and (c) Aristotle introduces an important distinction between (simply) ‘doing 
something grammatical’ (γραμματικόν τι ποιῆσαι) and doing that thing ‘grammatically’ 
(γραμματικῶς). We see here much more precision in Aristotle’s treatment of action, for we are no 
longer talking simply of ‘doing grammatical things’, but rather of ‘doing something grammatical’, 
 61 
of the thing that is done, and ‘acting grammatically’, the way in which it is done.14 In particular I 
suggest that his move to the singular here – to the ‘something grammatical’ (γραμματικόν τι) away 
from the plural ‘grammatical things’ (τὰ γραμματικὰ) – is a clear sign that that some 
disambiguation is underway. It indicates that Aristotle is here talking about a concrete doing, 
rather than a way of behaving.15 
What does this disambiguation allow Aristotle to show? It allows him to show first that there 
are two ways in which we can think about action. We can think of action in terms simply of the 
thing that is done. But we can also think about action in a way that includes the way that that 
thing is done, which, as we will see, refers to features of the agent. And this in turn allows him to 
respond to the challenge as follows.  
Taking just the case of skills for now, he can show through the example in (b) that if we think 
about ‘doing grammatical things’ in terms simply of the thing done, then we shouldn’t think that 
if someone does such things, that she is thereby a grammarian. For we would not want to call 
either the chance doer or the student grammarians; indeed, Aristotle appears to contrast these 
two subjects with the grammarian in the next line. If we apply the same reasoning to the case of 
the virtues, we can see too that it does not follow from a person’s simply doing just things that she 
is a just person. Thus Claim 2 and the challenge it poses to the virtue acquisition thesis are 
undermined: if one does just things, one is not just already. 
It might look as though this interpretation is therefore vulnerable to the same straw man 
objection as before. Yet unlike the possibility reading, which took Claim 2 and the assumption 
that gave rise to it to be immediately undermined, here Aristotle’s solution requires him to 
disambiguate the ways in which we might think of action, and to show that on one sense of action, 
the conclusion that ‘one is just already’ does not follow. Moreover, we see Aristotle engaging with 
the thoughts that gave rise to the challenge, and showing that there is nevertheless a certain truth 
to the motivating assumption that there is an important connection between the what we do and 
the kinds of people we are. For in text (c) he shows that the grammarian is someone who does 
                                                             
14 In fact, Aristotle’s treatment of action becomes more precise still, for notice the introduction of the verb ποιέω 
when talking about skills. In (a), no verb is given when talking of doing ‘τὰ γραμματικὰ’, and we are presumably 
required to supply the ‘πράττουσι’ of the line before. Moreover, its introduction here may already anticipate the 
diﬀerence between ποίησις and πρᾶξις which he explicitly addresses later in the Ethics, and may already be	present in 
the disanalogy between virtues and skills (in particular, in the condition that virtuous actions are performed by a 
virtuous agent for their own sake). 
15 It might also signal a recognition on his part that we don’t in fact think that people repeatedly do grammatical 
things by chance, but that such doings are just one oﬀs. 
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grammatical things, but it turns out not in any old way: she does them grammatically. The 
important connection between the kinds of persons we are and what we do doesn’t concern action 
understood in terms simply of the thing done, but rather action understood as incorporating both 
the thing done and the way in which it is done.16 
Turning to the original challenge, if we put this in terms of becoming grammatical for now, 
we should see that it turns out to be perfectly fine to think that there is a process of becoming 
grammatical through doing grammatical things: a learner does grammatical things, considered in 
terms of the thing done, and becomes over time such as to do those things grammatically. There 
is something to aim at over and above her doing grammatical things, and that is to do them 
grammatically. But Aristotle does not yet draw such a conclusion in the case of virtue; rather he 
points to a certain disanalogy between the cases of virtues and skills. We need then to understand 
what the disanalogy is between skills and virtues, and what role this plays in Aristotle’s response 
to the original puzzle about virtue acquisition.  
2.4 THE DISANALOGY 
For those who adopt the possibility reading and take the first response from skills to be a suﬃcient 
response to the original challenge, the introduction of the disanalogy at (d) presents a particular 
interpretive challenge. Broadie and Irwin – who take the challenge to be resolved by (b), since it 
shows the assumption about skills that was thought to be the basis of the challenge in fact to be 
false – suppose that Aristotle introduces the disanalogy ‘as if to be on the safe side’; to show, that 
is, that since the virtues are not analogous to skills, that we are not justified in drawing conclusions 
about the virtues from assumptions about skills in the first place.  
But even for those who do not take Aristotle to have yet suﬃciently responded to the 
challenge as it concerns virtue acquisition, the disanalogy still presents an interpretive challenge, 
for it is by no means clear what the precise content of the disanalogy is. The main source of 
diﬃculty lies in understanding Aristotle’s first claim in the disanalogy concerning skills. He writes 
in (d) that “the things that come about from skill have their ‘good’ in themselves, and so it is 
suﬃcient that they are produced having a certain quality (τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα τὸ 
εὖ ἔχει ἐν αὑτοῖς: ἀρκεῖ οὖν ταῦτά πως ἔχοντα γενέσθαι)” (1105a26-28). But what, we should ask, 
                                                             
16 Unlike the possibility reading, then, this reading can make sense of what Aristotle writes in (c) with its focus 
on the grammarian and the way in which they behave, which seemed irrelevant if his concern was with the possibility 
of performing actions prior to the possession of virtue.  
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does he mean by ‘the things that come about’ (τὰ γινόμενα), and what is their having a certain 
quality suﬃcient (ἀρκεῖ) for? 
2.4.1 A CHANGE OF SUBJECT 
Many commentators, and in particular those who maintain that the original challenge has been 
suﬃciently responded to in the first response concerning skills, take the disanalogy to involve, in 
eﬀect, a change of subject. Most take it that by ‘the things that come about’ (τὰ γινόμενα) Aristotle 
means to refer to the characteristic products of skill, which as Broadie rightly points out could 
include either physically independent products such as houses or shoes, or non-physically 
independent products such as musical performances.17 But what these being of a certain quality is 
suﬃcient for, and what the disanalogy thus amounts to, remains controversial.  
2.4.1.1 WHAT IT IS FOR AN AGENT TO HAVE DONE WELL (BROADIE) 
Broadie argues that what Aristotle can’t be claiming is that “the product’s being in the right 
condition is suﬃcient evidence of skill in the (immediate) producer”, since she takes Aristotle to 
have told us at (b) that “the product could be correct through chance or someone’s instruction” 
(1991, p.83).18 If it is the case that a product could be of a good quality but produced by a non-
skilled agent, then a product’s being of a good quality couldn’t be a suﬃcient indication of skill. 
Broadie assumes, then, that Aristotle’s claim in (d) is rather: 
that we are satisfied with things which are normally produced by someone without skill. If 
we assess what such a doer has done by what he has made, we can say that what he has done is 
good. The lack of skill implies no defect in what he has done on this occasion, and it might 
reasonably be claimed that the skill is of value only because whoever possesses it is more likely 
to produce acceptable articles (1991, p.83). 
In the case of the virtues, however, to say that an agent has done well it is not enough that they 
have performed an action of a certain physical quality; only an agent who performs the act 
fulfilling the three conditions can be considered to have done well. 
                                                             
17 Given that Aristotle’s first analogy with skills in (a) drew on the example of musical skill, as well as grammar, 
the claim in the disanalogy should then be able to cover such cases.  
18 This isn’t strictly speaking true, however. Aristotle does not say anything at (b) about the quality of what’s 
done. He says that one could produce something grammatical by chance etc., but says nothing in particular of whether 
this is of the same quality as that produced by a grammarian. 
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2.4.1.2 THE VALUE OF ACTING FROM SKILL VS. ACTING FROM VIRTUE (IRWIN) 
Irwin, meanwhile, takes Aristotle in the disanalogy to be restricting his claim to cases in which a 
product is produced by a skilled agent – presumably on account of the agential ὑπὸ in line 27 – 
and not products produced by any person. Thus the claim in (d) need not be seen to be in conflict 
with (b). But the disanalogy still involves a change of topic on Irwin’s reading, and concerns the 
value of acting from skill compared with the value of acting from virtue (alluded to by Broadie 
also). For Irwin, Aristotle’s point is that “the goodness and badness of production is determined 
by its usefulness for producing the product; a better method of production is better at producing 
the right sort of product” (1999, p.195). Irwin’s thought, I take it, is that possessing skill, rather 
than acting by chance, is simply a more reliable method for producing good products, and this is 
why skill is a more valuable method of production than chance. But its value comes from its 
eﬀectiveness at (consistently) producing good products. In the case of the virtues, however, 
“virtuous action is not valuable simply as a means to some further result (e.g. acting kindly is not 
simply a means to making someone feel better)” (1999, p.196), but rather has intrinsic value. 
2.4.1.3 THE ‘HOW’ OF HABITUATION (JIMENEZ) 
More recently still, a quite diﬀerent interpretation of the disanalogy and its role in the passage has 
been proposed by Jimenez. Jimenez, who endorses the possibility reading of the original challenge 
takes (b) to constitute Aristotle’s ‘formal’ solution to the puzzle, but argues that we should resist 
seeing this as his ‘full’ response. A full response, she argues, would require Aristotle to show “how 
the process of learning by doing works, that is, how practice contributes to the formation of the 
corresponding dispositions” (2016, p.14). Text (b) showed that practice is possible, but not how 
it works, and thus Jimenez suggest that the disanalogy is intended to provide the materials for 
making progress towards an account of learning by doing, by “underlining a diﬀerence in the 
requirements that we should take into account when learning virtue” (2016, p.15). 
On her view, the claim in the disanalogy is that: 
things have ‘goodness’ (τὸ εὖ) simply when they are done ‘by the crafts’ (ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν), 
independently of the actual characteristics of the agent, while in the case of the virtues, e.g. 
justice or temperance, the focus shifts to the agent: how he acts and whether he himself fulfils 
certain conditions (2016, p.16). 
The point of the disanalogy, Jimenez argues, is to show the diﬀerent requirements for learning a 
skill and learning a virtue. When learning a skill, she argues, “agents should pay attention in their 
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practices to features of the product and make them correspond to the rules of the corresponding 
craft” (2016, p.17), but in the case of the virtues, “agents not only must be aware of the 
appropriateness of their outcomes to the given situations, but they also must themselves be in a 
certain condition when they perform those actions” (2016, p.17).  
2.4.1.4 CRITICISM 
With regards to each of these readings, my purpose isn’t to dispute whether Aristotle would or 
would not endorse the claims advanced in each (whether, that is, these are ‘Aristotelian’ theses).19 
The issue, rather, is that these readings fail to take into account the terms of the disanalogy, and in 
particular what Aristotle says here with regard to the virtues. For in (e) Aristotle does not say that 
“with the virtues, it is not the case that an agent has done well if the agent is not in a certain 
condition” as we would expect on Broadie’s reading, nor that “it is not the case that the goodness 
of virtuous action lies in its results” as we would on Irwin’s.20  Rather, he tells us that “the things 
that are produced in accordance with the virtues are not justly (δικαίως) or temperately 
(σωφρόνως) done, if they (we might supply - ‘simply’) have a certain quality in themselves” 
(1105a28-30).21 
                                                             
19 We will look more closely at Jimenez’ claims about the requirement for becoming virtuous in the next chapter, 
where we will consider whether and to what extent it is necessary given the conditions stipulated in (h) for a learner 
to themselves be in a certain condition when they practise virtuous actions. With regards to Irwin’s interpretation, 
meanwhile, I suggest that it is less than obvious that Aristotle would wish to claim that the value of skill lies only in 
its eﬀectiveness in producing products of certain sorts, as Irwin implies. 
With regards to Jimenez’ interpretation of the intended role of the disanalogy in this passage, however, it is 
unclear that Aristotle’s intention in presenting the disanalogy to point to an explanation of how learning by doing 
works. Jimenez is of course right that (b) does not provide any insight into the issue of how we learn by doing, and 
may be right too in thinking that this is something Aristotle himself would grant. She may be right, furthermore, that 
from Aristotle’s remarks in this passage we can glean some information as to how he may conceive of this process as 
working. But this does not mean that we should interpret the argument of II 4 itself in this way. For the question of 
how we do in fact learn by doing is not the question that Aristotle asked in (a); he asked how it is that we say we 
become just by doing just actions, and this invites us to show how the thesis can be maintained and/or what concretely 
the claim amounts to (what it is, say, that we mean by saying ‘we become just by doing just things’). It is a further issue 
to ask how this in fact works. Thus I suggest we should look for an interpretation of the disanalogy that makes the 
argument fit with what has so far been stated. 
20 Jimenez recognises that (e) concerns the conditions for acting virtuously, although it is unclear from the 
remark of hers quoted above (§2.4.1.3) that she recognises that the contrast being drawn is between the conditions 
for acting virtuously and grammatically. As above, there is certainly no explicit mention in the disanalogy of what 
one needs to do in the course of one’s practice, as her reading requires. 
21 Jimenez takes this to be equivalent to claiming that they are well performed, writing “he contrasts this with 
the requirements for the stereotypical outcomes or results of actions to be well (or ‘justly’ or ‘temperately’ and, in 
general, virtuously) performed” (2016, p.16). Again, it may well be the case that Aristotle takes acting ‘justly’ to be 
equivalent to acting ‘well’, but in trying to understand the content of the disanalogy, we should take seriously the 
terms in which it is stated. 
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2.4.2 A CONTINUATION OF THE ARGUMENT: THE TRUTH CONDITIONS OF THE 
ADVERBS 
The presence of these adverbs in text (e) strongly indicates that the contrast Aristotle is pointing 
to concerns what it is to do something skilfully on the one hand, and virtuously on the other, and 
so that Aristotle is not changing the subject, but continuing with the point made at (c) where he 
introduced the adverb ‘grammatically’. The claim in (d) is a claim then, it seems, about what it is 
to act skilfully; but if this is the case, do we not then find ourselves faced with the problem flagged 
by Broadie, that this would seem to conflict with the claims in (b) and (c), in which Aristotle says 
that a non-skilled agent can do something grammatical, an agent, that is, who doesn’t act 
grammatically? How could the quality of what comes about be an indication of it’s being skilfully 
done if something of the appropriate quality could be produced by someone not acting skilfully?  
In order to deal with this concern, it is important to recognise that Broadie is specifically 
concerned with the thought that the quality of a product could count as evidence of skill in the 
producer (or, in the strict terms of the disanalogy, of its being skilfully produced). The concern is 
that if good products can be produced by both skilled and non-skilled agents, the quality of a 
product surely can oﬀer no evidence for the presence of skill. But why should we think that 
Aristotle is concerned in this passage with evidence? The original puzzle is not an epistemic puzzle, 
about whether we can tell if agents are just or not on the basis of their action, and nor should we 
think in the disanalogy that Aristotle is concerned with whether we can tell if actions have been 
skilfully or virtuously performed. He is oﬀering an analysis of skilfully and virtuously performed 
actions, and telling us what each way of acting in fact involves.  
Thus I propose that we can read the disanalogy as follows: Acting skilfully depends on the 
presence of knowledge in the agent, and consists in producing things of a certain quality. It is 
entirely a matter of producing things, albeit with a certain causal origin in the agent. But acting 
virtuously is not simply a matter of producing certain outcomes or performing certain kinds of 
action. It is, importantly, a matter not only of acting from knowledge, but of the agent’s 
motivation and a certain stability of character. 
Note that this way of reading the disanalogy provides a way of responding to a concern raised 
by Vasiliou (attributed to Barney): 
One might be puzzled, however, about whether there really is a disanalogy between virtue 
and craft as Aristotle claims. After all, there is a “two-level” evaluation at work in each case: 
there is the evaluation of what was done and there is the evaluation of how it was done – was 
it done as the virtuous or craftsperson would do it? So where is the disanalogy? (2011, p.175). 
 67 
My argument is that there is an evaluation of what’s done and how it was done in each case, but 
that the disanalogy concerns the diﬀerent truth conditions of the latter in the case of the virtues 
and the skills. 
It is because the truth conditions for virtuously and skilfully performed action are diﬀerent 
that Aristotle could not conclude his argument at (c). For there he told us that an agent will be a 
grammarian if they do something grammatical and do it grammatically, which is to do it in 
accordance with the grammatical knowledge in them. But if we were invited to draw the same 
conclusion in the case of virtue, we would be misled into thinking that acting virtuously is also 
simply a matter of acting in accordance with some knowledge inside oneself (as opposed to by 
chance or under instruction), and to think that all that needs to be developed over the course of 
habituation is knowledge of virtuous action. But as the disanalogy makes clear, acting virtuously 
consists in far more than this, and there is more to aim at in our development simply than the 
acquisition of some body of knowledge.   
2.4.3 THE FULL SOLUTION 
It is thus with the important diﬀerence between the adverbial modifications of skilled action on 
the one hand, and virtuous action on the other now in place, that Aristotle can turn his attention 
again to the original worry about virtue and the underlying thoughts that first gave rise to this.  
The return is signalled, I submit, in (h) by a return to the ‘τὰ δίκαια’ language of NE II 1 and 
the original challenge in (a), (away, that is, from the ‘τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα’ locution of 
(e)). We are told that a learner comes to meet the agential conditions on virtuously performed 
action by doing just and temperate things many times (h), and that the things we call just and 
temperate are those that a just and temperate person would do (i). Importantly, however, the 
person who ‘simply’ does just things is not just, she is just only if she acts as just people act (j). This 
claim, then, is the counterpart of claim (c) about skills, and makes clear that the important 
connection between doing just things and being a just agent concerns not simply what one does, 
but the way that one acts. Not only does this show, in response to the original challenge, that one 
who simply does just and temperate things cannot yet be considered just and temperate, but it 
allows Aristotle to show that there is indeed something to aim at in our moral lives over and above 
simply performing just and temperate actions, and that is to become such as to act knowingly, to 
choose these actions for their own sake and to do so from a firm and unchanging state. 
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Our coming to act in this way, however, is not something that can come about without our 
having continually performed virtuous actions over a long period of time: “And so it is well said 
that the just person becomes so by doing just things and the temperate person by doing temperate 
things: and no one would ever stand a chance of becoming good without doing these things (εὖ 
οὖν λέγεται ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια πράττειν ὁ δίκαιος γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ σώφρονα ὁ σώφρων: ἐκ 
δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ μελλήσειε γίνεσθαι ἀγαθός)” (1105b9-12). Indeed, that 
the agential conditions on virtuously performed action are still conditions with respect to action 
– for her knowledge and choice certainly concern action – already indicates why a learner must 
have some experience of virtuous action if she is to gain knowledge of this and come to choose it 
for its own sake.22  
2.5 PRACTICE AND PRAXIS 
We have now a complete reading of Aristotle’s argument in NE II 4, and I want in the last part of 
this chapter to reflect on what Aristotle has showed through the course of this argument, and 
what this reveals for the purposes of our project.  
In the course of the argument of NE II 4 we have seen there is a distinction to be drawn 
between (simply) performing virtuous actions, and ‘acting virtuously’, which involves performing 
such actions knowingly, choosing them for their own sake, and doing so from a stable state. The 
latter constitutes the activity of the mature virtuous agent. Aristotle’s account of virtuously 
performed action reveals the virtuous agent to be the author of her action in a very strict sense. 
An author in this strict sense, it transpires, is not merely one who acts intentionally, nor is it even 
one who acts knowingly – although both of these are conditions on authorship.23 Rather, for an 
agent to be an author in this strict sense is for her action to reflect her firmly held values, and to 
issue from something fixed and stable. As Lawrence puts it: 
                                                             
22 We will investigate the importance of a learner doing these things herself in Chapters 5 & 6, in particular.  
23 Only the knowledge condition is explicitly pointed to by Aristotle in NE II 4, but Aristotle’s discussion in 
Book III reveals that the action of the virtuous agent must be hekousion, that is ‘voluntary’, or as Charles (1984, p.62) 
prefers, ‘intentional’. Hekousion action is defined, in part, as action which has its principle in the agent himself, 
knowing the particulars that constitute the action (τὸ ἑκούσιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότι τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα 
ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις, 1111a22-24). We might reasonably suppose that at 1105a31 that the knowing condition of virtuously 
performed action is stronger than the knowledge ‘of particulars’ required for intentional action, and requires perhaps 
that the agent know that her action is what virtue demands in a situation, rather than particulars like “who is doing 
it, what he is doing, about what or to what he is doing it; sometimes also what he is doing it with – e.g. with what 
instrument, for the sake of what, e.g., safety; in what way, for example, gently or hard (τίνα καὶ πόσα ἐστί, τίς τε δὴ καὶ 
τί καὶ περὶ τί ἢ ἐν τίνι πράττει, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ τίνι, οἷον ὀργάνῳ, καὶ ἕνεκα τίνος, οἷον σωτηρίας, καὶ πῶς, οἷον ἠρέμα ἢ 
σφόδρα)” (1111a3-6). 
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Praxis is then action that agents stand four-square behind, seeing it as truly theirs – as 
expressing their selves, their values, their character – as being the fine way to go on, as making 
a life worth the living. For Aristotle it is this specifically human activity – the humaning that 
is the realisation of their essence – the form of life and life-activity that constitutes the 
function of the adult, or mature perfection of its nature (tetelesmenon) (1.7 1098a3-5) (2011, 
p.235). 
So a virtuous agent, as a strict author of her actions, does not simply identify what is called for in 
a situation in a disinterested way; it is not that she recognises, whether on the basis of some 
authority or through some process of deduction, that some course of action is the one that she 
ought to take. Rather, it seems that the virtuous agent sees what is called for in any given situation, 
because certain features of the situation are salient to her and strike her as what matters about the 
situation; 24 indeed, these things matter to her. The virtuous agent’s chosen action constitutes her 
own response to the objective moral features of the situation. It is at once a highly demanding, 
but also deeply attractive picture of authorship, which takes into account that we are not only 
knowing beings, but desiring beings as well. This form of action is the perfection of our (practical) 
nature, and that towards which the learner’s practice of just and temperate actions is aimed. 
By contrast with the virtuous agent and the praxis in which she is engaged, the learner 
performs just and temperate actions, but she does not yet act virtuously. For Aristotle asserts that 
one who does virtuous things virtuously is virtuous; if he claimed that a student of virtue acts in 
this way also, Aristotle would invite the charge that the learner is thereby virtuous and that there 
is nothing for her to aim at in her practice. We will reflect further on this thought in the following 
chapter, but for the present let us simply acknowledge that the argument of II 4 forces us to see 
the action of a learner and that of a virtuous agent as distinct in just this way.25 
We might want to reflect a little further on the ‘virtuous actions’ that both the student of 
virtue and the virtuous agent perform. I have spoken so far of ‘the thing done’ or the ‘deed’, and 
contrasted this with thinking about ‘the way that thing is done’; we have seen that ‘the way a thing 
is done’ involves psychological facts about the agent, such as her knowledge, choice and state of 
                                                             
24 For a discussion of ‘salience’ in this sense, see both Wiggins (1978-79) and McDowell (1998). 
25 Importantly, beyond the thought that a student of virtue performs just and temperate actions, but does not 
yet perform those actions justly and temperately, we do not know much of the learner’s action. How we should 
conceive of the learner’s not virtuously performed action will be the focus of the following chapter, but to anticipate 
the discussion there, let it be noted that nothing from the claim that a learner does not act virtuously entails that all 
she does is merely perform virtuous actions nor to suggest that her action is to be conceived of in any way like that of 
the chance actor. 
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character (which we might take to include her various desires, perceptions, pleasures and pains, 
and so on), but how should we conceive of the ‘things done’, the ‘virtuous actions’ themselves? 
There are at least two considerations that are relevant to how we go about characterising these 
actions. First, our characterisation must allow that they can be performed by a variety of agents, 
acting both virtuously and not. Certainly they need to be performable both by a virtuous agent 
and a learner, and presumably an enkratic agent too, who performs the right actions, but fails to 
act as the virtuous agent does, in so far as her appetites are bad (1145b13) and she presumably does 
not choose these for their own sake.26 So our characterisation of the actions must allow that they 
can be performed by agents with a variety of psychological states, and should not include as part 
of the description of the action that, for example, they are chosen for their own sakes. 
The second important consideration is that these actions must have a certain value, 
independently of their performance by a virtuous agent. That this must be so might strike us as 
less clear, since one might suppose that the disanalogy between the virtues and crafts has revealed 
that whilst in the case of skills ‘τὸ εὖ’ is found in the product of skill, in the case of the virtues the 
quality of the thing done or produced is not as important as its being done in a certain way. But 
recall that the disanalogy concerned not the value of the respective forms of action per se, but 
rather the conditions on acting skilfully vs. virtuously; an agent may not be engaged in eupraxia 
unless she acts virtuously, but that is not to say that there is no value in the actions she performs 
if she does not yet act virtuously. More to the point, the reason for supposing that these actions 
must themselves have some value is that the virtuous agent chooses these for their own sake; there 
must then be some value to the thing done, independently of the way it is done, that makes it 
something worth choosing for its own sake.27  
In order to identify a virtuous action, independently of the virtuous agent’s manner of acting, 
we might be tempted to characterise the former in terms of the external or physical element of 
what the virtuous agent does, as contrasted with her inner psychological states. But here some 
                                                             
26 What is less clear is whether we should allow or disallow that such actions could be performed by chance. 
Depending on whether Aristotle would allow that such actions could be performed by chance or not will determine 
whether we should characterise them in such a way that they could be performed unintentionally, as involuntary 
actions described in Book III are, or whether we should characterise them as intentional actions, thus including 
certain psychological states of the agent within the description of the action (in accordance with Aristotle’s analysis 
of voluntary actions in Book III; for discussion, see Charles, 1984, Ch.2). Aristotle’s grammar example reveals that an 
agent can do something grammatical by chance, but it is unclear whether he holds that this is true for the case of 
virtuous actions. It might indeed be seen as conspicuous that Aristotle does not repeat the claim that one could do 
something virtuous by chance (although we should presumably allow that one could do something virtuous under 
instruction, since this is the way in which most agents learn to act). 
27 In Chapter 5 I will argue that such actions have the quality of being fine. 
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caution is required. First, I submit that we should not thereby reduce ‘what the virtuous agent 
would do’ to some mere physical event or change (‘the coins moving from A to B’); 28 that Aristotle 
tells us that “things are called just and temperate when they are such that the just and temperate 
person would do” (1105b5-7) strongly indicates that he has in mind here actions, things that an 
agent would do (πράξειεν).29 If we are to identify the virtuous action with any physical events or 
changes, these must be the events or changes that correspond to acts of agency (the action of 
transferring the money to B, or the act of repaying the debt to B).30 Indeed, in light of our second 
consideration, if the virtuous action is identified merely with some physical change, and not at 
least an act of agency, it is diﬃcult to see how a mere physical change could be something that is 
chosen for its own sake.31  
This brings us to a second reason for caution if we are to describe virtuous actions in terms of 
the physical or external element of what the virtuous agent does, since we need also to take care 
with respect to which changes we identify as the virtuous action. For Aristotle’s discussion of 
agency in Physics III reveals that where action is conceived of in terms of acting upon something,32 
the agent’s action is not to be identified with a change in the agent, but rather, a change in the 
patient. Teaching is actualised not in the teacher, but in the student (202b8ﬀ ). And since an 
agent’s actions are not to be identified with changes in the agent,33 Aristotle would not, for 
                                                             
28 In fact, as Coope explains, Aristotle’s conception of change is such that – unlike modern philosophers, who 
suppose that there can be instances of an agent’s arm going up that are not instances of the agent raising her arm 
(owing, perhaps to anarchic hand syndrome) – he would not count instances of an arm going up that are not exercises 
of a causal power as changes in the appropriate sense, since their not being end-directed rules them out as such (2007, 
pp.135-136). 
29 Indeed, as we have seen, Aristotle has been very precise in his language throughout NE II 4, and if he wished 
to identify a virtuous action with some mere physical event, whether or not this was produced by an agent, he has the 
language to do so.  
30 For something to be an action, for Aristotle, is for it to be an exercise of an agent’s (active) causal power. The 
question of what, for Aristotle, it is for something to be an act of agency – what is it for something to be a causal 
power of an agent’s is a diﬃcult question, and one that is beyond the scope of this discussion. Certainly, many acts of 
agency will be intentional, and will be performed as a result of an agent’s beliefs and desires, but unlike the 
Davidsonian picture of agency, it is not the presence of beliefs and desires that make something an act of agency. 
Importantly for this account too, diﬀerent sets of beliefs and desires can result in the same action. 
31 Moreover, this consideration should make us wary of being too deflationary in our specification of ‘what the 
virtuous person would do’, even if we require that this is an act of agency. So, for example, we may do better to identify 
the action that the virtuous agent would perform in somewhat more intensional terms, such as ‘repaying a debt’, rather 
than ‘transferring money to B’. This of course raises questions about the individuation of such actions. For discussion, 
see Charles (1984).  
32 N.b. When Aristotle discusses agency in Physics III, he does not have in mind the contemporary sense of 
agency, where to be an agent is to be capable of intentional action, say. He allows that inanimate objects can be agents 
too. Nevertheless, his discussion does include reference to what we would ordinarily count as agential actions, such 
teaching or building. 
33 As Coope (2005) explains, an agent’s actions may be changes of the agent, in so far as they are actualisations of 
one of her potentialities – “the sculptor’s sculpting is a change of the sculptor, since it is an actuality of a power of the 
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example, identify the agent’s action of sharing with another person with the movements of the 
agent’s hands.34 So Aristotle would not, I submit, identify ‘what the virtuous person would do’ 
with some bodily movements, even if these are acts of agency. 
2.5.1 THE PRIORITY OF PRAXIS 
I suggest, in fact, that Aristotle’s remark in (i), that “things (πράγματα) are called just and 
temperate, when they are such as the just and temperate person would do (πράξειεν)” points to a 
way in which we might go about characterising virtuous actions. The virtuous agent, as we have 
seen, performs some action and does so knowingly, choosing the action for its own sake, and from 
a firm and unchanging state; her action is performed in a specific, psychologically determinate 
way. In identifying the virtuous action, we can begin by looking at the virtuous agent and whatever 
she does, and then specifying that the virtuous action is whatever she does, but where the 
psychological states of the agent are determinable.  
Taken in this way, Aristotle’s remark at (i) would seem to indicate a certain priority that the 
activity of the virtuous agent has in our thinking about virtuous action. Some have taken this 
enigmatic remark to suggest that token actions become virtuous when performed by a virtuous 
agent, and so to imply that these actions are neutral with respect to value when not performed by 
a virtuous agent. (The actions of a learner on this reading are then not in fact virtuous, for they 
become so only when performed by someone who is virtuous already). But this is not the claim 
that Aristotle is making here. He does not claim that token actions become virtuous when 
performed by a virtuous agent, but rather that the actions that a virtuous agent would perform 
(πράξειεν) on a given occasion, those are the ones we call just. 35  
                                                             
sculptor. Similarly, the bronze’s becoming a sculpture is a change of the bronze, since it is an actuality of a power of 
the bronze” (2005, p.205) – but to ask where the changes are in, is to ask a diﬀerent question. It is to say what 
undergoes the change, and this Aristotle argues, must be the patient.  
34 Of course, in the case of a basic action like ‘raising an arm’, we can identify this action with a bodily movement 
of the agent, namely ‘the arm’s going up’.  
In response to certain contemporary philosophers of action, who would argue that the action of raising an arm 
cannot be identified with the event an arm’s going up, since this would appear to identify the cause (the action of 
raising an arm) with its eﬀect (the arm going up), Aristotle can argue that the action of raising an arm is the cause not 
of the process of the arm’s going up, but of the state of the arm’s being up (Coope, 2007). Hence, there is no problem 
in supposing that the action of raising an arm is the same event as an arm’s going up.  
35 Vasiliou attributes this view to Taylor, who reads this passage as evidence of the ‘definitional priority’ of the 
agent. Vasiliou takes definitional priority to be closely related to metaphysical priority, and argues that such priority 
results in a vicious circle “since it is impossible both that virtuous actions become virtuous by being done by virtuous 
agents and that virtuous agents become virtuous by doing virtuous actions” (2011, p.176). 
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I think this remark can be seen as part of Aristotle’s project of shifting our focus when 
thinking about virtuous action away from thinking about action merely in terms of ‘what is done’, 
towards thinking about action in a way that includes both the thing done and the determinate 
psychological facts about the agent by whom the action is authored. I suggest, thus, that we can 
take (i) to point towards the following idea: when we think about virtuous action, we should start 
by thinking of the virtuous agent and the way in which she acts – which as I have said, consists in 
her acting with a specific psychologically determinate state. The virtuous agent is one who is in 
such a condition that she is able to read, and be moved by, the relevant moral features of situations, 
to see what practically speaking is demanded of her, and to act accordingly. We begin by looking 
at a psychologically determinate way of acting, and then specify that the way of acting may be 
psychologically determinable, and that so conceived, this action then is something that could be 
performed by a variety of agents. Virtuous action conceived of as divorced from the agent’s strict 
authorship and own responsiveness to the moral features of the world is then posterior in account 
to the psychologically determinate action of the virtuous agent, which is conceptually prior. 
This is not to say that for example ‘just action’, conceived of in the posterior sense, only in 
terms of the thing done, is not properly speaking ‘just’.36 Aristotle says precisely the opposite: the 
virtue acquisition thesis states that we become just by doing just things (1103a31-b2), he tells us 
that we come to act justly by doing just things many times (1105b4-5), we are informed that things 
are called just when they are such as the just person would do (1105b5-7), and he concludes his 
argument with the assertion that we speak well when we say that we become just by doing just 
things (1105b9-12).  
The thought is rather that in our thinking about just action, we should begin by thinking 
about the kind of action that is chosen by an agent who is sensitive to the relevant moral features 
of a situation; just action that is performed by an agent in this specific, psychologically 
determinate way is conceptually prior to such action where the psychological states of the agent 
                                                             
In fact, it is not clear that when Taylor speaks of the definitional priority of the agent he has in mind the idea 
that an action becomes virtuous when performed by a virtuous agent, as Vasiliou interprets him, and not rather the 
kind of priority in account I argue for below. 
36 Many commentators take this to be the implication of this remark. Stewart calls these actions “ὁμωνύμως 
δίκαια” (1892, p.183); Gauthier & Jolif write: ‘l’action vertueuse ne doit pas découler d’une disposition passagère, mais 
d’un état habituel de caractère qui rend cette activité comme naturelle (1958-59, p.130); Hardie calls these actions 
“not strictly virtuous” (1968, p.104); Taylor writes that: “[…]in the case of the virtues extra conditions concerning 
the agent must be satisfied for the act to be virtuous’ (2006, p.83); Vasiliou states that “it will only be a truly virtuous 
action if the agent is motivated in the appropriate way” (2007, 52 n.22), my emphases. 
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are determinable; the specific determination has priority over the determinable. But that does not 
mean that the psychologically determinable action cannot still be ‘just’. 
Developmentally, however, the priority is reversed. Because the ‘the thing that is done’ is 
something alienable, it is possible for an agent who is not herself just and who does not act justly 
to nevertheless perform a just action. So while conceptually, the psychologically determinate 
action of the virtuous agent has priority over psychologically determinable virtuous action, 
developmentally the agent starts with the virtuous action which may be performed in a variety of 
ways,37 and through her practice comes to act in the specific way that the virtuous agent does, 
becoming an author of such actions in a strict sense. But we have no hope of becoming virtuous 
and the author of our actions in this strict sense without doing just and temperate things.  
2.6 THE EXPLANATORY TASK 
I have argued in this chapter, via a reading of Aristotle’s argument in NE II 4, that whilst the 
student of virtue and the virtuous agent both perform virtuous actions, their action should 
nevertheless be regarded as importantly diﬀerent. There is something distinctive about the action 
of a virtuous agent, and it is towards this distinctive way of acting – towards becoming full, and 
strict authors of virtuous actions – that the learner’s practice is directed. Our challenge, then, is to 
explain how it is that through performing virtuous actions, but not yet doing so virtuously, a 
learner can come over time to act virtuously. How does a learner progress from performing 
alienable actions, actions that are strictly speaking of the virtuous agent, to being an author of her 
actions in the same strict sense as a virtuous agent? 
We need now to turn from the praxis of the virtuous agent to the action of the learner, and to 
examine how we should conceive of her performance of virtuous actions in such a way that this 
transition is intelligible.  
                                                             
37 A particular learner’s action is, of course, psychologically determinate – she will act with some determinate set 
of psychological states – but she does not act in the particular determinate way that the virtuous agent does, and 
diﬀerent learners (some successful, some not, perhaps) may act in diﬀerent psychologically determinable ways. 
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3 CONTINUITY AND DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter I argued that Aristotle in NE II 4 establishes an important distinction 
between the action of a virtuous agent and that of a learner who is not (yet) virtuous. The virtuous 
agent performs virtuous actions virtuously – she acts knowingly, chooses such actions for their 
own sake, and acts from a stable and unchanging state – and it is towards this end that a learner’s 
practice of virtuous actions is directed. The learner’s action is closely related to that of the virtuous 
agent – the learner performs the actions that a virtuous agent would perform in a given 
circumstance – but is nevertheless importantly distinct.  
In this chapter, I want to turn our attention from the telos of the development process – that 
is, from the activity of the mature virtuous agent – to the not-virtuously-performed action of the 
learner, and ask how we should conceive of this. I approach this question by way of a demand that 
has been placed on characterisations of the learner’s action, namely the demand that the learner’s 
action be, importantly, continuous with that of the virtuous agent. Various commentators have 
emphasised that accounts of the learner’s action which present this as only coincidentally, or in a 
very minimal way, like that of a virtuous agent make mysterious how such action could result in 
the formation of virtuous dispositions and her coming to act just as a virtuous agent does. As such, 
many have attempted to show the ways in which there is continuity between the two, with a view 
to explaining just how virtue might emerge from the practice of virtuous actions.  
But whilst such concerns are well motivated, and commentators are right to stress the need 
for some form of continuity in action, it is easy to overlook another feature of the learner’s action 
that it is essential to acknowledge, namely that it is something that must develop. We need to 
allow for the possibility that there is also a change that occurs in the learner and the way that she 
acts, and that there is development and progress that must take place over the course of her 
practice. Whilst accounts of the learner’s action which present it as radically discontinuous with 
that of a virtuous agent might make mysterious the formation of virtuous dispositions, accounts 
which suppress too much the diﬀerences between the action of a learner and that of a virtuous 
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agent seem equally to exclude the possibility of any significant change in the developing subject 
and the way in which she acts; the sort of change we might have thought the practice of virtuous 
actions was supposed to eﬀect (1105b4-5). The challenge, then, is to find a conception of the 
learner’s action which meets both of these requirements: one which does not leave mysterious 
how virtuous agency and virtuous activity could ever emerge from the learner’s practice, but 
allows at the same time that there is something transformative about such practice, as Aristotle 
himself indicates.  
3.2 A REQUIREMENT OF CONTINUITY  
Aristotle’s discussion of moral habituation in the early chapters of NE II points to an intimate 
connection between the actions of a learner and of those of a virtuous agent, and it is to this 
connection that commentators appeal in arguing that there is a strong continuity between the 
action of a learner and that of a virtuous agent.  
In NE II 1, recall, Aristotle concludes that “states come about through like activities (ἐκ τῶν 
ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται)” (1103b21-22), and continues: “that is why we must perform 
the right activities, since [diﬀerent] states follow in accordance with the diﬀerences in these (διὸ 
δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιὰς ἀποδιδόναι: κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἕξεις) 
(1103b22-23). That like states arise from like activities is a claim that is reiterated in what follows, 
notably in NE III 5 when Aristotle writes, on the topic of responsibility for one’s character and 
actions, that only “a totally insensible person would not know that a given activity is the source of 
the corresponding state (τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται, 
κομιδῇ ἀναισθήτου)” (1114a13-14). 
In NE II 2 meanwhile, having observed the ways in which virtues are both cultivated and 
destroyed, Aristotle writes that not only are the sources and destruction of the virtues found in 
the same things, “but the exercise of the virtues will also be in the same things (ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ 
ἐνέργειαι ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔσονται)” (1104a8-29). And he continues to point to the connection 
between what one does on the way to acquiring a state, and what one will be able to do once one 
is in that state, through an analogy with health and strength. By standing firm in situations people 
become brave, and once they are brave they will be most capable of standing firm (1104b1-3). 
By connecting the claim that “we become just by doing just things” (1103b1), with the claim 
that “things are called just and temperate, when they are such as the just and temperate person 
would do (τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματα δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα λέγεται, ὅταν ᾖ τοιαῦτα οἷα ἂν ὁ δίκαιος ἢ ὁ 
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σώφρων πράξειεν)” (1105b5-7), I argued in Chapter 2 that this reveals that both the student of 
virtue and the virtuous agent perform virtuous actions. But in light of the close connection 
alluded to in these passages between the action of a learner and that of a virtuous agent, and a 
desire to make intelligible the development of virtuous dispositions from the performance of 
virtuous actions, various commentators have seen the need to stipulate further continuity 
between the action of the learner and that of a virtuous agent, beyond their performing the same 
virtuous actions.  
Sherman, for example, places great stress on the importance of the conditions that virtue 
meets being reflected in the educational process (1989, p.159), and for this reason argues that our 
account of the learner’s practice must show the origins of her practical wisdom. Others meanwhile 
have registered concerns with accounts that suggest a significant discontinuity between the 
actions of learners and those of virtuous agents, with Broadie, for example, writing of Aristotle in 
NE II 4 that “the more he stresses the diﬀerences, the more one is entitled to wonder how merely 
performing the actions leads to moral character” (1991, p.104).1 The question is: what sort of 
diﬀerences between the action of a learner and that of a virtuous agent would make the 
development of virtue appear problematic, and precisely what sort of continuity do we require? I 
want to begin by examining an objection that has recently been pressed against the distinction 
between a learner’s action and that of a virtuous agent defended in the last chapter, before 
considering more concrete ways in which continuity between the two has been demanded. 
3.3 THE CONTINUITY WORRY 
I argued in the previous chapter that Aristotle establishes a distinction between the action of a 
learner and that of a virtuous agent, according to which the latter agent performs virtuous actions 
                                                             
1 Hursthouse approaches the issue of continuity from a diﬀerent perspective, beginning not with the mature 
virtuous agent and asking how we should conceive of the young learner in light of this, but by stressing what she takes 
to be “a specially realistic feature of Aristotle's thought”, namely that: 
he never forgets the fact that we were all once children. To read almost any other famous moral 
philosopher is to receive the impression that we, the intelligent adult readers addressed, sprang fully 
formed from our father's brow. That children form part of the furniture of the world occasionally 
comes up in passing (about as often as the mention of non‐human animals), but the utterly basic fact 
that we were once as they are, and that whatever we are now is continuous with how we were then, is 
completely ignored (1998, p.14). 
I think this, indeed, is one of the central concerns of Burnyeat’s account too: 
from all this it follows not only that for a long time moral development must be a less than fully rational 
process, but also, what is less often acknowledged, that a mature morality must in large part continue 
to be what it originally was, a matter of responses deriving from sources other than reflective reason 
(1980, p.80). 
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virtuously (that is, knowingly, choosing them for their own sake, and from a firm and unchanging 
state), whilst the former does not. Yet accounts which maintain such a distinction between the 
learner and the virtuous agent have come under recent scrutiny in an article by Marta Jimenez, 
who argues that Aristotle’s apparent solution to the puzzle of NE II 4 gives rise to what she calls 
a ‘Problem of Continuity’. For, Jimenez argues: 
if we take the view to be that learners become virtuous by doing virtuous actions in a diﬀerent 
way to how virtuous people do them – i.e. not virtuously – then it is hard to see how actions 
performed in that way can contribute to the formation of truly virtuous dispositions (2016, p.4). 
Thus she argues that if habituation is to be successful, we should grant that a learner can fulfil “at 
least occasionally and at least to some degree the requirements for virtuously performed virtuous 
action”, thus enabling us “to see the origins of the capacity to choose well and the stability and 
firmness required for virtue” (2016, p.17-18).2 If a learner could not fulfil the requirements for 
virtuously performed action, at least on occasion and at least to some degree, Jimenez argues that 
it is unclear how virtuous dispositions could be formed as a result of her practice.  
The addition of “at least to some degree” in her positive proposal is important I take it, for it 
would certainly be problematic to argue that a learner could meet the requirements for acting 
virtuously on occasion – and so act in this way on such occasions, as I will presently argue. 
Aristotle’s remarks in NE II 4, as I have already argued, reveal that to act virtuously is something 
distinctive of the virtuous agent, and once we recognise this, it becomes both apparent that a 
learner could not act in this way, and less clear why the learner’s not acting in this way should be 
regarded as problematic. It will be helpful to examine Jimenez’ concern and positive proposal 
alongside Aristotle’s remarks in NE II 4, to understand what kind of continuity between the 
learner’s action and that of the virtuous agent we should and should not be demanding.  
Jimenez is concerned that if a learner acts not-virtuously it is then hard to see how in so acting 
virtuous dispositions could emerge. Yet it should be clear that if we were to suppose that a learner 
could meet all the requirements for acting virtuously (and thus act virtuously), even ‘on occasion’, 
this would appear seriously to threaten the distinction between the learner’s action and that of 
the virtuous agent established in the previous chapter, according to which only a virtuous agent 
can act virtuously. One might perhaps think we should then revise the view arrived at in the 
                                                             
2 It is for this reason that Jimenez reads the disanalogy between virtues and skills at 1105a29-b4 as she does (see 
§2.4.1.3 above). Jimenez argues that the disanalogy points to the conditions that must be met by a learner if her action 
is to be successful: a learner in the case of skills must pay attention to the product and the eﬀect her actions have on 
this; a learner in the case of the virtues must herself be in the conditions specified at 1105a31-33.  
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previous chapter, yet our close examination there of Aristotle’s argument in NE II 4 revealed to 
us the importance of maintaining the distinction between the virtuously performed action of a 
virtuous agent and the action of a learner. In terms of the interpretation of the argument of II 4 
itself, it is clear that we need to maintain that a learner does not act virtuously, if we are to maintain 
– as Aristotle seeks to show – that the learner, in performing virtuous actions, is not thereby 
virtuous. In the second clause of the grammar example at 1105a23-25, Aristotle writes that an agent 
“will be grammatical, then, if he does something grammatical and grammatically (τότε οὖν ἔσται 
γραμματικός, ἐὰν καὶ γραμματικόν τι ποιήσῃ καὶ γραμματικῶς)”, and mutatis mutandis for the case 
of virtue. If someone does something grammatical and does it grammatically, then she is a 
grammarian; likewise, if she does something virtuous and does it virtuously, she is virtuous.3 Thus 
if a learner acts virtuously, it would follow from these remarks that she is thereby virtuous. But 
Aristotle is seeking precisely to show that a learner is not yet virtuous.4  
If Jimenez were to propose that a learner could meet the requirements for acting virtuously 
(and thus do so) on occasion, without her qualification, this would conflict with the distinction 
Aristotle needs to maintain in this passage. It is important, then, that Jimenez later adds that a 
learner could (only) meet the requirements of virtuously performed action “to some degree”, for 
if she only meets the requirements “to some degree” – by meeting two, but not three of the 
conditions, say – it is possible to maintain still that a learner does not yet act virtuously. Indeed, 
Jimenez’ subsequent discussion reveals that she takes meeting the requirements of virtuously 
performed action “at least to some degree” to consist in her acting (on occasion) with a virtuous 
motivation (and perhaps also with knowledge), whilst not yet possessing “stable dispositions” 
(2016, p.17). And since for Aristotle the possession of a stable state is a condition of an action’s 
being performed virtuously – indeed, the stability condition, along with the choice condition, is 
marked by Aristotle as being all-important (1104b3-4) – this shows that it would not be possible 
to act virtuously without being in possession of a stable state (even if one fulfilled the knowledge 
                                                             
3 See also: “But the person who does these things is not just or temperate, but only if they act as just and temperate 
people act (δίκαιος δὲ καὶ σώφρων ἐστὶν οὐχ ὁ ταῦτα πράττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὕτω πράττων ὡς οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες 
πράττουσιν)” (1105b7-9); if someone does virtuous actions as the virtuous person does, then they are virtuous.  
4 Jimenez does not recognise the importance of this distinction here, since she endorses the possibility reading 
of the original challenge, and hence supposes the challenge can be met merely by showing that it is indeed possible to 
perform virtuous actions without being virtuous. If we recognise, as I have argued at length, that the original challenge 
does not concern the possibility of performing certain sorts of actions, but rather the relation between virtue and 
action, we see that Aristotle needs to maintain that a learner performs virtuous actions, but does not perform them 
virtuously, if he is to maintain that the learner in performing virtuous actions is not virtuous already. If Aristotle were 
to allow that a learner can perform virtuous actions virtuously, he would no longer have the resources to show this. 
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and choice conditions). Jimenez’ use of the phrase “at least to some degree” appears to be intended 
to pick out the idea that a learner can (on occasion) fulfil two but not three of the conditions on 
virtuously performed action.5 From §3.4 I will suggest that we will do better to examine more 
concretely the kind of continuity in the learner’s action that is required, rather than talking of 
fulfilling the requirements for acting virtuously “at least to some degree”, since this might be taken 
to suggest – falsely – that a learner can thus act virtuously.  
So what, then, are we to make of the supposed ‘problem of continuity’ (2016, p.4) that 
Jimenez claims arises from Aristotle’s distinction in NE II 4? Jimenez’ remarks in the passage 
quoted above are again somewhat misleading, for they imply that if we are to conceive of the 
learner as not acting virtuously, we will be unable to explain how the practice of not-virtuously 
performed actions (as she puts it) could result in the formation of virtuous dispositions. But if we 
reflect on what for Aristotle it is to act virtuously, we can see that the fact that a learner does not 
act in this way is not as problematic as Jimenez’ remarks above seem to imply.  
As we have seen, for an action to count as virtuously performed the agent must act knowingly, 
she must choose the action for its own sake, and her action must issue from a stable state. It is a 
very demanding picture, but it is the picture Aristotle presents all the same. Now if we take 
seriously, in particular, the presence of the stability condition in Aristotle’s definition of acting 
virtuously, this reveals that the adverb is intended to point to something distinctive about the 
action of a virtuous agent, for only she has the requisite stability. Once we recognise this, it 
becomes less clear why it should be regarded as problematic that a learner does not act in precisely 
this way. To act virtuously is clearly the end towards which a learner’s practice of virtuous actions 
is aimed; to say that a learner does not act virtuously, is to say that she does not yet act in this 
distinctive way. But this should not in itself be regarded as problematic. For compare this case 
with a language learner. A skilled speaker of a foreign language speaks fluently, whilst the learner 
does not. To claim that a learner does not speak in this way does not in itself entail a problem; we 
are not puzzled as to how a learner can move from not speaking fluently to speaking fluently. Thus 
the distinction between the learner’s action and that of the virtuous agent does not obviously 
                                                             
5 We might suppose that there are more appropriate ways of expressing the thought that a learner meets some 
but not all the conditions of virtuously performed actions than with the phrase “to some degree”. The phrase may also 
be intended to pick out the thought that with regards to those conditions that are fulfilled (the knowledge and choice 
conditions), the learner’s fulfilment of those conditions is also not ‘full’ (her knowledge, perhaps, is not as extensive 
as that of the virtuous agent’s). As Jimenez herself admits, however, the learner does not meet the stability condition 
(indeed, one cannot possess a stable character ‘on occasion’). 
 81 
entail a ‘problem of continuity’, and so we should resist the thought that only in allowing that a 
learner can act virtuously could the development of virtue ever be intelligible.  
I suggest then that we ought to think about the learner’s action in more concrete terms, and 
to consider how we should conceive of her not-yet-virtuously-performed action in such a way that 
the development of virtue and realisation of virtuous activity is intelligible.  
3.4 JIMENEZ’ UNDERLYING CONCERN: RADICAL DISCONTINUITY 
Jimenez’ concern, I take it, is that to say that a learner does not act virtuously might suggest that 
she acts in a way that is radically discontinuous with the action of a virtuous agent: 
the main problem is that this reading might lead us to think that learners do not fulfil the 
conditions for virtuously performed virtuous action at all and thus overlook the conclusion 
that… if habituation is to be successful, then the actions of the learners must be done well and 
not just in any old way (2016, p.17).  
Her worry is that a ‘deflationary’ picture of the learner’s action might suggest that her actions are 
merely coincidentally like those of a virtuous agent, such that it is hard to see how anything like 
virtue could develop from her practice. To illustrate her worry, Jimenez oﬀers an example from 
the case of grammatical skill: 
If a learner of Spanish keeps copying random words from a list and putting them together in 
sentences, even if she were so lucky that she hit upon correct sentences on every occasion 
(thus producing grammatical outcomes), we would not say that she is really learning anything 
in that process. To learn something through her practice, the learner’s productions cannot be 
merely coincidental nor simply done in any old way (2016, p.14-5). 
Jimenez is of course right that in such a case it would be mysterious how a student comes to 
develop the kind of knowledge that is constitutive of grammatical skill. But why should the claim 
that a learner does not act virtuously lead us to suppose that she acts in ‘any old way’, and that her 
action is to be understood as anything like this picture of learning – or rather, precisely not 
learning – Spanish?  
3.4.1 MECHANICAL ACTION 
The Spanish example oﬀered by Jimenez presents a picture of (not-) learning in which a subject 
repeatedly hits on correct Spanish sentences, thus producing something that would count as a 
‘grammatical’ outcome, and Jimenez is right to claim that such a process could not conceivably 
result in the subject’s learning Spanish, since the subject is not aware of, or attending in any way, 
to what she is doing. Now if the learner’s not yet virtuously performed action were like this, it 
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would indeed by mysterious how such action would result in virtue. But as we shall see shortly, 
we need not conceive of the learner’s action in so deflationary a way that she merely performs 
coincidentally virtuous actions without any form of cognitive engagement, as is the case in 
Jimenez’ Spanish example.  
Jimenez’ Spanish example conjures a picture of the learner’s action that, admittedly, was at 
least implicit in a number of accounts of Aristotelian habituation in the recent past; namely, those 
accounts which portray the habituation process to be ‘mindless’ or ‘mechanical’. Such a picture 
has been forcefully rejected by commentators over the last forty years, but it will be helpful to 
briefly review a number of so-called ‘mechanical’ accounts, to bring into view what a problematic 
picture of the learner’s action would look like, and the form that a corrective to this should take.  
3.4.1.1 PRODUCING MECHANICAL OUTPUTS 
The past tendency to conceive of the learner’s action as mechanical was often merely implicit,6 and 
as we will see, is revealed in a number of diﬀerent accounts of what is eﬀected in the habituation 
process. Perhaps one of the few explicit statements of a mechanical view of the learner’s action is 
to be found in Grant, who in his 1885 commentary, writes: 
A mechanical theory is here given both of the intellect and the moral character, as if the one 
could be acquired by teaching, the other by a course in habits…7  We need only compare the 
theory of virtue in this book with the discussions in the Meno to see how immensely moral 
philosophy had gained in definiteness in the meantime. While becoming definite and 
systematic, however, it had also to an extent become scholastic and mechanical (Grant, 1885, 
p.480-1).8  
Whilst Grant, attributes to Aristotle a mechanical view, this quotation oﬀers relatively little 
information as to what such a view amounts to. For further insight, one might, however, draw on 
other parts of Grant’s commentary on NE II 1, such as the following which seeks to explicate 
Aristotle’s claim that character states are formed out of corresponding acts. Grant writes:  
In each act and moment at the outset of life, something which was potential in us and quite 
indeterminate for good or evil (δύναμις) is brought into actuality (ἐνέργεια) and now is 
determinately either good or bad. This determination, by the law of habits, reproduces itself, 
                                                             
6 There are some, indeed, who explicitly reject the idea that the learner’s action should be conceived of as 
‘mindless’, or ‘mechanical’, whilst nevertheless implicitly assuming such a picture (see for example Engberg-Pedersen, 
1983, and Hursthouse’s 1986 criticism that Engberg-Pedersen presents a picture of habituation as mindless). 
7 It is worth noting that the term ‘mechanical’ is used here to describe Aristotle’s view of character, rather than 
his view habituation per se, though Grant’s immediate reference to the idea that character is acquired ‘by a course in 
habits’ suggests for him an intimate connection between the nature of a character and the process by which it is 
acquired. See also (1885, p.458) for reference to the ‘mechanical’ nature of Aristotle’s theory.  
8 Stewart in his commentary also cites Grant’s remarks in apparent agreement (1892, pp.170-1). 
 83 
and thus there is no longer left an ambiguous δύναμις, but a έξις, or definite tendency for good 
or evil, is superinduced… It will be observed that why an act tends to reproduce itself Aristotle 
does not inquire (1885, p.484, my emphasis). 
The allusion here to an act reproducing itself suggests a conception of habituation in which this 
merely involves the repetition of similar actions resulting in a mindless tendency to reproduce 
such acts.9 Grant does not refer to the process, nor the result, as ‘mindless’, but the suggestion that 
‘an act reproduces itself ’ suggests that the resulting moments of action owe to the operation of a 
mechanism rather than any kind of thoughtful responsiveness on the part of the agent. 
Interestingly, I think we can see a remnant of this kind of view in Curzer, who whilst stressing 
that habituation cannot be mindless, writes that: 
It is easy enough to see how performing virtuous acts can provide dispositions of virtuous 
action. . . But the acquisition of the two remaining components of virtue seems mysterious. 
How do we acquire the ability to identify virtuous acts? How do we come to desire virtuous 
acts for their own sake? (2012, pp.318-19). 
That Curzer takes the emerging disposition to act (which he takes to be a discrete ‘component’ of 
virtue) to be easily explained by the practice of virtuous actions suggests a picture of habituation 
in which the practice of actions mechanically results in a tendency to so act. 
Given that Aristotle’s picture of moral virtue and virtuous activity involves more than a blind 
tendency to act in certain ways few commentators have supposed that Aristotle endorses anything 
like a picture of moral habituation on which a learner mindlessly repeats certain actions,10 and 
                                                             
9 Support for the thought that repetition plays some involvement in the course of habituation can be gleaned 
from a number of sources. At 1105b3 Aristotle states that it is by doing just and temperate actions many times that we 
achieve virtue, and in the EE Aristotle defines as habituated anything which “as a result of a pattern of conduct that 
is not innate, by repeated (πολλάκις), movement of one sort of another, so that it is eventually capable of being active 
in that way (οὕτως ἤδη τὸ ἐνεργητικόν)” (1220b1-3). Elsewhere, in the Rhetoric, Aristotle writes that “acts are done 
from habit because individuals have done them many times before” (1369b6), and both the Rhetoric and De Memoria 
associate habitual events with what is frequent and repeated (Rhet. 1370a6; Mem 452a27).  
In criticising the emphasis placed on repetition in such accounts, I do not mean to suggest that repetition plays 
no role in the student’s habituation, for the above quotations reveal that it clearly does. Broadie writes that while 
“forming a habit is connected with repetition, […] where what is repeated are (for example) just acts, habituation 
cannot be a mindless process, and the habit (once formed) of acting justly cannot be blind in its operations” (1991, 
p.109), and goes on to stress the variety of actions and responses that fall under the description of ‘just action’ and 
which must thus be repeated. In this case what repetition of just acts would aﬀord is experience of a variety of actions, 
rather than repeated performance of the very same thing.  
A certain emphasis on repetition does appear to be a symptom of mechanical accounts, and I suggest that such 
accounts tend to present the achievements of habituation as owing to the operation of a mechanism on a subject, 
rather than to any active involvement of the agent. 
10 Whilst those commentators who have (at least implicitly) presented such views of the learner’s habituation do 
not tend to oﬀer an analysis of the nature of the learner’s action, in accordance with my characterisation in Chapter 
2 of the learner’s action as an act of agency which thus involves the exercise of certain psychological states, (to be 
charitable) we should not suppose that even on the mechanical view the learner’s action would be entirely mindless. 
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thereby develops a mindless and mechanical tendency to repeat those actions. Nevertheless, there 
are other forms that the so-called ‘mechanical view’ of the learner’s habituation has taken, and it 
will be helpful to take stock of these too, before looking to the kind of correctives that have been 
proposed to these views. 
3.4.1.2 THE PLEASURE OF REPETITION  
Despite the almost complete rejection of mechanical accounts such as Grant’s, there remained for 
much longer a certain tendency to revert to a mechanical view of the learner’s habituation in 
explaining the cultivation of a learner’s desiderative states. This tendency can be found in a 
number of versions of the traditional, non-rational picture of virtue and habituation discussed in 
Chapter 1; in particular, in those views which emphasise the need for ‘force’ in bringing the non-
rational elements of the soul into a good condition.11 Such views often begin with Aristotle’s claim 
in X 9 that “passion yields not to reason but to force (βίᾳ)” (1179b29),12 and suppose that it is for 
this reason that habituation, conceived of as non-rational (and for some, non-cognitive) process, 
is thus needed to bring these into line with the prescriptions of reason. 
It is worth noting, as an aside, that when Aristotle claims that emotion yields only to force, 
we should recognise, as Joachim and Engberg-Pedersen do not, that he is talking here about a 
formed character. Aristotle is speaking here only of the grown up person who lives kata pathos, 
and is claiming that if a person has formed certain emotional dispositions, these will not be 
amenable to reason, and will only yield to force. But as Hursthouse remarks, “the passions of those 
who have yet to be habituated and are being so do not necessarily have to yield – to force or reason. 
They have to be amended, developed, complicated and enriched” (1986, p.214). 
                                                             
As I argued in Chapter 2, if an agent accidentally slipped and shot a bullet from a gun, this would not count as having 
performed, say, a brave action (it may not in fact count as an action at all). Indeed, if any advocate of a mechanical 
view held that the learner’s habituation consisted in performing ‘actions’ conceived of in this way, they would invite 
the charge that this conception of the learner’s action does not even meet the requirements that a learner perform 
just, temperate and brave actions. To be charitable to the various mechanical views canvassed, then, advocates must 
then grant that a learner acts intentionally at least in minimal way as required for what she does to count as an action 
and moreover a virtuous action. Nevertheless, we can still claim that such accounts present the learner’s habituation 
as ‘mindless’ to the extent that she does not attend particularly closely to what she is doing, to the nature of her action 
and importantly the situations to which it is (or ought to be) a response.  
11 See for example Joachim (1951), Engberg-Pedersen (1983). 
12 Joachim commenting on the X 9 claim writes:  
force, then – external compulsion – must be applied: the character of the pupil must be prepared by a 
training in which he himself is passively subject to authority, in order that he may become amenable to 
the influence of reasoning and true theory” (1951, p.297-8, my emphasis). 
Joachim does not explain how the use of force results in the formation of virtuous emotional dispositions; it is 
presumably taken as a brute fact that such dispositions will result from this.  
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In any case, whilst those commentators who maintain that habituation is required in order to 
bring the passions of a subject into line by force do not maintain that all that is eﬀected by the 
habituation process is a mere behavioural tendency, they nevertheless appeal in a similar fashion 
to the ‘mechanism’ of habituation and in particular the power of repetition, which act upon the 
learner to transform her desires not only by non-rational, but also non-cognitive means.  
One version of such a view is that proposed by Engberg-Pedersen, who argues that we can 
conceive of the learner as being ‘forced’ to perform virtuous actions under psychological 
pressure,13 and that through repeatedly performing actions that are initially undesired, the learner 
forms new desires to perform those actions, on the basis of the empirical fact that: 
things which are at first felt to be painful are no longer so ‘when they have become customary’ 
(synēthē genomena 1179b35-36). Thus the mechanism of the process of habituation depends 
for its eﬀect on a fact about the phenomenon of ‘custom’. (cf. also Rhet. 1.10 1369b16-18) (1983, 
p.183).  
Desiring for Aristotle involves in some way apprehending the object of desire as pleasant or 
attractive (see e.g. NE 1113a23-24; DA 433a27-29; 413b23‐24; 414b1‐6),14 and so Engberg-Pedersen 
must suppose – if habituation is to result in the formation of desires for virtuous action, not simply 
a lack of resistance to it – that the student must also come to find her habitual action pleasant. Yet 
the NE passage that Engberg-Pedersen quotes only tells us that virtuous actions will not be painful 
when they have become habitual, and not that those things which were once painful are rendered 
positively pleasurable by habituation. If it is the case that repetition only renders painless what 
was previously painful, such an account of habituation can then only explain, at most, the 
development of enkrateia;15  if the agent does not take pleasure in virtuous actions and positively 
desire to perform these virtuous actions, she cannot count as virtuous. 
To explain how the repetition of actions could result in the agent taking pleasure in those 
actions, Engberg-Pedersen could however appeal to the other passages he cites, namely the claim 
                                                             
13 Engberg-Pedersen takes as his model Aristotle’s account of forced acts in his treatment of the voluntary in NE 
III in order to explain how it is that “habituation may accomplish what reason cannot” (1983, p.182), viz. the training 
of a student’s desiderative states. In NE III Aristotle presents an account of acts that an agent is forced to perform 
under psychological pressure (1110a5-8); acts which can be contrasted with those which are truly enforced, 
unintentional and to which an agent contributes nothing, such as when someone directs another person’s hand when 
they are asleep. Engberg-Pedersen suggests we should see a similar mechanism as lying behind the eﬃcacy of 
habituation (1983, p.182); just as a person acting under the ransom of a Tyrant, will perform some unwanted act in 
order to avoid some greater evil (the murder of their family, say), the person being habituated is likewise ‘forced’ to 
do some particular act in order to avoid evils she takes to be greater. This, he takes it, “is the point of the remark about 
passions yielding to force and the mention of fear and punishment” (1983, p.182). 
14 This will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 6. 
15 This challenge is raised by Hursthouse (1983, p.210). 
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in the Rhetoric that “the familiar and the habitual are among the pleasurable; for people even do 
with pleasure many things they do not naturally find pleasant when they have grown accustomed 
to them (ἔστιν δὲ καὶ τὸ σύνηθες καὶ τὸ ἐθιστὸν ἐν τοῖς ἡδέσιν: πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει μὴ ἡδέων, 
ὅταν συνεθισθῶσιν, ἡδέως ποιοῦσιν)” (Rht. 1369b16-18).16 
In any case, on Engberg-Pedersen’s account, the student of virtue is forced to perform virtuous 
actions, and comes to desire to perform such actions because it is a fact (according to the Rhetoric) 
that when an action is repeated, and it becomes customary, it will no longer be painful. Like 
Grant’s account, then, the success of habituation comes down to the power of mindless repetition, 
and does not to this extent require any thoughtful engagement on the part of the learner. 
3.4.1.3 PLEASURE THROUGH ASSOCIATION  
A related account also appeals to the power of repetition to explain how a learner comes to take 
pleasure in virtuous actions and so to desire such action on future occasions. In this case, however, 
the student’s pleasure in such action is not explained by the inherent painlessness or pleasure of 
habitual action, but rather by the power of association. The learner is trained to take pleasure in 
virtuous action through the association of antecedent pleasures with such action. Thus it is 
supposed that the student will come to find such actions pleasurable by association and so be 
motivated to perform them in the future.  
This is the thought that underlies the many accounts which appeal to the power of rewards in 
training a student to desire to perform virtuous actions.17 MacIntyre, for example, describes how 
                                                             
16 Curzer too discusses this passage in criticising a version of the ‘pleasure of the habitual’ view which he 
mistakenly attributes to Burnyeat. Curzer writes that:  
Burnyeat attributes to Aristotle the view that repetition makes virtuous acts pleasant. But Aristotle 
never actually says this. He does say “things familiar and things habitual belong to the class of pleasant 
things; for there are many actions not naturally pleasant which men perform with pleasure, once they 
have become used to them. (Rht. 1369b15-19; 1179b35-6). But a few lines later Aristotle goes on to count 
among pleasures escape from painful or apparently painful things and the exchange of a greater pain 
for less (Rht. 1369b26-8). So in these passages his claim really is that habituation transforms acts that 
are not naturally pleasant into pleasant acts or less painful acts” (2012, p.325-6).  
It is not clear, however, that Burnyeat does believe that repetition itself makes acts pleasant; he merely claims that 
learning to take proper enjoyment in objects takes time and practice (1980, p.78). 
17 This is another view that has often been mistakenly attributed to Burnyeat. Fossheim (2007), for example, 
takes Burnyeat’s famous claim “that the child’s sense of pleasure […] should be hooked up with just and noble things 
so that his unreasoned evaluative responses may develop in connection with the right objects” (Burnyeat, 1980, p.78) 
to imply that Burnyeat has in mind a picture of habituation according to which antecedent pleasures are associated, 
through repetition, with virtuous actions. Grönroos makes a similar attribution (2007, p.267, n.33).  
But there is nothing to indicate that this is Burnyeat’s view. Burnyeat is not identifying as a problem the child’s 
motivation to perform virtuous actions, and proposing as a solution an appeal to the only thing that will motivate 
them to act, namely those things in which they already take pleasure, but rather is claiming that since the child’s (only) 
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a child might be brought to see what he calls the goods ‘internal to’ an activity, by means of goods 
‘external to’ that activity, writing:  
I wish to teach [a child] to play chess, although the child has no particular desire to learn the 
game. The child does however, have a very strong desire for candy… I therefore tell the child 
that if the child will play chess with me once a week, I will give the child 50 cents worth of 
candy. Thus motivated the child plays and plays to win (1981, p.188). 
We see a similar picture in Lear, who also takes the learner to be motivated by an external pleasure: 
The child will typically begin acting considerately in order to gain the reward or 
encouragement: that is, for an external pleasure. But, through repetition, the child begins to 
derive pleasure from the considerate acts themselves (1988, p.169). 
Here again the role of repetition in producing the kinds of association needed is stressed.18  
The role of ‘positive reinforcement’ in eﬀecting the transformation of a student’s desires is 
challenged by Curzer (2002, 2012), who claims instead that pain rather than pleasure drives moral 
development.19 As evidence that Aristotle endorses negative reinforcement, Curzer appeals to 
Aristotle’s claims that “the many yield to compulsion more than to argument and to punishments 
more than to the fine (οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἀνάγκῃ μᾶλλον ἢ λόγῳ πειθαρχοῦσι καὶ ζημίαις ἢ τῷ καλῷ)” 
(1180a4-5), and that the legislator “must impose corrective treatments and penalties on anyone 
who disobeys or lacks the right nature, and must completely expel the incurable (ἀπειθοῦσι δὲ καὶ 
ἀφυεστέροις οὖσι κολάσεις τε καὶ τιμωρίας ἐπιτιθέναι, τοὺς δ᾽ ἀνιάτους ὅλως ἐξορίζειν)” (1180a8-
10). Curzer claims moreover that “Aristotle does not take pain to be a mere side eﬀect of moral 
development or even a minor contributor; he thinks that the pain drives the process” (2012, 
p.337).  
This view might strike one as quite diﬀerent to the ‘Associated Pleasures’ view, on the grounds 
that it takes pain, not pleasure, to drive the habituation process, yet the assumption that 
habituation works by a mechanism of association remains. On Curzer’s picture of habituation, a 
learner performs virtuous acts “over and over under the threat of pain” (2012, p.337), and by the 
‘mechanism of internalising punishments’ she moves from being punished for vicious acts to 
                                                             
source of motivation is pleasure, we had better make sure this is aligned with the right objects from the start. See also 
Chapter 4 (§4.4). 
18 See also Hutchinson (1995, p.213). 
19 Some attempt to arbitrate between these positions is made by Taylor, who writes that: 
it is clear that Aristotle’s insistence that correct education proceeds via pleasure and distress (1104b9-
16) stresses the importance both of positive reinforcement of desirable character traits via pleasure and 
negative reinforcement of undesirable traits via distress; at its simplest, we have to learn to like acting 
well and to dislike acting badly (2007, p.81 n.5). 
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punishing herself. By coming eventually to feel aidōs for vicious acts, he claims, the many come to 
desire to perform virtuous acts for their own sake.  
On both the views that emphasise the role of reward in habituation, and Curzer’s view which 
emphasises the role of punishment, the idea is that independent and antecedent pleasures and 
pains are associated with virtuous or vicious actions by means of repetition, such that students of 
virtue come to find (by association) virtuous actions pleasant and vicious actions painful, and thus 
to desire to perform virtuous actions and to avoid vicious actions.  
3.4.1.4 SUMMARY 
The first of the three forms of ‘mechanical’ accounts surveyed took the result of habituation to be 
a mindless tendency to produce certain actions, whereas the second two took the result to be a 
certain pleasure in producing such actions; all three however take the success of moral habituation 
to be attributable to the power of repeating the same, or similar, actions. None of the accounts 
represent the learner as cognitively engaged in any significant way with what she is doing (see n.10 
above); nor, given what they take habituation to eﬀect, do they appear to see this as necessary to 
her success.20 To the extent that such views do not attribute to the learner any significant cognitive 
engagement in, or attention to, her action, they are similar to Jimenez’ Spanish example, and as 
we will now see, have long been rejected owing to their failure to explain how virtue could emerge 
from such practice.  
3.4.2 DISCERNING ACTION 
Since the exercise of virtue involves more than simply repeating certain sorts of actions, but 
requires that a virtuous agent must discern what to do in a given situation, a view of the learner’s 
action and the habituation process wherein the learner merely repeats certain actions without 
attending in any important sense to what she does, or the situations in which she finds herself, 
will be unable to explain how a learner comes to acquire the knowledge of virtuous action 
characteristic of a virtuous agent. The virtuous agent must be responsive to the details of situations 
and be able to discern, in a variety of situations, what action is required of her (see esp. 1105a32; 
                                                             
20 Admittedly, Engberg-Pedersen does maintain that habituation “is a non-rational process that results in a 
desiderative state (of the orektikon) and a non-rational cognitive state (of the faculty of perception)” (1983, p.161, my 
emphasis), and argues that since one result of habituation is a cognitive state, habituation cannot be a mindless process 
(1983, p.158). His account of the training of the learner’s pleasure, however, presents the learner as passively subject to 
a mechanism, and does not require the engagement of other cognitive capacities.  
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1143a33-34). And if anything like this ability is to develop through the practice of virtuous actions, 
commentators stress, it is clear that the learner must be attentive in her action, and not merely act 
in a ‘mindless’ way.21  
Numerous scholars thus maintain that habituation is not blind, mindless training, but instead 
involves from the start both the exercise and the cultivation of the learners’ perceptive and critical 
powers. Kraut, for example, argues that in order for an agent to know what is just in a given 
circumstance, it will be necessary that on some occasions they: 
recognize that an equal division is what a situation calls for; at other times, he will see that 
some deserve more, or need more, than others; and that these are appropriate reasons for 
deviation from an allocation in which each gets the same share. To become just by repeatedly 
doing what is just is to encounter many situations in which one must come to a decision about 
what is just, and in this way to develop suﬃcient experience and insight regarding such 
matters (2012, p.538). 
 
Or more recently Jimenez herself writes: “if learners do not exercise their perceptual and 
deliberative capacities in their practices towards virtue, then it becomes a mystery how they 
eventually develop them” (2016, p.6). 
In these quotations we can discern two reasons for thinking that successful habituation must 
require the exercise of these capacities. On the one hand, there is the thought that these capacities 
are clearly operative in virtuous activity, and that the development of these capacities requires that 
the student must have had practice in using them.22 Without having practised using our critical 
or deliberative capacities, it is unclear how such capacities could ever develop, as mature 
engagement in virtuous activity surely requires that they do. On the other hand, there appears to 
be the suggestion in the quotation from Kraut that a learner’s knowledge of virtuous action 
depends on her having paid thoughtful attention to what she does and what is demanded in 
                                                             
21 Sorabji presents his account of the role of intellect in virtue as a reaction to those who “have treated habituation 
as a mindless process suﬃcient for making men good” (1973-74, p.107; p.126); Cooper notes that “though [Aristotle] 
is not careful to say so, this process of training is not the purely mechanical thing it may at first glance seem: . . . the 
habituation must involve also (though Aristotle does not explain how it does so) the training of the mind”  (1986, 
p.8); Hursthouse, indeed, regards as the deepest objection to Engberg-Pedersen’s view of moral habituation that it “is 
the account of a mechanism, a mindless process” (1988, p.211). See Broadie (1991, p.109) quoted in n.9 above.  
A number of commentators also compare a ‘mindless’ account of habituation to the training of an animal. 
McDowell writes: “it is clear that the habituation that produces excellences of character is not supposed to produce 
motivational propensities that are merely obedient to an extraneous exercise of reason like those of a trained animal 
(1996, p.28); Vasiliou too writes that “Aristotle’s account of habituation is not simply the mindless training of one’s 
appetites – training that, for example, might apply equally to a dog” (2007, p.42).  
Vasiliou recognises the variation in what commentators take non-mindless accounts to consist in. 
22 See, for example Kraut: “a just person is good at thinking about problems that call for a just response. That 
kind of thoughtfulness cannot be acquired by automatically and mindlessly repeating some single type of action like 
brushing one’s teeth” (2012, p.539). 
CHAPTER 3 - CONTINUITY AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
 90 
diﬀerent situations in the course of her habituation. There is something, it seems, about the 
virtuous agent’s epistemic condition that leads commentators to suppose that certain intellectual 
capacities must be operative in the course of the learner’s habituation if we are to account for this 
achievement. In summary, it is supposed either that perceptual and deliberative capacities must 
be exercised if such capacities are to develop, and/or that they must be exercised if the agent is to 
gain the requisite knowledge of virtuous action.23  
Most commentators acknowledge, then, that a learner’s action should be seen as continuous 
with that of the virtuous agent at least to the extent that she must attend to what she does and the 
circumstances in which she acts, exercising the perceptive and even deliberative capacities that we 
see exercised in mature virtuous activity. But this picture of the learner’s action is perfectly 
consistent with the thought that a learner does not act virtuously. We now have in place at least 
one general demand on our conception of how the learner acts, namely that she must be attentive 
in the way described above. 
3.5 VIRTUOUS MOTIVATION 
Whilst the last four decades have seen a clear rejection of what might be called an ‘extreme’ 
deflationary conception of the learner’s action, where this is taken to consist in the repetition of 
actions that are physically like those of the virtuous agent, but to be lacking their cognitive or 
intellectual components, a diﬀerent kind of deflationary view of the learner’s action has persisted.  
According to this view the learner’s action diﬀers from the virtuous agent’s in respect of her 
motivation. Many regard this as the crucial distinction that Aristotle establishes between the 
learner and the virtuous agent in NE II 4. Thus Ross for example argues that: 
the actions that produce virtue are not in their inner nature but only in their external aspect 
like those that virtue produces. Aristotle here (1105a17-b18) lays his finger with precision on 
the distinction between the two elements involved in a completely good action—(a) that the 
thing done should be the right thing to do in the circumstances, and (b) that it should be 
done from a good motive (1949, p.194). 
                                                             
23 It is, I take it, on both of these grounds that intellectualists (see §1.2.2) have argued that habituation must 
involve the exercise of a learner’s intellectual capacities, since they suppose either that moral virtue itself involves the 
exercise of such capacities, or that the kind of knowledge that a learner has could only be acquired through the exercise 
of these capacities. It is worth noting, however, that this demand has often been made in reaction to the kind of 
mechanical views described above (see esp. Sorabji 1973-74), and it is thus worth considering whether all of those 
who have made this demand would continue to insist that a learner’s intellectual capacities must be operative in her 
habituation if it is to be successful, and not grant instead that habituation could involve the exercise of a subject’s 
non-rational, but cognitive capacities.  
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Or more recently, Vasiliou writes: 
What Aristotle needs… to solve to the puzzle of II.4 is not only a separation between virtuous 
action and motive but also the ability to describe the virtuous action, the action to be done, 
without using ethical terms (2007, p.52, n.22).24 
This view, however, has recently been subject to criticism from Jimenez, who has argued that 
accounts of the learner’s action must allow for continuity in motive, as well as continuity in the 
ways already discussed. She argues that the central diﬃculty facing what she calls the 
‘motivationally neutral view’ of the learner’s action is that it introduces an apparent ‘moral 
upbringing gap’: “if the actions of the learners lack virtuous motivation, then it is not clear how 
learners are supposed to become virtuous by doing such actions” (2016, p.23): 
If the actions of the learners of virtue diﬀer in motive from those of virtuous agents, it is hard 
to see how repeatedly performing such actions should lead to the acquisition of a state to 
which proper motivation is crucial. The motivationally neutral conception thus creates a 
moral upbringing gap’ similar to the gap seen by commentators in the explanations of moral 
development given by mechanistic theory (2016, p.24). 
This should, of course, put us in mind of the continuity worry discussed in §3.3 above, which was 
levelled against the proposal that a learner does not act virtuously, and indeed I take it that it is in 
reality a concern about continuity in motivation that underpinned Jimenez’ initial worry. The 
thought, I take it, is that to claim that a learner does not act virtuously might suggest that a learner 
should thus be understood as acting with a motive other than that of the virtuous agent, thus 
making mysterious, Jimenez believes, how she comes to develop the disposition to choose actions 
for their own sake that is characteristic of the virtuous agent.  
In trying to develop our understanding of the learner’s not yet virtuously performed action, 
we ought then to consider the issue of the learner’s motivation and the merits of the picture 
Jimenez proposes in its place. It transpires in Books III and IV that ‘acting for the sake of the 
noble’ is characteristic of the virtuous agent and, as we will discuss further in Chapter 5, appears 
to replace Aristotle’s talk of choosing virtuous actions for their own sake. Since this motivation is 
characteristic of the virtuous agent and, indeed, part of what her acting well consists in, Jimenez 
                                                             
24 Irwin, whose interpretation of NE II 4 we examined in the previous chapter, puts Aristotle’s initial challenge 
in terms of the motivational component of moral virtue: “We may suppose that if the actions are the same, their 
motive must be the same too, so that we can learn to be virtuous only if we already have the motive of the virtuous 
person” (p.1999, 195). 
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argues that “the actions of learners can and indeed must be done for the sake of the noble, even if 
learners do not yet have stable virtuous dispositions of character” (2016, p.7):  
Since the learners’ virtuous actions must be performed well to contribute to the formation of 
virtue, they must be cases of properly hitting the intermediate in action, where the learners 
are both aware that they are doing so, and willing. In the case of the motivation factor, this 
means that the learners do not aim at the right goal under a diﬀerent motivationally neutral 
description, but rather they aim at the noble goal insofar as it is noble. Only if this is the case 
can we understand how the activities of the learners eventually yield dispositions to choose 
the right actions for their own sake and not for some other motive (2016, p.30). 
What Jimenez proposes, then, is a fairly rich conception of the learner’s action, and one in which 
there is a strong continuity between the action of a learner and that of a virtuous agent. Far from 
repeatedly performing outwardly virtuous actions in a mindless or mechanical fashion, Jimenez’ 
successful learner not only intentionally performs virtuous actions, exercising her discriminatory 
capacities when she does so, but she performs such actions for the sake of the noble, insofar as it 
is noble. In its richness it might be regarded as an attractive picture of what moral habituation 
consists in, particularly as compared with the mechanical picture sketched above.  
3.6 THE TEXTS DO NOT MANDATE THE ‘VIRTUOUS MOTIVATION’ VIEW  
Despite certain attractive features of Jimenez’ characterisation of the learner’s action, there are a 
number of concerns to be had about the picture of the learner’s action and habituation that she 
presents, which I will discuss shortly. Jimenez, however, takes it that this view is demanded by 
Aristotle’s remarks on moral development throughout NE II, and I want first to assess whether 
Aristotle’s remarks do commit him to the picture of the learner’s action that Jimenez proposes. 
Jimenez’ argument in favour of her ‘virtuous motivation’ view begins from the thought that 
Aristotle, from the early chapters of NE II, puts great store in ‘how’ a learner is to act. We have 
already seen that for Aristotle there is a strong correlation between the kinds of actions performed 
by learners, and the dispositions that these produce (1103b21-23; 1104b19-21), but Jimenez takes 
him to be making a stronger claim, namely that the way in which the learner performs such actions 
will determine the kind of disposition that is produced. As evidence of this, she appeals to 
Aristotle’s remark at the beginning of II 2, where he writes that: 
We must examine the nature of actions, namely how they ought to be done; for these determine 
also the nature of the dispositions that are produced, as we have said.  
ἀναγκαῖον ἐπισκέψασθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις, πῶς πρακτέον αὐτάς, αὗται γάρ εἰσι κύριαι καὶ 
τοῦ ποιὰς γενέσθαι τὰς ἕξεις, καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν (1103b29-31).  
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Aristotle’s comments reveal, Jimenez argues, that the practice of superficially similar actions will 
not be suﬃcient to produce the desired dispositions; “instead, the actions of the learners need to 
have certain qualities and it is important to pay attention to how they are done, i.e. they need to 
be done in the right way” (2016, p.10). 
As will become evident in the following chapters, I agree with Jimenez that the way in which 
a learner performs virtuous actions will importantly determine how successful her habituation is, 
although as we will see this is for diﬀerent reasons and in a diﬀerent way than Jimenez supposes. 
Even so, it is worth noting that the passage quoted above does not itself provide decisive evidence 
that, for example, the psychological states of the learner when she acts will importantly determine 
the success of her habituation.  
3.6.1.1 THE ‘HOW’ 
Jimenez takes it that ‘πῶς πρακτέον αὐτάς’ in this passage must refer to the psychological states of 
the learner, and indeed that is a very natural way in which to read this phrase. But the discussion 
that follows makes it less clear that this is indeed Aristotle’s point. That he follows this remark 
with a discussion of the uncodifiability of ethics, claiming that matters of conduct have nothing 
fixed about them and that agents must instead consider the circumstances on any occasion, would 
seem to suggest instead that Aristotle has in mind at this point a more general question about the 
kinds of things we should do, and what is required for us to get our actions right, than the 
psychological states of the agent. He continues to argue that when we act we must be neither 
excessive nor deficient – we must, for example, neither run away from too many things, nor stand 
firm in all situations – and it might simply be this that he has in mind when he writes ‘πῶς 
πρακτέον αὐτάς’. We must act in neither an excessive, nor deficient way. 
3.6.1.2 THE ‘WELL’ – THE SKILLS ANALOGY 
Jimenez, however, takes it that there is further evidence that a learner must perform virtuous 
actions with the correct motivations in Aristotle’s analogy with skills at 1103b6-13. There, Aristotle 
emphasises again that it is from the same causes and on account of the same things that every 
virtue is created or destroyed, as it is in the case of skills. For, he writes: 
it is from playing the lyre that good and bad lyre players are produced. And the corresponding 
statement is true of builders and all the rest; people will become good builders as a result of 
building well and bad builders as a result of building badly. For if this were not so there would 
have been no need of a teacher, but everyone would have been born good or bad. 
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ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ γίνονται κιθαρισταί. ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ οἰκοδόμοι καὶ οἱ 
λοιποὶ πάντες: ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ εὖ οἰκοδομεῖν ἀγαθοὶ οἰκοδόμοι ἔσονται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κακῶς κακοί. εἰ 
γὰρ μὴ οὕτως εἶχεν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τοῦ διδάξοντος, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἂν ἐγίνοντο ἀγαθοὶ ἢ κακοί.  
This passage indicates that key to the formation of virtuous dispositions is that a learner acts 
well, though Aristotle does not tell us here what practicing actions ‘well’ amounts to in either the 
case of skills, or the case of virtues. Jimenez, however, drawing presumably on Aristotle’s later 
remarks in NE II 4, takes it that for an action to be performed well, it must be performed with 
the correct motivation and be accompanied by the correct emotional response. Thus she 
concludes that “the relevance of the how implies… that learners have to be able to perform well 
the relevant actions before they have the relevant dispositions” (2016, p11), and this she takes to 
involve performing those actions with the correct motivation.  
Now, I do not want to claim that an agent’s emotional and desiderative states play no role in 
the success of her habituation; Aristotle’s references to the importance of developing habits of fear 
and confidence (1103b16-17), the training of our appetites and anger (1103b18), and of course the 
training in pleasures and pains (II 3), indicate just the opposite. It is clear that successful 
habituation must involve the training of our emotional and desiderative states. Indeed, I will oﬀer 
an explanation in Chapter 5 of just why the motivational states of the learner may be important 
in her successful habituation. But again it is by no means clear that Aristotle’s remarks here 
commit him to the view that a learner must perform virtuous actions with a virtuous motivation 
if her habituation is to be at all successful.  
Aristotle does not tell us what it is for a learner to perform virtuous actions well, so why is it 
that Jimenez thinks motive is the determining factor in a learner’s action being well or badly 
performed? Jimenez takes the skills analogy to show that two learners can perform the very same 
action, and that whether an agent performs this well or badly determines the kind of disposition 
that is produced. She supposes, then, that in the case of the virtues, if two learners can both 
perform the very same action, but one acts well and another badly, that the action’s being well or 
badly performed must then be determined by something about the agent’s psychological state. 
The most plausible candidate, she supposes, is the agent’s motivation.  
And yet, again, it is unclear whether at this point in his exposition, in claiming that an action 
must be performed ‘well’, Aristotle means to say anything about the learner’s psychological states, 
let alone that the determining factor is the agent’s motivation.  
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First, let us note that in this passage Aristotle does not in fact say that ‘the successful and 
unsuccessful learner perform the very same actions, but that one performs the action well, the 
other badly’. Rather, he writes in the second half of the analogy that: 
For by acting as we do in our dealings with men, some of us become just, some unjust; by 
acting as we do in terrifying situations, and accustoming ourselves to fear or to be confident 
some become brave, some cowardly. Likewise, with regards to things involving appetites and 
anger: for some become temperate, and mild, others intemperate and irascible, one lot 
through behaving in one way in these situations, the other by behaving in another way. To 
sum it up in one phrase: like states come about through like activities.  
πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γινόμεθα οἳ μὲν δίκαιοι οἳ 
δὲ ἄδικοι, πράττοντες δὲ τὰ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς καὶ ἐθιζόμενοι φοβεῖσθαι ἢ θαρρεῖν οἳ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι 
οἳ δὲ δειλοί. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ὀργάς: οἳ μὲν γὰρ σώφρονες 
καὶ πρᾶοι γίνονται, οἳ δ᾽ ἀκόλαστοι καὶ ὀργίλοι, οἳ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ οὑτωσὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναστρέφεσθαι, 
οἳ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ οὑτωσί. καὶ ἑνὶ δὴ λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται (1103b13-22). 
And this claim is at best ambiguous. For when Aristotle writes that “what we do in our dealings 
with other people makes some of us just, some unjust”, he could have in mind that two agents can 
perform the very same action (such as repaying a debt), and that by performing that same action 
with a good motivation, one agent becomes good, whilst the agent who performs it with a bad 
motivation becomes bad (as Jimenez’ reading requires). But he might also only be claiming here 
that within the sphere of ‘dealings with other people’, those who perform the just action, such as 
repaying the debt, and so act well, become just, whilst those who perform the unjust action, such 
as not repaying the debt, and so act badly, become bad; that is, that it is by performing what are in 
fact diﬀerent actions, within a given sphere, some become just, and some become unjust. 
The latter interpretation is all that the analogy with skills at least establishes. For to say, in the 
case of the skills that an action was performed well, and another badly, does not always imply that 
‘the same’ action was performed, at the level of specificity Jimenez requires for her conclusion in 
the case of the virtues. The actions of the good and bad lyre player may be considered the same at 
a certain level of generality, insofar as they are both engaged in lyre playing. But considered in a 
more fine-grained way, the actions of a good and bad lyre player are precisely not the same. Jimenez 
herself imagines a case in which someone “repeatedly plays with the wrong rhythm, in the wrong 
tone, with the wrong instrument”, but such action (considered in terms of the physical events or 
changes that correspond to acts of agency) surely is not ‘the same’ as that of the student who plays 
the right notes on the right instrument.  All the skills analogy shows is that one needs to perform 
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the right action. If the cases are to be analogous in this passage, the skills example would suggest 
indeed that he is talking about the need to perform the right actions within the relevant sphere.25 
Moreover, on the virtue side of the analogy, the fact that Aristotle has chosen to frame the 
actions in the more general terms of ‘what we do in our dealings with other people’ (πράττοντες 
γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους), ‘what we do in terrifying situations’ 
(πράττοντες δὲ τὰ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς) and ‘in situations involving appetites and anger’ (τὰ περὶ τὰς 
ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ὀργάς) rather than ‘by doing just actions’ (τὰ δίκαια πράττοντες), 
‘by doing brave actions’ (τὰ ἀνδρεῖα [πράττοντες]) or ‘by doing temperate actions’ (τὰ σώφρονα 
[πράττοντες]) (as he has done previously) further supports the idea that he wishes to stress the 
importance of performing the right action, rather than to highlight anything about the learner’s 
attitude towards such action.   
Once again, the point is not that the learner’s emotional and desiderative states play no role 
in her practice of virtuous actions, and that a learner’s motivation when she acts could not 
determine the kinds of dispositions that emerge from her practice. The point is that Aristotle’s 
references to ‘how’ we are to act, and claim that we must act ‘well’ in NE II 2 do not in themselves 
establish anything over and above the thought that we must perform the right actions (that is, 
virtuous actions) if we are to develop the right dispositions. 
Moreover, even if we are to suppose that a leaner’s acting well does consist in more than merely 
performing the right actions, it does not follow that the only relevant diﬀerence between two 
learners’ psychological states would consist in their respective motivations. To draw on the 
discussion of discerning action above – and to anticipate a claim I make in Chapter 5 – it might 
be that the learner who acts well is one who is attentive to the features of the situation in which 
she acts, whilst the learner who does not act well acts in a more mechanical or inattentive manner. 
Motivation is surely not the only diﬀerence maker, when it comes to acting well or badly.  
3.6.1.3 THE MEAN AND THE ‘RIGHT END’ 
Jimenez might, however, draw on a second piece of evidence to support the thought that acting 
well requires that a learner act with a virtuous motive. This evidence can be found in Aristotle’s 
discussion of the mean in NE II 9, which he begins with a summary of the account of the mean 
established in the previous chapters, listing the requirements for hitting the mean in action and 
                                                             
25 Unless, that is, the two cases are disanalogous in this case. Yet Aristotle doesn’t discuss any disanalogy between 
the cases until NE II 4. In these chapters he appears to be treating the cases as analogous in the relevant respects.  
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so for performing an action well in any given circumstances. With respect to paying money, or 
getting angry, say, we must do it towards “the right person, in the right amount, at the right time, 
for the right end, and in the right way… hence doing these things well is rare, praiseworthy and fine 
(τὸ δ᾽ ᾧ καὶ ὅσον καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὥς... διόπερ τὸ εὖ καὶ σπάνιον καὶ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ καλόν)” 
(1109a28-30). What matters about this passage for Jimenez’ purposes is that: 
Aristotle includes the goal, ‘that for the sake of which’ (οὗ ἕνεκα), among the things that the 
agent should get right if the particular occurrence of anger is to be appropriate or if the action 
of giving money is going to be well done (2016, p.23).  
And yet Aristotle does not tell us here what it is for an agent to act for the right goal, and certainly 
does not claim that to act in this way requires acting with a virtuous motivation. The stipulation 
that an action be done for the right goal might only mean here that the action is intentional, or 
perhaps that the relevant action type is what the agent is aiming at (that she is indeed intending 
to repay a debt), rather than that she must be acting from a particular set of values. Jimenez 
supposes that Aristotle must have in mind ‘acting for the sake of the noble’ when he writes ‘οὗ 
ἕνεκα’ here, since in Books III and IV he writes that the virtuous agent acts for the sake of the 
noble (τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα)” (1120a23). And yet in the discussion of the voluntary in Book III 
Aristotle specifies ‘ἕνεκα τίνος’ as one of the particulars an agent must know in order to act 
voluntarily, and oﬀers ‘safety’ (σωτηρίας) as an example of such an end. In claiming that mean 
action requires that an agent act for a certain end, Aristotle may have in mind only that she must 
know what action type she is performing and perhaps what will result from her action. If so, this 
passage lends textual support not to the claim that a learner must act with the right motives, but 
to the thought discussed above that a learner must be aware of what she is doing, and not act 
mindlessly.26  
                                                             
26 Jimenez does concede such a possibility, and writes: 
A child, thus, can do a generous action like sharing her sandwich while aiming simply at the goal of 
sharing her sandwich independently of whether it is a noble action or not; for example, she can aim at 
sharing her sandwich because the action is pleasant (for example, if she does not really like her 
sandwich), or because it brings some gain (for example, if she gets some reward for her behavior). I 
suspect, however, that in these cases, someone who insists that the goal of the child is simply the action 
of sharing the sandwich disregards the fact that the child’s ultimate goal is not the action itself but 
pleasure or gain. Now, whatever Aristotle means when he says that one should aim at getting the goal 
right if one is to find the intermediate in action, I think we can rule out that pleasure or gain are the 
goals he has in mind (2016, p.23).  
But children can also perform actions because they are obedient, because they want to be good, or because they value 
being praised, and it is not so obvious that such motives could not be ones from which virtuous motives develop. 
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3.6.1.4 GOOD PRACTICE  
Moreover, even if we were to assume that Aristotle would grant that that the motivational state 
of the learner does in some sense contribute to the quality of the action she performs and so the 
dispositions that are produced, it is not clear that Aristotle should be committed to the far 
stronger claim that for an action to be performed well by a learner requires that the learner 
perform it with the same motivation as a virtuous agent. Eupraxia of course, requires that an agent 
performs virtuous actions for their own sake. But why suppose that the standard by which we 
assess the actions of mature agents is the same standard by which we should assess the practice of 
(frequently young) learners? This is not to espouse the kind of agent relativism criticised by Brown 
(1997), which takes Aristotle’s mean in feeling and action to vary according to one’s moral 
progress. For one thing, the claim is not that the learner in practising well has achieved eupraxia.27 
The claim, rather, is that what is required for good practice need not be the same as the requirement 
for good action simpliciter.28  
Jimenez, I take it, is in part driven by the intuition that if a learner repeatedly performed 
virtuous actions from a selfish motive, it is diﬃcult to see how such practice could contribute to 
the formation of virtuous dispositions. I will return to this case in Chapter 5 (§5.6) and show how 
the account I develop there can accommodate this intuition. But even if we agree with Jimenez 
that it would indeed be diﬃcult to see how, in such a case, a learner’s practice could contribute to 
the formation of virtuous dispositions, why again suppose that what is required is that a learner 
perform virtuous actions with virtuous motives. Might it not be the case that a learner could count 
as practising well if she performed virtuous actions open-mindedly, or obediently, rather than 
stubbornly, say, and might this moreover be the kind of state from which it would be possible to 
develop the motivations characteristic of the virtuous agent?  
3.7 LEAVING ROOM FOR DEVELOPMENT AND DISCOVERY 
I have argued so far that Aristotle’s remarks on how an agent must act in NE II do not mandate, 
at least, that we adopt Jimenez’ view of the learner’s action, which requires that a learner both can 
                                                             
27 Nor indeed is it the case that to claim that a learner practises well without performing actions in precisely the 
same way as the virtuous agent entails denying that what it is for human beings to do well is to act virtuously. 
28 As Brown puts it: “More is expected of the fully developed moral agent (the Milo type) than of the beginner 
in moral training; what is best and right for the expert may not be right for the beginner” (1997, p.82) and this she 
claims is both true and would be granted by Aristotle.]  It is by no means clear that Aristotle makes it a requirement 
of successful practice that a learner act with the same motive as a virtuous agent. 
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and must act with virtuous motives, at least on occasion, if her habituation is to be successful. 
There may, however, be reasons beyond Aristotle’s remarks on the habituation process itself for 
supposing that we need to assume this sort of continuity between the action of a learner and that 
of a virtuous agent if we are going to be at all successful in explaining how the one develops into 
the other. Jimenez herself claims that what makes motivationally neutral views of the learner’s 
action problematic is the putative moral upbringing gap that they introduce.  Must we then adopt 
Jimenez’ picture of the learner’s action if we are to have any hope of explaining how the practice 
of virtuous actions contributes to our virtuous agency and the realisation of virtuous activity?  
Jimenez is right, I believe, to be concerned by accounts of the learner’s action that leave 
unaccounted for the development of capacities that are distinctive of the virtuous agent and 
crucially exercised in virtuous activity. She is no doubt right, too, to suggest that it is overly 
restrictive, and not mandated by the text, to claim that only a virtuous agent can act for the sake 
of the noble (2016, p.26). And yet, as I noted at the end of §3.6.1.4, it is not clear that we need to 
stipulate that a learner can on occasion act for the sake of the noble if she is to practice well, nor 
indeed is it clear that this stipulation helps us to make progress in our explanatory endeavour.  
3.7.1 THE BUMP IN THE CARPET 
Beyond the thought that the texts do not mandate the view Jimenez proposes, my first major 
source of dissatisfaction with her view is that to claim that the learner can and must act for the 
sake of the noble is simply to posit one of the things that needs to be explained. We are trying, 
amongst other things, to explain how a learner develops the motivational disposition of a virtuous 
agent, and Jimenez’ argument is that the development of this disposition can only be made 
intelligible if a learner can perform such actions for the sake of the noble. In doing so she in not 
claiming “that the motives of learners can be strictly the same in all possible senses as the motives 
of virtuous people—since virtuous people have phronēsis, their motives will have a complexity that 
cannot be present in the case of non-virtuous agents” (2016, p.26). Yet still, she does claim that:  
the motives of learners can be virtuous in the relevant sense that the central concern of the 
agents is the nobility of their actions and not the consequential advantages or disadvantages 
they will get from performing them—i.e. they are not motivated by the pleasure or the gain 
that they will derive from a particular action, but by the fact that it is the noble thing to do 
in the circumstances (2016, p.26). 
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And yet this only moves the explanatory bump in the carpet. For surely one of the things we are 
trying to account for is how a learner comes to acquire what are characteristically virtuous motives, 
and how indeed it is that a learner comes to perform virtuous actions for their nobility?  
Aristotle is clear that our initial source of motivation is not the nobility of acting in certain 
ways, but rather pleasure. Aristotle discusses the roles of pleasure and pain in virtue and action in 
NE II 3, and insists on the importance of training our sense of pleasure from early youth: 
for it is on account of pleasure that we do base things, and on account of pain that we abstain 
from fine things. That is why we need to have had the appropriate upbringing – right from 
early youth, as Plato says – to make us find enjoyment or pain in the right things; for this is 
correct education. 
διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα. διὸ δεῖ 
ἦχθαί πως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν, ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ: ἡ γὰρ ὀρθὴ 
παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν (1104b9-13).29 
Later in the passage, he explains further that: 
Pleasure grows up with us from infancy on. That is why it is hard to rub out this feeling that 
is dyed into our lives. We also estimate actions [as well as feelings] – some of us more, some 
less – by pleasure and pain.  
ἔτι δ᾽ ἐκ νηπίου πᾶσιν ἡμῖν συντέθραπται: διὸ χαλεπὸν ἀποτρίψασθαι τοῦτο τὸ πάθος 
ἐγκεχρωσμένον τῷ βίῳ. κανονίζομεν δὲ καὶ τὰς πράξεις, οἳ μὲν μᾶλλον οἳ δ᾽ ἧττον, ἡδονῇ καὶ 
λύπῃ (1105a1-5). 
Aristotle takes it to be an empirical fact that we begin our lives motivated by pleasure, and that it 
is an achievement of mature agents that they act not simply for the sake of pleasure, but can act 
because they recognise a certain value in certain forms of action that goes beyond any immediate 
pleasure that they may gain.30 Part of our moral development consists in the transformation of 
our desires and motivational states, and this is precisely one of the things which an account of our 
development through the practice of virtuous actions must attempt to explain. We need, indeed, 
to explain how the learner comes to grasp the value of virtuous action that is grasped by the 
                                                             
29 See also X 9: 
The many, especially the young, do not find it pleasant to live in a temperate and resistant way. This is 
why laws must prescribe their upbringing and practices; for they will not find these things painful 
when they get used to them (τὸ γὰρ σωφρόνως καὶ καρτερικῶς ζῆν οὐχ ἡδὺ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἄλλως τε καὶ 
νέοις. διὸ νόμοις δεῖ τετάχθαι τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα: οὐκ ἔσται γὰρ λυπηρὰ συνήθη γενόμενα) 
(1179b29-35). 
30 This is not to claim that a mature agent is not motivated by pleasure in any way – the passages just quoted 
make clear that pleasure cannot be eradicated as a source of motivation, and his discussion in NE II 3 makes clear that 
a virtuous agent takes pleasure in the virtuous actions they perform. This indeed is one of the insights of Burnyeat’s 
discussion, noted at the outset of this chapter. 
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virtuous agent. The demand for continuity might lead us to overlook the fact that a certain 
development and transformation essentially takes place, and that this is something that needs to 
be explained.31  
3.7.2 THE PICTURE OF HABITUATION 
My second source of dissatisfaction with Jimenez’ demand for strong continuity between the 
action of a learner and that of a virtuous agent, and her proposed picture of the learner’s action, 
has to do with the picture of habituation and of what happens in the course of the learner’s 
practice of virtuous action that I think implicitly underpins these demands.  
At the end of the previous section I suggested that Jimenez may be motivated by the intuition 
that it will be nearly impossible for a learner to develop virtuous dispositions if she performs 
virtuous actions only with vicious motives. I suggested that even if we share this intuition, we 
might still wish to maintain that actions performed willingly, say, though not for the sake of the 
noble, could still result in the development of virtuous dispositions. But Jimenez does not 
consider such a possibility. Instead she insists that the learner’s virtuous actions must be performed 
for the sake of the noble if her habituation is to be successful, and this I submit is revealing.  
It suggests, first, that for Jimenez only the moments when a learner acts with a virtuous motive 
will contribute to her successful development. And second, it suggests that, on her view, what is 
eﬀected in the course of the learner’s practice is that such motives and ways of acting become more 
regular, and to that extent more entrenched.32 The power of habituation, then, would seem to lie 
in making more entrenched, through repetition, aspects of a subject’s psychology that previously 
were not so entrenched. What is most important about performing virtuous actions is that this is 
something repeated, and that however the learner acts gets established as a habit.33  
Now, on the one hand we might think that this is exactly what happens when we practice 
virtuous actions. As we are by now more than aware, the moral virtues come about ‘from habit’, 
and NE II 4 makes very clear that by practicing virtuous actions many times, a firm and 
unchanging state is established (1105a33-b5). Aristotle, indeed, is all but explicit in claiming that 
                                                             
31 Moreover, how is it that a learner comes to grasp that virtuous action is noble? 
32 There is a question, of course, as to why it is these moments that ‘stick’ and these ways of acting that become 
more entrenched, and not those in which a learner acts with a diﬀerent motivation. 
33 Just as if a learner repeatedly performs certain actions, they will develop the habit of performing such actions, 
and perform them more and more regularly (as the mechanical view maintains), so too if a learner repeatedly 
performs virtuous actions from a virtuous motive, they will develop the habit of performing actions with that motive, 
and do so more and more regularly 
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the practice of virtuous actions establishes a ‘second nature’, where the analogy with nature is 
intended to pick out the sense that what gets established is something law-like and deep-rooted: 
For habit is easier than nature to change. Indeed, the reason why habit is also diﬃcult to 
change is that it is like nature; as Euenus says:     
 Habit, I say, is long time practice my friend,      
 and in the end training is nature for men. 
ῥᾷον γὰρ ἔθος μετακινῆσαι φύσεως: διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἔθος χαλεπόν, ὅτι τῇ φύσει ἔοικεν, 
ὥσπερ καὶ Εὔηνος λέγει                                                                                                                                  
 πολυχρόνιον μελέτην ἔμεναι, φίλε, καὶ δή     
 ταύτην ἀνθρώποισι τελευτῶσαν φύσιν εἶναι (1152a30-33).  
Certainly, then, part of what happens through the practice of virtuous actions is that such action, 
and certain ways of being motivated, patterns of feeling, and so forth, become second nature.  
But we need to be careful. Certain of Jimenez’ remarks suggest that she takes the stability 
condition to be, in eﬀect, a second order condition;34 a condition which refers to the agent’s 
disposition to choose virtuous actions for their own sake, as if we should suppose that a learner 
could come to meet the knowledge and choice conditions, and that what is then required is for 
her knowledge and choice of virtuous action to become something stable.35  But it is not clear that 
the stability condition is second order in this way, or something that follows upon the agent’s 
achievement of the other two conditions (or indeed that the conditions could be met in stages). 
Although Aristotle does not make explicit what the stability condition amounts to, it is highly 
plausible to suppose that he is referring to the state which comprises the agent’s desires, 
perceptions, emotions, pleasures and pains (and perhaps even beliefs), and that he is suggesting 
that through the gradual transformation of these various capacities, the agent achieves what can 
be described as a firm and unchanging state. Indeed, if we understand the stability condition in 
this way, it is not clear that this is something that would come after the agent’s achievement of the 
knowledge and choice conditions; rather, we might think that it is through the development of 
these various capacities that all three conditions are fully and simultaneously met.  
                                                             
34 “[Non-virtuous agents] can aim at noble goals for their own sake, even if this aiming might be occasional and 
lack the reliability and firmness that the possession of virtue confers” (2016, p.26). 
35 It is slightly odd to think of stability as something that could be added to knowledge, since we might reasonably 
suppose that Aristotle would count stability as a feature of knowledge. It is for this reason, then, I take it that 
commentators such as Jimenez talk specifically of the stability of the agent’s motive. E.g. “they can aim at noble goals 
for their own sake even if this aiming might be occasional and lack the reliability and firmness that the possession of 
virtue confers” (2016, p.26). 
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This brings us to the second reason for caution when conceiving of habituation as making 
more entrenched certain ways of acting and responding that were occasional or unreliable to begin 
with. For to see this as all that is eﬀected by habituation (and to think, in particular, that only the 
moments when a learner acts (almost) as the virtuous agent does are those that contribute to her 
successful habituation),36 is to overlook the thought that there might be something that is 
discovered, something that the learner learns when she performs virtuous actions, and that more 
moments contribute to the learner’s successful development than just those in which she gets 
things right, motivationally speaking.37 
Aristotle tells us in NE II 4 that “we achieve [the conditions of virtuously performed action] 
from doing just and temperate things many times (ἅπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις πράττειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ 
σώφρονα περιγίνεται” (1105b4-5). The practice of virtuous actions does not merely eﬀect a certain 
stability in the agent, but a motivational state as well. And importantly, this remark suggests that 
it is by engaging in certain forms of action that we come to desire and to choose such action for 
its own sake. There is, his remarks suggest, something that is learned and a value that is grasped 
that only comes about through so acting; action, it seems, aﬀords discovery, and can transform 
our motivations and desiderative states.  
Thus even if we were to grant that at some stage in her development a learner could perform 
virtuous actions for the sake of the noble, it remains a task to explain how it is that a learner comes 
to be so motivated in the first place, and to choose virtuous actions for the sake of their nobility. 
And moreover, we need to explain what it is that happens when a learner performs these actions 
that results in this transformation. In the following three chapters I will develop an account of the 
learner’s action, which allows for the kind of continuity required to make her development 
intelligible, whilst also maintaining an important distinction between her action and that of the 
virtuous agent, allowing for the possibility of change and development in the course of her 
practice. Furthermore, I will show that there is something that a learner discovers in the course of 
her practice, and thus show what it is about acting that transforms her psychological states.
                                                             
36 We might imagine this model as analogous to hammering a nail: we need to get the hammer and nail in the 
right position, and our hammering is successful every time we hit the nail in the right place.  
37 Moreover, if the learner makes progress only when she acts with a virtuous motivation, this excludes the idea 
that we might make progress through our mistakes, and through coming to recognise these. We might think, instead, 
that getting things wrong, not least with regards to motivation, is a way in which we make moral progress. In 
recognising that on past occasions I acted with X motive, rather than virtuous motive Y, I can recognise that there 
was something wrong about my initial motive, that I had not seen the value in a particular action, for example, that I 
now realise is there to be grasped, and so on. 
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4 IMITATING VIRTUE 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
We established in Chapter 2 that the virtuous agent is an author of her actions in a very strict 
sense: she not only acts knowingly, but in choosing virtuous actions for their own sake, and doing 
so from a stable state, her action can be seen to issue from, and to reflect, her settled values and a 
distinctive way of seeing things. Aristotle’s remarks in NE II 4 reveal moreover that this kind of 
activity has a certain conceptual priority in Aristotle’s account of moral action. I argued that in 
thinking about just action, Aristotle is encouraging us to begin by thinking about the mature 
agent, who performs actions from the specific psychological state just described. Such action is 
paradigmatic and conceptually prior to action which is seen as divorced from an agent’s settled 
way of seeing and valuing things, and of which the agent’s psychological states are variously 
determinable. The latter is posterior in account to action that is authored in the strict sense. 
Developmentally, however, the positions are reversed: a learner, it seems, starts from action that 
is alienable, and may act in a variety of psychologically determinable ways, but through repeated 
practice develops the knowledge, disposition to choose and the stability of character that 
characterises a virtuous agent, thus becoming an author in the full sense of virtuous actions.  
The diﬃcult task is to explain just how this kind of change occurs – how it is, that is, that a 
learner moves from practising actions that in a sense are not strictly her own, to being the author 
of her actions in the strict sense described. In accounting for this change, we are required to answer 
at least two questions: we need to explain, first, how it is that a learner not only comes to have 
knowledge of virtuous action, but how she comes to grasp the value of such action, and so 
eventually to choose it for its own sake. Second we must explain what it is about doing just and 
temperate things that eﬀects this transformation, as Aristotle indicates is the case.  
In the previous chapter we surveyed a number of attempts that have been made to find 
continuity between the action of a learner and that of a virtuous agent, with the hope of making 
the learner’s development intelligible. We took note in particular of a recent suggestion that only 
by granting that a learner does, on occasion, act for the sake of the noble, can we explain the     
 105 
development of virtuous motives as we are required to do. But I argued that this picture merely 
takes for granted one of the features of the learner’s transformation for which we are trying to 
account. Not only that, but in so doing it obscures Aristotle’s insight that the transformation of 
the agent’s motivation is eﬀected by the doing of just and temperate things. Merely stipulating this 
kind of strong continuity between the action of a learner and that of a virtuous agent does not 
help us to make progress in our explanatory endeavour. So how then is progress to be made?  
Perhaps somewhat ironically, I believe that the explanatory challenge as I have framed it in 
fact oﬀers a way of understanding the learner’s action that may help us to explain her progress. For 
the contrast that I have emphasised between the action of a learner and that of a virtuous agent 
allows us to see the student of virtue as engaged, in eﬀect, in a form of imitation. And I suggest 
that by taking seriously the imitative nature of the learner’s activity, we can make progress in 
understanding how a learner’s alienable action could over time develop into the virtuous agency 
and strict authorship of virtuous action in which mature virtuous activity consists. 
4.2 IMITATION AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT 
In developing the thought that by taking seriously the imitative nature of the learner’s action we 
can make progress towards an account of how virtuous agency develops, I want first to reflect a 
little further on the reasons we may have for regarding the learner and her activity in this way. 
Aristotle himself does not make any explicit statement to this eﬀect, but I suggest that his remarks 
in NE II 4, and elsewhere in the Ethics, do allow for the thought that a learner is engaged in the 
imitation of a virtuous agent; a thought, moreover, that becomes increasingly plausible when we 
acknowledge the important status that had already been granted to the concept of imitation in 
moral development in the writings of Aristotle’s immediate predecessors. Having thus motivated 
the idea that seeing the student’s action as imitative oﬀers a fruitful way of understanding her 
development, we will then consider in more detail how this might work.  
We saw in Chapter 2 that Aristotle in NE II 4 points to the way in which actions, considered 
in terms of deeds done, are in an important sense alienable, and that virtuous actions, whilst 
characteristic of a virtuous agent, can nevertheless be performed by an agent who is not herself 
virtuous. As such, it is possible that a virtuous agent can be impersonated, through action, by one 
who is not virtuous. This, of course, is something to which Aristotle is very much alive, and to 
which he calls our attention when he writes in Book 3 of the rash man who: 
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Seems to be a boaster, and a pretender to bravery. At any rate, the attitude towards frightening 
things that the virtuous person really has is the attitude that the rash person wants to appear 
to have and hence he imitates the brave person where he can. 
δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἀλαζὼν εἶναι ὁ θρασὺς καὶ προσποιητικὸς ἀνδρείας: ὡς γοῦν ἐκεῖνος περὶ τὰ 
φοβερὰ ἔχει, οὗτος βούλεται φαίνεσθαι: ἐν οἷς οὖν δύναται, μιμεῖται (1115b28-32).1 
The rash man is not brave, but can make himself appear like the courageous person by imitating 
his actions.2 Indeed, it is thanks to the fact that actions can serve as ‘signs’ of virtue that virtue and 
character can be portrayed in drama.   
But Aristotle’s discussion in NE II 4 and in particular his claim that “things are called just and 
temperate, when they are such as the just and temperate person would do (τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματα 
δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα λέγεται, ὅταν ᾖ τοιαῦτα οἷα ἂν ὁ δίκαιος ἢ ὁ σώφρων πράξειεν)” (1105b5-7), 
can be taken as pointing towards a deeper thought. It indicates not simply that just and temperate 
actions are characteristic of the virtuous agent but, as I have argued, points to a certain conceptual 
priority that the virtuous agent and her activity have in our thinking about just and temperate 
actions. The virtuous agent’s properly authored action – action with a specific psychological 
component – is paradigmatic, and to this extent we might thus conceive of the derivative and 
alienable action that a learner can perform as an imitation of virtuous activity proper. Indeed, 
whilst the actions that a learner performs have the quality of being virtuous, it remains that they 
belong, properly speaking, to the virtuous agent; a thought that chimes with Woodruﬀ ’s remark 
that “a product of mimēsis is a thing in its own right, but is also of something else” (1992, p.84). 
As we will soon see, the concept of imitation is one which may be used in a variety of ways. 
Thus far, one might take the mimetic relation I have posited between the actions of a learner and 
the activity of the virtuous agent to be something like the relation that Plato is thought to posit 
between sensibles and forms, where the latter too are understood as paradigmatic.3 The relation 
                                                             
1 For another negative picture of imitative activity, see Aristotle’s discussion of those who imitate, but fail to be 
like, the great-souled man: 
being unable to bear [their prosperity], and thinking themselves superior to everyone else, they look 
down on them, even though they act in no better way than anyone else. For they imitate the great-
souled man without really being like him, and do this in what they can: they don’t act in accordance 
with virtue, but they do look down on others (οὐ δυνάμενοι δὲ φέρειν καὶ οἰόμενοι τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν 
ἐκείνων μὲν καταφρονοῦσιν, αὐτοὶ δ᾽ ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι πράττουσιν. μιμοῦνται γὰρ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον οὐχ 
ὅμοιοι ὄντες, τοῦτο δὲ δρῶσιν ἐν οἷς δύνανται: τὰ μὲν οὖν κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν οὐ πράττουσι, καταφρονοῦσι δὲ 
τῶν ἄλλων) (1124a31-b5). 
2 For a discussion of the deceptive sense of the concept of mimēsis, see Woodruﬀ (1992, esp. p.83-88). 
3 Republic X might be thought to suggest that sensibles stand in a mimetic relation to the Forms (597bﬀ ), though 
only the painter is explicitly referred to as an imitator in this discussion. In Timaeus (38aﬀ ) constructed time is said 
to imitate eternity.  
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that Plato posits between these is, of course, a source of much contention, but typically scholars 
find evidence for understanding the relation in one of two ways. On the one hand, one might 
suppose the relation to be one of resemblance (Phd. 74aﬀ; Parm. 129aﬀ ), and on the other, a 
relation of deficiency (Phd. 74d, 75b; Symp. 211aﬀ ). One might thus think that in claiming that 
the learner’s actions stand in a mimetic relation to those of the virtuous agent, I am then claiming 
either that the learner’s actions resemble the virtuous agent’s actions, which are paradigms, or else 
that they are deficient in some respect to these paradigms. Certainly, as we have seen already, there 
is at the very least a resemblance between the action of a learner and that of a virtuous agent, and 
moreover, in so far as a learner does not achieve eupraxia, we might see her action as deficient with 
respect to that of the virtuous agent.  
But these are not the primary senses of imitation I have in mind when I claim that we can see 
the learner’s action as an imitation of the virtuous agent’s activity. For the fact that Aristotle 
alludes to the conceptual priority and paradigmatic nature of the virtuous agent’s action in the 
course of explaining what it is that a learner does and how virtue is developed, invites us to think 
of imitation as something in which the learner herself is engaged. The virtuous agent and her 
activity serve as a paradigm, a model, for the learner, and thus I submit that we should not merely 
see the learner’s actions as standing in either a resemblance and/or deficiency relation to those of 
a virtuous agent, but rather suppose that when a learner performs virtuous actions, she will be 
actively imitating a virtuous agent and her mature virtuous activity.  
That the learner’s action is in some respect imitative is recognised by a number of 
commentators, including Sherman (1989, p.168ﬀ ), Broadie, (1994, p.82), Lovibond (1996, p.81), 
Price (2000, p.77), Fossheim (2006), Lawrence (2011, p.252) and Kraut (2012, p.537). Kosman too 
notices that: 
the assumption of virtue, by itself a mere act, is, when repeated, the instrument by which 
virtue is produced: “ek tou pollakis prattein ta dikaia kai sōphrona [hai aretai] periginetai – 
[virtue] comes about through repeated just and moderate actions.” Virtue, in other words, is 
itself shaped by the impersonation of the virtuous (1992, p.62). 
But this is not a thought that is new in Aristotle; that imitation is not only a means by which 
agents can make themselves appear like a virtuous agent, but a means by which a learner can become 
virtuous is a thought that is voiced by a number of thinkers prior to Aristotle. I want, then, briefly 
to survey a number of sources which attest to the power of imitation in moral development in the 
tradition prior to Aristotle, both to motivate the thought that this is something familiar to him, 
and to gain a little more insight into the thought that we might develop through imitation. 
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4.2.1 IMITATION AND DEVELOPMENT BEFORE ARISTOTLE 
Kosman draws attention to the following quotation from Xenophon, who in discussing the 
charges brought against Socrates asks: 
How could he, being such as he is, have made others either impious or lawless or gluttonous 
or sexually intemperate or work-shy? Rather, he kept them from these things, making them 
all desire virtue and allowing them to expect that if they took care of themselves, they would 
become fine and good people. Indeed, he never professed to be a teacher of this, but by being 
manifestly of this sort, he made his followers hope that by imitating him, they will become 
like him.  
πῶς οὖν αὐτὸς ὢν τοιοῦτος ἄλλους ἂν ἢ ἀσεβεῖς ἢ παρανόμους ἢ λίχνους ἢ ἀφροδισίων 
ἀκρατεῖς ἢ πρὸς τὸ πονεῖν μαλακοὺς ἐποίησεν; ἀλλ᾽ ἔπαυσε μὲν τούτων πολλοὺς ἀρετῆς 
ποιήσας ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ ἐλπίδας παρασχών, ἂν ἑαυτῶν ἐπιμελῶνται, καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ἔσεσθαι: 
καίτοι γε οὐδεπώποτε ὑπέσχετο διδάσκαλος εἶναι τούτου, ἀλλὰ τῷ φανερὸς εἶναι τοιοῦτος ὢν 
ἐλπίζειν ἐποίει τοὺς συνδιατρίβοντας ἑαυτῷ μιμουμένους ἐκεῖνον τοιούτους γενήσεσθαι 
(Memorabilia I.ii.2-3). 
The importance of imitation is stressed again later in the work, when Socrates himself is asked 
how those civilisations who have lost their old virtue can regain it. Socrates answers that: 
 “It doesn’t seem mysterious to me. If they discover the customs of their ancestors and practise 
them in no lesser way than they did, they will become as good as they were; or if not, they 
[should] imitate those who are now pre-eminent and practise their customs, and if they 
observe them likewise, they will be as good as they, and, if they are more careful [in observing 
them] even better.” 
“οὐδὲν ἀπόκρυφον δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν ἐξευρόντες τὰ τῶν προγόνων ἐπιτηδεύματα 
μηδὲν χεῖρον ἐκείνων ἐπιτηδεύοιεν, οὐδὲν ἂν χείρους ἐκείνων γενέσθαι: εἰ δὲ μή, τούς γε νῦν 
πρωτεύοντας μιμούμενοι καὶ τούτοις τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύοντες, ὁμοίως μὲν τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρώμενοι 
οὐδὲν ἂν χείρους ἐκείνων εἶεν, εἰ δ᾽ ἐπιμελέστερον, καὶ βελτίους” (Memorabilia, III.v.14). 
These quotations are helpful in a number of ways. They not only explicitly point to imitation as a 
means by which virtue can be acquired, but also oﬀer us a number of important details about this 
process. In the first passage, for example, we see that Socrates, as a person of good character, does 
not strictly teach virtue – at least not in the sense that Protagoras or Gorgias claimed to do – but 
rather that he provides a model of it that his followers can imitate. Moreover, it is he, Socrates, 
that they imitate; the implicit suggestion here is that one becomes good by imitating a good person 
(or agent), a thought to which we will return. In terms of Socrates’ followers – the would be 
imitators of virtue – we learn not simply that they can hope to acquire virtue by imitating Socrates, 
but specifically that through his example they should be brought to desire virtue (ἀρετῆς ποιήσας 
ἐπιθυμεῖν); a thought that is especially important in light of the particular explanatory challenge 
we face.  
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Elsewhere, in the Agesilaus, Xenophon writes that: 
If line and rule are a fine discovery of men for good work, I think that the virtue of Agesilaus 
may become a fine example for those to follow who wish to practise bravery. For which man 
that imitates a pious man would become impious, a just man unjust, a temperate man wanton, 
a self-controlled man akratic? Indeed, Agesilaus prided himself less on reigning over others 
than on ruling himself, less on leading the people against their enemies than on guiding them 
to the whole of virtue. 
εἰ δὲ καλὸν εὕρημα ἀνθρώποις στάθμη καὶ κανὼν πρὸς τὸ ὀρθὰ ἐργάζεσθαι, καλὸν ἄν μοι δοκεῖ 
ἡ Ἀγησιλάου ἀρετὴ παράδειγμα γενέσθαι τοῖς ἀνδραγαθίαν ἀσκεῖν βουλομένοις. τίς γὰρ ἂν ἢ 
θεοσεβῆ μιμούμενος ἀνόσιος γένοιτο ἢ δίκαιον ἄδικος ἢ σώφρονα ὑβριστὴς ἢ ἐγκρατῆ ἀκρατής; 
καὶ γὰρ δὴ οὐχ οὕτως ἐπὶ τῷ ἄλλων βασιλεύειν ὡς ἐπὶ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχειν ἐμεγαλύνετο, οὐδ᾽ ἐπὶ 
τῷ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τῷ πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἡγεῖσθαι τοῖς πολίταις (Agesilaus X.2). 
This passage once again attests not only to the power of imitation in producing virtue, but to the 
virtuous agent’s role as a model (παράδειγμα) for others, guiding (ἡγεῖσθαι) them towards virtue, 
rather than ruling or instructing.  
Perhaps the most famous acknowledgement of the power of imitation in shaping our moral 
development, however, is to be found in Plato, who in recognising the power of imitation to 
influence a subject’s development in one way or another, goes as far as to prohibit certain forms 
of imitation in the ideal city of the Republic. One of Plato’s most explicit treatments of the power 
of imitation, in particular with respect to the development of the young, can be found in his 
discussion of the young Guardians’ education in Republic III, where he has Socrates argue that: 
If [the young guardians] imitate anything, they must imitate right from childhood what is 
appropriate for them – that is to say, people who are courageous, temperate, pious, free, and 
everything of that sort. On the other hand, they must not be clever at doing or imitating 
illiberal or shameful actions, so that they won’t enjoy the real thing from imitating it. Or 
haven’t you noticed that imitations, if they are practised much past youth, get established in 
the habits and nature of body, speech and mind?  
ἐὰν δὲ μιμῶνται, μιμεῖσθαι τὰ τούτοις προσήκοντα εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων, ἀνδρείους, σώφρονας, 
ὁσίους, ἐλευθέρους, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, τὰ δὲ ἀνελεύθερα μήτε ποιεῖν μήτε δεινοὺς εἶναι 
μιμήσασθαι, μηδὲ ἄλλο μηδὲν τῶν αἰσχρῶν, ἵνα μὴ ἐκ τῆς μιμήσεως τοῦ εἶναι ἀπολαύσωσιν. ἢ 
οὐκ ᾔσθησαι ὅτι αἱ μιμήσεις, ἐὰν ἐκ νέων πόρρω διατελέσωσιν, εἰς ἔθη τε καὶ φύσιν καθίστανται 
καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν; (Rep. 395c3-d3).4 
                                                             
4 For another instance of the potentially corrupting power of imitation, see for example Isocrates: 
If, then, you will listen to me, you will preferably not deal in future with such base subjects, but if that 
cannot be, you will seek to speak of such things as will neither injure your own reputation, nor corrupt 
your imitators, nor bring the teaching of rhetoric into disrepute (Ἢν οὖν ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, μάλιστα μὲν οὐ 
ποιήσει τοῦ λοιποῦ πονηρὰς ὑποθέσεις, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τοιαῦτα ζητήσεις λέγειν ἐξ  ὧν μήτ’ αὐτὸς χείρων εἶναι 
δόξεις μήτε τοὺς μιμουμένους  λυμανεῖ μήτε τὴν περὶ τοὺς λόγους παίδευσιν διαβαλεῖς. Καὶ μὴ θαυμάσῃς, 
εἰ νεώτερος ὢν καὶ μηδέν σοι)” (Busiris, §49, trans. Van Hook). 
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A word of caution is required in approaching this passage. The topic of discussion at this point in 
Republic 3 is ‘lexis’; it is concerned, that is, with the activity of speaking.  Having completed their 
discussion of the kind of content that will be permitted in stories within the ideal city, the 
interlocutors then move on to discuss the way in which stories are presented, or, perhaps more 
accurately, the way in which the speaker presents himself in telling such stories. He may, on the 
one hand, narrate the story, presenting himself as himself whilst telling the story of another, but 
he may also tell the story in an imitative mode, speaking as a character in the story, by adjusting 
his voice, and so on (see esp. 397a). This impersonatory sense of mimēsis would appear to consist 
in imitation through voice, and is in this respect diﬀerent to what we might think of as the more 
behavioural or enactive sense that is implied in the Xenophon passages and in which I am 
suggesting we should see Aristotle’s learner as engaged.  
Nevertheless, the passage attests to our susceptibility through mimēsis to taking on the 
persona of another, and indeed reveals just how thoroughgoing this can be, for imitations 
practised long past youth become established in the ‘habits and nature’ of ‘body, speech and mind’. 
The passage points, moreover, to the important fact that imitation is something that can be 
practised right from youth, chiming with the thought, stressed by both Plato and Aristotle, that 
moral habituation is something that must start from the earliest age (e.g. Rep 401e; NE 1104b12). 
Indeed, it is a thought that is made explicit by Aristotle in the Poetics when he writes “it is an 
instinct of human beings, from childhood, to imitate (τό τε γὰρ μιμεῖσθαι σύμφυτον τοῖς 
ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παίδων ἐστὶ” (144b5); a passage to which we will return shortly.  
In the Republic passage, as in Xenophon, we learn that through the imitation of a thing agents 
can come enjoy (ἀπολαύσωσιν) that thing, pointing once again to the power of imitation to 
transform a subject’s desires. In this passage, however, we are oﬀered an additional piece of 
information about imitation, namely that it is something at which people can be ‘clever’ (δεινοὺς). 
The allusion in this passage to ‘cleverness’ at imitating may of course be intended as a point 
specifically about an agent’s ability to sound like another, but it is worth reflecting on the thought 
that imitating is something at which one can be better or worse, and that the better one imitates, 
the more power this has.5 
These passages, then, attest to a recognition in the writings of Aristotle’s immediate 
predecessors of the power of imitation to aﬀect an agent’s moral development; a recognition of 
                                                             
5 This becomes especially important if taken in connection with Aristotle’s insistence in NE II 1 that by practising 
well we become good people. 
 111 
which he must have almost certainly been aware. It is plausible to suppose then that Aristotle may 
have something like these pictures in mind when discussing the learner’s development through 
the practice of virtuous actions in the early chapters of Book II.6 
4.2.2 IMITATION AND CHARACTER MODELS IN NE IX AND X 
A challenge to this interpretation of Aristotle’s account of moral habituation – that is, as involving 
imitation – that must be acknowledged at the outset is that Aristotle nowhere makes this thought 
explicit. Still, as we established at the outset of this thesis, any elaboration of Aristotle’s otherwise 
compressed remarks on moral habituation will require a degree of speculative supplementation. 
Moreover, as I have already explained, I believe that Aristotle’s remarks in NE II 4 are intended 
to encourage us towards thinking of the learner’s action in this way. And whilst the importance 
of imitation in a learner’s development is not a thought that is made explicit in the early chapters 
of Book II, I suggest there is evidence that Aristotle acknowledges the importance of imitation 
with respect to the development of one’s character elsewhere in the text. We can review this 
evidence before proceeding to consider just how imitation might play a role in the development 
of virtuous agency and realisation of virtuous activity.  
The importance of imitation and specifically of imitating virtuous agents is alluded to in a 
number of places later in the Ethics, specifically, in the discussion of friendship in Book IX and at 
the very end of the work in Book X when Aristotle discusses the role of the community in shaping 
the characters of the young. The emphasis of Book II, I submit, is on the importance of a learner’s 
own practice of virtuous actions, as opposed to her merely listening to arguments, say, and for this 
reason the role that imitation plays in the development of virtue and the importance of virtuous 
models is not emphasised here. But that the importance of imitation and virtuous guidance 
should emerge later in the work, when the focus turns to the role of other people in leading and 
coming to lead a good life, is not surprising.7 
Having discussed in Book VIII and the first half of IX various issues surrounding the topic of 
friendship, Aristotle pauses to take note of a particular dispute that surrounds the question of 
friendship’s value, for it is said by some that blessedly happy and self-suﬃcient people have no 
need of friends (1169b3-6). Aristotle responds that it would be absurd to award the happy person 
                                                             
6 Particularly given his explicit allusion to Plato’s account of moral development in NE II 3. 
7 Indeed, I will suggest that the collaborative nature of the activities discussed in Book IX is especially important 
with regards to explaining how a learner comes to be in a position to grasp the things that she does. 
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all the goods without giving him friends, for having friends seems to be the greatest external good 
(1169b10), and man moreover is a political animal, who tends by nature to live with others 
(1169b18-21). Aristotle adds a number of positive reasons for maintaining that a happy life must 
be one lived amongst friends, arguing that a virtuous friend provides a virtuous agent with 
opportunities to observe virtuous activity, which she will find pleasant. But he adds too that the 
lives of good people lived together allows for the cultivation of virtue (1170a11-12). What 
immediately follows is Aristotle’s enigmatic discussion of ‘perceiving together’, but at the end of 
the book Aristotle remarks that: 
And so it comes about that the friendship of bad people is wretched. (For they share bad 
things and are unstable, and they become wretched in coming to be like each other.) But that 
of decent people is decent, since it continues to develop through their association, and they 
seem to become even better people through their activity and by correcting each other, for 
they model themselves on one another in what they find pleasing, which is the source of the 
saying, ‘noble things from noble men’. 
γίνεται οὖν ἡ μὲν τῶν φαύλων φιλία μοχθηρά（κοινωνοῦσι γὰρ φαύλων ἀβέβαιοι ὄντες, καὶ 
μοχθηροὶ δὲ γίνονται ὁμοιούμενοι ἀλλήλοις), ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἐπιεικής, συναυξανομένη ταῖς 
ὁμιλίαις: δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ βελτίους γίνεσθαι ἐνεργοῦντες καὶ διορθοῦντες ἀλλήλους: ἀπομάττονται 
γὰρ παρ᾽ ἀλλήλων οἷς ἀρέσκονται, ὅθεν “ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ᾽ ἐσθλά” (1172a8-14). 
The passage is concerned primarily with agents whose characters are already formed, or who are 
far enough along the path of development. But it still points to the power that modelling 
(ἀπομάττονται) oneself on another can have and oﬀers a clue as to what may take place in the 
development of the young. Indeed, that modelling oneself on another can have the power to 
improve even those whose characters are by now formed, would suggest that such modelling 
would be even more eﬀective in the training of the young whose characters are not yet so fixed.  
A further piece of evidence that Aristotle acknowledges the power of imitation and recognises 
the need to model oneself on a person of good character occurs just a page before, when discussing 
the need for friendship in good and bad fortune. Noting that the sight of a friend who is pained 
by one’s own misfortune can itself be painful, Aristotle points out that a person of a manly nature 
will try to prevent his friends from sharing in distress, unlike women or those of an eﬀeminate 
nature who enjoy having people to wail with them. He concludes the discussion by stating that “it 
is clear that one ought to imitate the better a man in everything (μιμεῖσθαι δ᾽ ἐν ἅπασι δεῖ δῆλον 
ὅτι τὸν βελτίω)” (1171b11-12). The immediate message to be taken from the passage is that we 
ought to follow the ‘manly’ character in preventing others from sharing in our grief, yet the 
thought that we should imitate the better man in ‘everything’ (ἐν ἅπασι) suggests that Aristotle 
 113 
recognises the importance of imitating better agents over and above the particular case in 
question. Indeed, the conclusion is almost imperative and seems to carry the same normative force 
as his claims in Book II that we must become just, and must do so by doing just things.  
Finally, in X 9, when Aristotle returns to the topic of moral education, we see evidence again 
of the importance of virtuous models in the training of the young. Here, Aristotle picks up on a 
claim made in II 1, where he observes that “lawgivers make the citizens good by training them in 
habits of right action” (1103b3-4), and turns it into a prescriptive claim emphasising the 
importance of devising appropriate constitutions. In the best city, the community will be 
responsible for the supervision of the young in their moral upbringing, but where this fails it 
would seem appropriate for “each to contribute to his own children’s and friends’ acquisition of 
excellence”, for “the things a father says (οἱ πατρικοὶ λόγοι) and the habits (τὰ ἔθη) he imposes have 
the same force in the household as legal provisions and customs in the city” (1180b4-5). That the 
father’s habits, as well as his words, have force in shaping his children’s development clearly 
suggests that he acts as a character model to his children.8 
Given the emphasis on the importance of imitation for becoming virtuous in the writings of 
Aristotle’s immediate predecessors and his own acknowledgment in the final books of the Ethics 
of the power of imitation and the importance of good character models,9 we have good grounds 
for exploring the thought that a learner becomes virtuous through imitation of the virtuous. But 
what is it that happens when we imitate virtuous models and how might this help to explain our 
development as virtuous agents?  
4.3 MIMĒSIS IN THE POETICS 
I noted in the previous section that a number of commentators have alluded to the imitative 
quality of the learner’s activity, though few have developed this thought in much detail. Those 
who have attempted to explain how it is that imitation may contribute to the development of 
virtue have sought enlightenment in a particular source – outside of the Ethics – namely 
Aristotle’s discussion of mimēsis in the Poetics. Before we consider what role imitation may play in 
                                                             
8 This then sheds new light on Aristotle’s claim that “children of the same parents brought up together and 
educated alike are more alike in character” (1162a11-14), since we can suppose that such children will imitate and 
come to be like the same model. 
9 I owe this term to MM McCabe, who got me to see that the more commonly used ‘role models’ may in fact be 
too narrow.  
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the development of virtuous agency, then, I want briefly to say a few words about this text as a 
potential source of information for Aristotle’s views on imitation in moral development. 
In the various passages from Plato, Xenophon and Aristotle discussed above that attest to the 
power of imitation in moral development, the important verb in each is ‘μιμεῖσθαι’, cognate with 
the noun ‘μίμησις’. For this reason, it is supposed that a fruitful means of discovering the role 
imitation might play for Aristotle in moral development will be to examine his views on mimēsis 
in general, and then to apply these to the moral sphere. This concept, as we are aware, is not 
discussed explicitly in the Ethics, but is famously treated in the Poetics, and it is to this text that 
commentators then turn for enlightenment.  
Some caution, however, is required. It is a familiar fact that the verb ‘μιμεῖσθαι’ and the noun 
‘μίμησις’ have a notoriously broad range of senses. Mimēsis can be understood variously as 
‘imitation’, ‘impersonation’, ‘emulation’, but also ‘representation’, ‘reproduction’, ‘image making’ 
and so forth.10 For this reason, any one discussion of the concept of mimēsis cannot automatically 
be taken to inform us of a writer’s views on mimēsis in all senses, since a particular discussion may 
be restricted to a particular sense and not applicable to other senses beyond that.11 Indeed, even 
where there may be certain common features or insights that might be thought to apply more 
widely, we should be wary of coalescing the connections between the senses of mimēsis and 
reducing the concept to its lowest common denominator.  
The quotations from Xenophon point to what might generally be regarded as a behavioural, 
or perhaps more specifically, an emulatory sense of mimēsis, in which one agent takes another as a 
model or a paradigm, and imitates or emulates her behaviour. It is in broadly this sense that I am 
                                                             
10 For a comprehensive discussion of the various senses of the concept of mimēsis see Halliwell (1986). In Plato 
alone Halliwell finds the following senses:  
(a) Linguistic: language reflects the essence of things; (b) Philosophical: the philosopher’s thought 
aspires to provide a copy of truth – the mimēsis of an eternal model; (c) Cosmic: the material world 
may in various ways stand in a mimetic relation to eternal models; (d) Visual: the painter’s mimēsis 
pictures the appearances of things; (e) Mimicry: the voice and the body can be used to reproduce 
certain properties of the animal and natural world; (f ) Behaviour: ordinary imitation or emulation; 
(g) Impersonatory: the (non-artistic) acting out of a role; (h) Poetic: apart from unspecified references 
to poetic mimēsis, Plato usually treats poetry either as an art of verbal image making, comparable to 
the painter’s, or (in some of its forms) as a special case of (g), i.e. dramatic impersonation; (i) Musical: 
musical modes and structures can give expression to certain human actions and experiences (It is 
sometimes impossible to disengage music from poetry in Plato’s references to mousikê; (j) 
Cheoreographic: dancers can act out representations of human life (1986, p.121). 
Textual references for each of these senses are given at (1986, p.121, n.23). 
11 This is a familiar issue in Platonic scholarship, and particularly with respect to the connections between Plato’s 
discussion of mimēsis in paideia in Republic III, and his famously negative treatment of mimēsis in Republic X.  
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suggesting we can see Aristotle’s student of virtue as engaged in imitation too.12 But the Poetics is 
concerned for the most part with mimēsis as it is involved in tragic poetry. This sense of mimēsis 
is still behavioural (as opposed to the mimetic relation in which an image stands to a real object, 
say), but it consists specifically in the representation of characters to an audience; it is not 
emulatory. For this reason, we should be wary of drawing conclusions about the mimēsis in moral 
development from Aristotle’s discussion of mimēsis as it figures in tragic poetry. 
Nevertheless, a particular passage early in the Poetics has been selected by a number of 
commentators as a source of a more general insight into Aristotle’s conception of mimēsis. Early 
in the work Aristotle oﬀers an account of the origins of poetry, which he explains have to do with 
a natural tendency in human beings towards imitation. The passage is worth quoting in full: 
Poetry in general can be seen to owe its existence to two causes, and these are rooted in nature. 
First, there is man’s natural propensity, from childhood onwards, to engage in mimetic 
activity (and this distinguishes man from other creatures, that he is thoroughly mimetic and 
through mimesis takes his first steps in understanding). Second, there is the pleasure which 
men take in mimetic objects. An indication of the latter can be observed in practice: for we 
take pleasure in contemplating the most precise images of things whose sight in itself causes 
us pain – such as the appearance of the basest animals, or of corpses. Here too the explanation 
lies in the fact that great pleasure is derived from exercising the understanding, not just for 
philosophers but in the same way for all men, though their capacity for it may be limited. It 
is for this reason that men enjoy looking at images, because what happens is that they 
contemplate them, they apply their understanding and reasoning to each element 
(identifying this as an image of such-and-such a man, for instance). Since, if it happens that 
one has no previous familiarity with the sight, then the object will not give pleasure qua 
mimetic object, but because of its craftsmanship, or colour, or for some other such reason.  
ἐοίκασι δὲ γεννῆσαι μὲν ὅλως τὴν ποιητικὴν αἰτίαι δύο τινὲς καὶ αὗται φυσικαί. τό τε γὰρ 
μιμεῖσθαι σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παίδων ἐστὶ καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὅτι 
μιμητικώτατόν ἐστι καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας, καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς 
μιμήμασι πάντας. σημεῖον δὲ τούτου τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων: ἃ γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὁρῶμεν, 
τούτων τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα ἠκριβωμένας χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες, οἷον θηρίων τε μορφὰς 
τῶν ἀτιμοτάτων καὶ νεκρῶν. αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τούτου, ὅτι μανθάνειν οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις 
ἥδιστον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ βραχὺ κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτοῦ. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο 
χαίρουσι τὰς εἰκόνας ὁρῶντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τί 
ἕκαστον, οἷον ὅτι οὗτος ἐκεῖνος: ἐπεὶ ἐὰν μὴ τύχῃ προεωρακώς, οὐχ ᾗ μίμημα ποιήσει τὴν 
ἡδονὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν ἢ τὴν χροιὰν ἢ διὰ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἄλλην αἰτίαν (Poetics, 
1448b4-19, trans. Halliwell) 
Although much of the Poetics is concerned with a more restricted notion of mimēsis, the content 
of the above passage and in particular the claim that human beings have a natural desire to imitate, 
strongly suggest that here Aristotle is talking about mimēsis in a sense that is not particular to 
                                                             
12 I have already noted by contrast the way in which Plato may have a more restricted notion of mimēsis in mind 
in his discussion in Republic III.  
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tragic poetry. Moreover, Halliwell encourages us to see that “the enactive sense must be uppermost 
in Aristotle’s reference to the natural mimetic propensities of the human species” (1986, p.129), 
presumably because it is more plausible to suppose that we imitate the behaviour and mannerisms 
of others from our earliest moments, than to suppose, for example, that infants engage in image 
making or pictorial representations. That the enactive sense is at play in this passage then makes 
this passage particularly relevant to understanding the kind of imitation that is involved in moral 
development. Mimēsis would appear to be something to which we have an innate tendency and 
the source of our earliest understanding. 
Contrasted with the enactive sense, however, is what clearly looks like an example of a 
mimetic image in Aristotle’s claim that “we take pleasure in contemplating the most precise 
images of things whose sight in itself causes us pain – such as the appearance of the basest animals, 
or of corpses (ἃ γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὁρῶμεν, τούτων τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα ἠκριβωμένας χαίρομεν 
θεωροῦντες, οἷον θηρίων τε μορφὰς τῶν ἀτιμοτάτων καὶ νεκρῶν)” (1448b10-12). The example is 
clearly not particular to tragic poetry, but the particularity of the sense of mimēsis in play here (i.e. 
as concerned with mimetic images) might lead us to suppose that what we discover in these lines 
about the power of imitation cannot be carried over into our understanding of imitation in moral 
development. Nevertheless, whilst the example does appear to invoke a particular sense of 
mimēsis, the fact that it is oﬀered within the context of a discussion of our natural desire to imitate 
and a natural pleasure that is taken in imitation, suggests that Aristotle is providing an example of 
the ways in which pleasure taken in imitation, rather than suggesting that the pleasure gained 
from imitations is limited to the observation of mimetic images. So understood, the passage 
reveals that mimēsis is something toward which we have a natural tendency, a means by which 
learning takes place and a source of pleasure. It involves, moreover, recognition and a certain 
amount of figuring out (συλλογίζεσθαι). 
So whilst we ought to be wary of conflating the poetic sense of mimēsis with the sense of 
imitation that I am suggesting is involved in moral development,13 the above passage, in its more 
general treatment of mimēsis, may help us to make progress in understanding the possible role of 
imitation in the development of virtue. Let us consider now what role this might be.  
                                                             
13 And for this reason much of Aristotle’s discussion of mimēsis in the Poetics is too specific to the poetic sense to 
be relevant to our investigation. 
 117 
4.4 FOSSHEIM AND THE DESIRE TO IMITATE 
I stated earlier that whilst various commentators have alluded to the imitative nature of moral 
habituation, the thought has rarely been developed. One exception is Fossheim (2006), who 
draws on Aristotle’s remarks in the Poetics with a view to developing a mimetic account of the 
learner’s development. As one of the few developments of this thought within Aristotelian 
scholarship, Fossheim’s account is worth taking into consideration, though his is not an account 
of imitation’s role in moral habituation that I will ultimately adopt.14 In setting out Fossheim’s 
account, however, I hope to bring more clearly into focus my own account of the role of imitation 
in moral development, and indeed to show how this account is more explanatory. 
To understand the particular role Fosshiem envisages for the concept of mimēsis in a learner’s 
habituation requires us to understand something of the context in which he oﬀers his account. 
This, as we shall see, takes as its point of departure Burnyeat’s (1980) influential discussion of 
learning to be good, though, as I will suggest, is based on something of a misreading of Burnyeat’s 
view. Fossheim is seeking to understand how a learner comes to choose virtuous action for its own 
sake, and begins his inquiry by acknowledging Burnyeat’s insightful account of the importance of 
a learner’s enjoyment of virtuous actions in her coming to grasp their value. Burnyeat argues that 
in learning to properly enjoy those actions that are expressions of the virtues, the agent comes to 
recognise a value that such actions have, a value that cannot be fully appreciated except through 
such enjoyment:15 
Accordingly, if learning to do and to take (proper) enjoyment in doing just actions is learning 
to do and enjoy them for their own sake, for what they are, namely just, and this is not to be 
distinguished from learning that they are enjoyable for themselves and their intrinsic value, 
namely their justice and nobility, then perhaps we can give intelligible sense to the thesis that 
practice leads to knowledge, as follows. I may be told, and may believe, that such and such 
actions are just and noble, but I have not really learned for myself (taken to heart, made 
second nature to me) that they have this intrinsic value until I have learned to value (love) 
them for it, with the consequence that I take pleasure in doing them. To understand and 
appreciate the value that makes them enjoyable in themselves, I must learn to enjoy them, 
and that does take time and practice – in short, habituation (Burnyeat, 1980, p.78). 
Burnyeat’s account is notoriously diﬃcult to pin down, and just how it is that a learner comes to 
take pleasure in virtuous action in the way Burnyeat suggests she does is an important question 
                                                             
14 Fossheim’s account is adopted by Vakirtzis (2015), who takes it as the basis for his own account of the role of 
mimēsis in character friendship and the continued development of mature agents. 
15 I will propose a somewhat diﬀerent account of the relation between a learner’s enjoyment and her grasp of the 
value of virtuous action in the following chapter.  
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(we will return to the issue of the relation between pleasure and the grasp of value in Chapter 5). 
The suggestion in this quotation, however, is that as the student’s appreciation of virtuous activity 
develops over time, she comes to be motivated to perform such actions for the sake of their 
intrinsic value, and in this way comes to choose virtuous actions as the virtuous agent does. 
The above suggests a transition from an immature form of motivation to the mature choice of 
the virtuous agent. But Fossheim takes there to be a motivational diﬃculty arising prior to this 
transition. For he wonders how it is that a learner can be motivated to practise good actions in the 
first place. An appeal to the pleasure of virtuous activity cannot explain this stage of the learner’s 
development, argues Fossheim, for the intrinsic enjoyment of virtuous actions surely cannot 
motivate someone who has not yet engaged in virtuous activity. 
It is as a response to this challenge – that is, the challenge of initially motivating the student’s 
practice – that Fossheim takes Burnyeat to claim: “that the child’s sense of pleasure […] should be 
hooked up with just and noble things so that his unreasoned evaluative responses may develop in 
connection with the right objects” (Burnyeat, 1980, p.78).16 Both Plato and Aristotle recognise 
that successful habituation into virtue must train the learner’s sense of pleasure, not only because 
it is a mark of the virtuous agent that she takes pleasure in virtuous action, but because pleasure is 
initially and for a long time the (young) learner’s only source of motivation. Burnyeat is surely 
right to claim that successful habituation will require the development of the child’s sense of 
pleasure in connection with the right objects. Yet as Fossheim points out, what is missing from 
Burnyeat’s account is an explanation of what such ‘hooking up’ involves and how it is achieved.  
Fossheim ventures a possible explanation on Burnyeat’s behalf: by the ‘hooking up’ of pleasure 
and the noble, he suggests, Burnyeat might mean that an early student of virtue must develop an 
association between the two, through habituation.17 We discussed this view as a version of a 
                                                             
16 In fact, Fossheim does not accurately represent the dialectic of Burnyeat’s account. There is no indication that 
Burnyeat sees the issue of the child’s initial motivation as problematic in the way Fossheim does: Burnyeat is not 
identifying as a problem the child’s motivation to perform virtuous actions, and proposing as a solution an appeal to 
the only thing that will motivate her to act, namely her sense of pleasure, but rather is claiming that since the child’s 
(only) source of motivation is pleasure, we had better make sure this is aligned with the right objects from the start.  
17 Fossheim attributes this view to Burnyeat as ‘the simplest explanation’ of the hooking up claim, though it is 
not clear that Burnyeat should be committed to this account. As above, Burnyeat does not claim that the basic 
pleasures a child takes in certain objects should be appealed to as means of tempting the child onto virtuous action, 
as if this were some precursor to habituation, but rather that (among) the objects in which the child should take 
pleasure are virtuous actions. This pleasure develops in sophistication over time, and the child comes to see a value in 
virtuous actions and to be motivated by this value. His claim, I take it, is that if the child is going to recognise certain 
objects as fine and to be motivated by this property, we had better make sure that it is fine objects that she takes 
pleasure in in the first place. A better target, I believe, is Curzer (2002, p.159), whose account of habituation as 
involving pain and the threat of punishment, discussed in the previous chapter, looks closer to the association model. 
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mechanical picture of habituation in the last chapter; it consists in the thought that in the course 
of her practice of virtuous actions the learner’s performance of such actions must be repeatedly 
associated with something she already finds pleasurable, so that she thus comes to be motivated 
to perform those actions that she associates with this pleasure.  
On this picture, the object of the learner’s pleasure is (initially at least) external to her 
performance of virtuous actions; and herein, Fossheim rightly argues, lies the problem with such 
an account. For if the object of the learner’s pleasure is external to the performance of virtuous 
actions, it leaves unexplained how the learner comes to value and so be motivated to perform such 
actions for their own sake. Furthermore, it encourages a tendency to perform virtuous acts for 
some further end beyond the action itself, to perform them for the sake of some external reward. 
And to do this, as we know, is to fail to be virtuous. As Fossheim acknowledges, we cannot expect 
the learner to value virtuous action in exactly the way that the mature agent does, but an account 
that explains the development of the learner’s motivation by appeal to external, associated 
pleasures, leaves us with a gap between this and the pleasure that the virtuous agent takes in such 
actions, performed for their own sake.  
So if we agree with Burnyeat that successful habituation must involve the ‘hooking up’ of the 
learner’s sense of pleasure with virtuous actions, it seems we need an account of this where what 
the learner takes pleasure in is the very performance of virtuous actions, where she is motivated 
from the outset to perform such acts, and not to do so merely as a means to some external pleasure. 
It is in this respect that Fossheim argues that imitation is key.  
We saw in Poetics IV that Aristotle takes it to be “an instinct of human beings, from childhood, 
to imitate. Indeed, this distinguishes them from other animals: man is the most mimetic of all (τό 
τε γὰρ μιμεῖσθαι σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παίδων ἐστὶ καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων 
ὅτι μιμητικώτατόν ἐστι)” (Poetics, 1448b5-7). And this natural desire to imitate is incredibly 
important, Fossheim argues. For as he explains, the fact that we are naturally imitative beings will 
ensure that a student of virtue – so long as she is provided with appropriate role models – will 
perform actions in accordance with the virtues, and importantly do so without the need to appeal 
to external rewards or punishments. A young learner will naturally imitate the actions of a model, 
and does not therefore need to be coaxed into doing so. But this is not all; Fossheim argues that 
through the satisfaction of her mimetic desire, the learner will thus take pleasure in the very 
performance of that activity. It is the act, Fossheim stresses, of performing the mimēsis that pleases 
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the learner, and it is this, he thinks, that ensures that the learner’s pleasure is taken in her action, 
and not externally.  
In short, then, Fossheim argues that thanks to our natural desire to imitate, the student of 
virtue will perform virtuous actions without the need for an external reward, and will take 
pleasure in performing those actions in which successful imitation consists. Thus the learner takes 
pleasure in performing virtuous actions, and so comes to choose these for their own sake and not 
for the sake of some ulterior motive.  
4.4.1 ASSESSMENT OF FOSSHEIM’S ACCOUNT 
Fossheim’s account is interesting in various ways, in particular in its emphasis on the thought that 
our natural mimetic tendencies will help to guarantee that we perform certain sorts of actions – 
provided, that is, we are presented with appropriate models. But I submit that he is mistaken in 
thinking that we can account for the development of virtuous motivations simply by appeal to the 
satisfaction of mimetic desires.  
It may be the case that through the satisfaction of her mimetic desire the student takes 
pleasure in imitating virtuous actions – or as Fossheim puts in, in the ‘successful performance’ of 
that action. This pleasure, however, is surely taken in the successful performance of that action 
qua mimetic action, and has nothing to do with the nature of the action qua virtuous. One could 
on this account be equally pleased by the successful performance of a vicious action, if the object 
of one’s imitation were a vicious agent. Yet Fossheim’s appeal to our natural mimetic desire was 
ultimately intended to explain how the student comes to take pleasure in the performance of 
virtuous actions just as the virtuous agent does, that is, in the performance of such actions qua 
virtuous (or, as we will discuss in the next chapter, qua fine).18  
Now, once again, we can’t expect the student of virtue to perform virtuous actions in exactly 
the same way as the virtuous agent does, but Fossheim’s very complaint was that on an account 
that explains the development of the learner’s motivation by appeal to associated pleasure, a 
learner will only value virtue incidentally and as a means to the proper object of her pleasure. 
Whilst Fossheim’s account may escape the charge that the student of virtue performs virtuous 
                                                             
18 Fossheim does acknowledge the distinction between performing an activity qua mimēsis and performing that 
activity qua activity, but claims that for Aristotle the performance of an activity qua mimēsis is ‘in some respects the 
same as’ the performance of that activity qua activity, citing as support Aristotle’s claim at 1103a31 that we become 
something by doing it. Since our very concern, however, is to explain how it is that we become good by doing good 
things, the account looks dangerously circular if we invoke this passage as support for an interpretation of that claim.  
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actions merely instrumentally, as a means to some further, external pleasure, he is open to the 
charge that her performance and enjoyment of such action is still only accidental. Her pleasure, it 
seems, is taken in her successful imitating (and could be taken in any other thing that she chooses 
to imitate), and does not have to do with her valuing virtuous action. 
I submit, then, that Fossheim has mischaracterised the role of imitation in habituation and in 
doing so has severely limited the explanatory power of seeing the student’s activity as imitative.19 
That we are naturally imitative creatures may well play a role in encouraging a young learner 
towards virtuous activity, if provided with virtuous character models, but by attributing the 
success of habituation to the satisfaction of a mimetic desire we do not satisfactorily explain how 
mimetic engagement with virtuous activity contributes to the development of virtuous agency 
and eventual realisation of virtuous activity. The explanatory challenge remains unresolved.  
4.5  LEARNING THROUGH IMITATION 
I believe that Fossheim has focused on the wrong remark of Aristotle’s in the Poetics IV passage in 
attempting to explicate the contribution that mimēsis might play in our development as virtuous 
agents. Fossheim focuses almost entirely on Aristotle’s claim that we are naturally imitative, and 
that a certain pleasure is to be gained through imitative activity, but whilst – as I have 
acknowledged – these facts may play an important role in encouraging students towards virtuous 
practice, I believe the more instructive remark is the claim that “through imitations man develops 
his first understanding (τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας)” (1448b7-8). I want in 
                                                             
19 I suggest that Fossheim is led to this position because he overly problematises the issue of the student’s initial 
motivation and in light of this, misrepresents the purpose of Burnyeat’s account and picture of the development of a 
learner’s pleasure he proposes. Fossheim believes that we need to appeal to the concept of mimēsis in order to explain 
how the young learner can ever be motivated to perform virtuous actions in the first place, and believes that it has the 
additional benefit of being able to explain how the learner, through the pleasure she takes in her mimēsis of virtuous 
activity, learns to value such activity in the same way that the virtuous agent does.  
I do not, however, believe we need to regard the issue of the learner’s initial motivation to engage in practice as 
problematic in the way that Fossheim attempts to make out. Fossheim tries to show as problematic the role accorded 
to parental advice in certain accounts of Aristotelian habituation, arguing that if a child is instructed to perform a 
certain action, that she cannot then be performing it for its own sake, and rather must be acting from the fear of 
punishment or because of the prospect of reward (2006, p.107-8). Now, as we know, advice alone cannot bring a 
person to be motivated by the noble (1179b24ﬀ ) and those who in adulthood perform actions in accordance with 
virtue only through coercion of course fall short of moral virtue. But it is simply mistaken to suppose that the 
obedience of a child is the same as an adult who is merely obedient to the law, and I believe we should thus be 
suspicious of the idea that any appeal to the advice of a parent in explaining how a child initially comes to perform 
actions in accordance with the virtues will result in an ‘irreducible gap’ in her motivation. Aristotle recognises that 
children are, for the most part, obedient (NE I 13), and I suggest he would grant that so long as the child engages in 
the appropriate way in the activities towards which she is directed (which we are trying to understand) and begins to 
develop her own conception of the value of such activities, it is not problematic that she is directed towards certain 
courses of action under the instruction of a parent or some other guide. 
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what follows to explore the ways in which we might see the learner’s imitation of virtue as precisely 
a process through which she learns, and to think moreover about what it is that she might learn 
through this process.20   
4.5.1 IMITATION AND ATTENTION TO VIRTUOUS ACTION 
So, what is it that one might learn through the imitation of a virtuous agent and her activity? An 
obvious suggestion is that one learns about virtuous action. It is a familiar thought that a learner 
requires virtuous guides not simply so that she is told what to do, but so that she is provided with 
examples of virtuous action to follow. And behind this is the equally familiar thought that 
virtuous action is not codifiable and cannot be captured in any neat set of rules or universal 
principles that could be prescribed by a teacher, rather: “the agents themselves must consider in 
each case what the opportune action is, as doctors and navigators do” (11o4a10). Thus one might 
suppose that only in following an agent who is aware in any given case what the appropriate action 
is, can one acquire knowledge of what virtuous action consists in. This, one might suppose, is part 
of the force of Aristotle’s remark in NE II 4 that “things are called just and temperate when they 
are such as the just and temperate person would do” (1105b5-7); by looking to the just and 
temperate person, we can discover what is the just and temperate thing to do in a given situation.21 
One might add to this the thought that a virtuous model provides a learner not only with 
insight into the particularity of virtuous action, but into its variety as well. So Broadie writes: 
If the young person is trained to justice by getting him to perform just actions again and again, 
these may be physically and psychologically quite diﬀerent though they have it in common 
that they are just. This too is something which we have to learn if we are going to have the 
virtue of justice ourselves, so that practice should cover all sorts of cases, in which the just 
action is sometimes a giving, sometimes a withholding, sometimes treating people alike, 
sometimes diﬀerently and so on (1991, p.108). 
It is surely correct that any understanding of the nature of just action and knowledge of what just 
action consists in will require a learner to see the variety of forms that such action can take. And 
                                                             
20 Sherman (1989, p.168) too recognises the importance of imitation as a source of learning, and we will take note 
of certain aspects of her view in what follows. But whilst Sherman focuses on the knowledge of virtuous action that 
the learner acquires through the course of her practice, we should be wary of seeing this as distinct from her 
motivational development too. As I will argue at the end of this chapter and in the next, the understanding of virtuous 
action and situational awareness that a learner gains through the imitation of the virtuous also puts her in a position 
to grasp the value of such action, as I explain in Chapter 5.  
21 This extends not only to actions conceived of in behavioural terms, but to emotional responses too. With 
respect to the virtue of courage, for example, a virtuous model might show a young learner that a pet dog is not to be 
feared, and can be approached, but that fires or busy roads are rightly cause for trepidation, and to a more mature 
learner that minor slights are no grounds for extreme anger, but that anger at great injustices is warranted, and so on. 
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it is surely correct too that such knowledge could not be acquired through any kind of purely 
theoretical instruction, but rather through the example and guidance of a virtuous (or certainly, 
more developed) agent. But so far this does not tell us much about why imitation itself should 
play such an important role in our moral development, nor help us to make much progress in our 
project of explaining the development of the learner’s motivation.   
One obvious complaint one might have is that this suggestion so far doesn’t tell us much about 
why imitation is so important, and not merely the observation of a character model. The proposal 
so far motivates the importance of the presence of virtuous models for our development, but not 
our imitation of them as such. Despite my rejection of his account, however, a remark of 
Fossheim’s might oﬀer a route into explaining why imitation itself and not mere observation is so 
important in coming to know about virtuous action. Explaining why it is that imitation is superior 
not only to chance action, but action performed following another’s detailed instruction, 
Fossheim writes: 
That [the learner] is doing the action mimetically will mean, for instance, that her attention 
is on carrying it out as perfectly as possible, that an important kind of failure will consist in 
doing something which falls short of, or otherwise misses the target in relation to, the doing 
of X. Performing X mimetically entails a closer aﬃnity to its full performance than is 
guaranteed if X is done by pure chance, or if it is done with a view to an ulterior reward, or if 
it is carried out step-by-step according to someone else’s detailed instructions (cf. NE 1105a1-
23). For none of these other modes of performance is it required that one’s focus is on X in 
the relatively strong sense that mimetic performance requires. This is how doing X 
mimetically entails somehow ‘doing X for its own sake’ (2007, p.133).  
Fossheim does not explain how doing something in the way described “entails somehow ‘doing X 
for its own sake’”, though I take it that it has to do with the idea that in attempting to perform a 
successful imitation, one’s focus will be on getting the action right, and so on the action itself, 
rather than on what one might gain from performing that action, and so on. Fossheim has not 
done enough to explain how this kind of focus entails choosing an action for its own sake, but he 
is right at least to draw our attention to the attentiveness involved in imitative activity (or at least 
involved in imitative activity that is consciously undertaken). When engaging in imitative activity, 
the student is not passive in her observation of a model, but as Fossheim puts it, must also ‘use’ 
this model as the basis of her mimēsis (2006, p.111). To produce a successful imitation, the imitator 
must be particularly attentive to the question of what the perfection or failure of that activity 
consists in, and so be focused more on the nature of that activity than she would be if she were 
merely engaged in observation.  
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The suggestion so far is that through imitation we begin to acquire knowledge of what 
virtuous action consists in, which Aristotle might put in terms of acquiring ‘the that’ of virtuous 
action, famously discussed in NE I 4.22 We might connect this with the common thought 
discussed in Chapter 3 that a mindless or mechanical picture of habituation could not account for 
the knowledge of virtuous actions required for mature virtuous action, and see this picture as an 
antidote to such a view. But we can also see how imitative activity, so conceived, will aﬀord the 
opportunity to develop the capacities that must be active when engaging in mature, virtuous 
activity (as discussed too in Chapter 3). For an imitator must actively identify the relevant features 
of what she is imitating. She must attend particularly closely to the model’s actions and responses, 
seeing particular features of the model’s action and the situation as important, whilst abstracting 
away from others. In this way, through mimetic engagement with virtuous activity, the student 
not only becomes more attuned to the nature of the virtuous model’s action, but she also develops 
important cognitive skills of identification of features, abstraction from particulars, and so forth, 
which will allow her to go on herself in the future. 
It is this feature of imitative activity, I believe, that we see emphasised in Sherman’s discussion 
of imitation in moral development. Sherman, as we have seen, is keen to emphasise the sense in 
which habituation must be ‘critical’, and seeks in the following quotation to show the extent to 
which critical activity and its enjoyment characterise all stages of development. She notes, in light 
of the Poetics IV discussion, that “at the early stages, discriminatory activity will often take the 
form of mimēsis”, and goes on to suggest that: 
Intellectual delight, here, seems to hang on making a discovery, on coming to understand or 
actively puzzle out (sullogizesthai) what is not yet familiar in terms of what is. ‘This is that’ is, 
within the mimetic mode, a classification of actual characters, ways of acting and feeling, 
features of circumstances, etc., through familiarity with some represented form. Within the 
ethical sphere ‘to figure out that this is that’ is again a matter of broadening one’s inductive 
base, of the learner sizing up situations in terms of past experience plus some imaginative and 
aﬀective feel for how it is related to what is at hand. It is significant that Aristotle describes 
this process as sullogizesthai. It is itself a kind of critical activity which, in the case of action, 
precedes the practical inference (sullogismos or deliberation) about what to do. As we have 
described it in earlier chapters, it involves a discerning of the particulars, a reading of the 
                                                             
22 Here Aristotle writes:  
This is why one should have been well brought up in good habits if one is going to listen adequately to 
lectures about things noble and just, and in general about political (social) aﬀairs. For the beginning 
(starting point) is ‘the that’, and if this is suﬃciently apparent to a person, he will not in addition have 
a need for ‘the because’. Such a person has, or can easily get hold of, beginnings (starting points), where 
he who has neither… let him hearken to the words of Hesiod (διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἦχθαι καλῶς τὸν περὶ 
καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλως τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμενον ἱκανῶς. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο 
ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι: ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἔχει ἢ λάβοι ἂν ἀρχὰς ῥᾳδίως. ᾧ δὲ μηδέτερον 
ὑπάρχει τούτων, ἀκουσάτω τῶν Ἡσιόδου) (1095b4-9, trans. Burnyeat).  
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situation in terms of salient considerations. As such, it is a reasoning that is non-procedural; it 
is a ‘figuring out’ by ‘improvising’ (1106b15), by remaining close to and aﬀected by the 
concrete details (1989, p.168, my emphasis). 
Imitative activity, Sherman suggests, already involves the kind of ‘figuring out’ that is characteristic 
of the mature virtuous agent and in particular the discerning of particulars that is necessary for 
mature virtuous action. By seeing the learner as engaged in imitation it seems we are thus oﬀered 
a way of understanding how this activity, whilst distinct from that of the virtuous agent, might 
allow for the development of the capacities that are required for mature virtuous activity. 
The proposals discussed so far are more promising than Fossheim’s initial account of the role 
that imitation plays in the development of virtue. But they do not yet do enough to explain what 
it is we have been seeking to account for, namely how a learner moves from performing alienable 
actions to being the author of her actions in a strict sense. I believe however that we can develop 
the account in such a way that helps to explain how this kind of change is eﬀected. 
4.6 IMITATION AND THE VIRTUOUS AGENT’S PERSPECTIVE 
We can gain further insight into the learner’s imitation and what this may involve and eﬀect, by 
reflecting on two things that have already been mentioned in passing, namely the proper object 
of the learner’s imitation, and her purpose in imitating. Our discussion so far has emphasised a 
particular aspect of the learner’s imitation, in which her focus is seen to be on the actions of a 
virtuous agent and we might thus suppose that what the learner imitates are the virtuous agent’s 
actions. As the foregoing discussion shows, the learner’s imitation certainly will involve an 
attentiveness to the actions of a virtuous agent, and be manifested in the actions she performs. But 
I think it is mistaken to think that the object of her imitation is the virtuous agent’s action and 
not instead the virtuous agent herself. After all, we saw in Xenophon that it is Socrates that his 
followers must imitate (ἑαυτῷ μιμουμένους, Memorabilia, I.ii 2-3), that people ought to imitate 
those who are now preeminent (τούς γε νῦν πρωτεύοντας μιμούμενοι, Memorabilia, III v.14), that 
Agesilaus is a paradigm of virtue (ἡ Ἀγησιλάου ἀρετὴ παράδειγμα, Agesilaus X 2), and again that by 
imitating a pious, just, sober and self-controlled person we cannot become bad. In Plato too it is 
courageous, temperate, pious and free people (ἀνδρείους, σώφρονας, ὁσίους, ἐλευθέρους, Rep. 
395c) whom the young guardians must imitate, and again in the passages from the Ethics it was on 
one another that the virtuous friends model themselves (ἀπομάττονται γὰρ παρ᾽ ἀλλήλων, 
1172a12-13). 
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As for the learner’s purpose in imitating the virtuous agent, we can contrast her intention with 
the rash man, discussed in NE III 7, who it seems wishes merely to appear like the brave person, 
in wishing to appear (βούλεται φαίνεσθαι) to have the attitude towards brave things that she does. 
Thus the rash man imitates the brave person in what she does. But the successful student of virtue 
does not want simply to appear like the virtuous agent, she wishes rather to be like her. She is not 
a pretender to virtue (προσποιητικός), but is seeking to become virtuous.  
Putting together these thoughts about the object of the learner’s imitation and her purpose in 
imitating, I suggest we should see her imitation as consisting in more than the simple copying – 
however attentively done – of virtuous actions. In imitating and trying to be like the virtuous 
agent, the learner must not simply seek to reproduce her actions, but also to adopt her perspective. 
She must try to see things as the virtuous agent does. It is then from this perspective that she 
performs the actions that the virtuous agent would perform. The learner must see the situation in 
which she finds herself as if through the eyes of the virtuous agent; she must see the features of the 
situation that are, or would be, salient to the virtuous agent and then act as the virtuous agent 
would act in response to these. The learner does not simply copy a temperate agent in refusing a 
second slice of cake; rather, in imitating the temperate agent, the learner adopts her perspective, 
and attmpts to see, as if through her eyes, that the second piece of cake is one too many and is thus 
something that the virtuous agent would avoid.  
To say that a learner, in imitating a virtuous agent, adopts her perspective rather than simply 
copies her actions may seem demanding as a picture of imitation. But it is a form of imitation we 
see even in children’s games. An important diﬀerence between the case of games and the case of 
moral development is that games involve an acknowledged form of pretence, but reflecting on 
such cases can help to bring into focus this picture of the learner’s imitation of the virtuous agent. 
Consider, say, a group of children playing doctors and patients. The child playing the doctor does 
not simply copy the actions she has seen a doctor perform, such as holding a stethoscope up to the 
chest of her patient; this she does, but in inhabiting the role of the doctor, she also sees 
opportunities for providing ‘medical care’, where she didn’t previously: her playmate’s scratched 
knee aﬀords the opportunity for bandaging, as do her broken teddy-bears and so on. Or imagine 
again a child playing the role of headteacher in a playground game, who in inhabiting this role 
quickly sees opportunities to tell his playmates oﬀ for untucked shirts or chewing gum, where 
neither would normally register with him. In imitating the headteacher he has to adopt his 
perspective, and to imagine the situation as he would see it. So whilst this may appear a more 
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demanding picture of imitation than one on which an imitator simply copies the actions of 
another, it is nevertheless a form of imitation of which even young learners are capable.  
So how does seeing the learner’s imitative activity in this way help with our explanatory 
project? Now, one thing that is achieved by adopting the perspective of another is that in doing 
so the learner will be forced to stand outside of her own (initial) perspective, and importantly to 
see the world as structured not simply so as to serve her own immediate desires and to provide her 
with pleasure. When faced with a particular situation, the imitator will not simply look at the 
world and consider what will bring her immediate pleasure, or what will serve her immediate 
desires; rather, she must think about what features of the situation the virtuous agent would see 
as important, and the action she would perform in light of those features. In this way, the adopting 
of the virtuous agent’s perspective already sees a move away from a way of acting that consists in 
the pursuit of bodily pleasure and satisfaction of appetitive desires, to a more mature form of 
action that involves a more panoramic view, as it were, of the situation and recognition of the 
importance of factors other than those which relate to one’s own immediate pleasures.  
Further still, this mode of imitation also importantly aﬀords the learner the opportunity to 
see virtuous actions not as isolated performances, but as the appropriate, practical response to the 
situations in which she finds herself. It reveals to her what it is about the situation that makes the 
virtuous agent’s action an appropriate response; an awareness that is more diﬃcult to come by if 
one merely copies a virtuous agent’s actions. But more than this, it enables her to learn to read 
situations well and reveals to her the things that morally matter, which may not have been 
apparent to her in the past.23 I will argue in the following chapter that in being so positioned the 
student of virtue does not simply acquire knowledge of virtuous action, but is enabled to perceive 
the value of virtuous action that is grasped by the virtuous agent. 
 Before we turn to this, however, there are two final points to be added to this picture.  
4.6.1 PERCEIVING TOGETHER 
One might be concerned about how it is that a learner could ever come to imagine these features 
of situations that are salient to the virtuous agent but have not thus far been apparent to her. For 
if they are not apparent to her, how can she imagine them? Here the answer is surely that a learner 
                                                             
23 Analogously, we can imagine an able-bodied person who is unaware of the diﬃculties a wheelchair user may 
have in navigating a university campus. Only when he adopts the perspective of the wheelchair user do the number 
of staircases, narrow doorways and lack of ramps become apparent to him; these things become salient. 
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does not, at least in the early stages of her education, do this alone. A virtuous agent not only acts 
as a model for the learner, but can oﬀer guidance too, guiding her attention to the features that 
matter about a situation. This is one of the potential roles I wanted to allow for a guide when I 
argued in Chapter 1 that we should not exclude from the learner’s practice the involvement of 
‘practical teaching’ on the part of a more developed agent. This kind of guidance then does not 
simply instil in the learner certain beliefs about moral virtue, but is instrumental in the training 
of her perceptions and, as I will later argue, her motivations too.  
I have argued already that Aristotle’s discussions of friendship and moral education in the 
final books of the Ethics point to the importance of virtuous guides in moral development. But 
we might suppose that this kind of ‘joint attention’ to situations and actions, and the role I am 
suggesting this can play in educating the learner’s perception is plausibly amongst the activities 
Aristotle has in mind when he discusses the importance of living together (συζῆν) at the end of 
NE IX 9. He writes here that the virtuous agent must: 
perceive together his friend’s being, and this will come about in living together and sharing 
conversation and thought. For it seems that living together in the case of human beings is to 
converse, not to share the same pasture in the case of grazing animals.  
συναισθάνεσθαι ἄρα δεῖ καὶ τοῦ φίλου ὅτι ἔστιν, τοῦτο δὲ γίνοιτ᾽ ἂν ἐν τῷ συζῆν καὶ κοινωνεῖν 
λόγων καὶ διανοίας: οὕτω γὰρ ἂν δόξειε τὸ συζῆν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ 
ἐπὶ τῶν βοσκημάτων τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νέμεσθαι (1170b10-14). 
The passage attests to the importance of perceiving together (συναισθάνεσθαι),24 and points to the 
richness of a human life lived together, which involves more than living concurrently in a shared 
space, but engaging in activities together and sharing thoughts and conversations. We might 
reasonably suppose that shared perceptions count amongst the shared thoughts referred to here. 
Interestingly, then, whilst on the one hand we can see that a young person will require more 
active guidance in being brought to see the morally important features of situations, whereas a 
more developed learner will be able more often to inhabit the virtuous agent’s perspective on her 
own, being in a better position to imagine a situation as the virtuous agent would see it, these 
remarks in IX 9 also point to the importance of joint perception even in mature and virtuous 
activity, and indicate that this is something that could continue to enrich our perception of the 
                                                             
24 The importance of this is obscured in Irwin’s translation, in which he renders 1170b10 as “he must then perceive 
his friends being [together with his own]”, implying that the συν- of συναισθάνεσθαι has to do with the two objects 
perceived by the virtuous agent (his own being, and his friends) rather than this being an instance of joint perception.  
McCabe ([2012], 2015) emphasises the importance of the συν- prefix in both the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics.  
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world. This, indeed, is something to which McCabe draws attention at the end of her examination 
of self-perception in the Eudemian Ethics. Here she writes: 
If we are perceiving something together, and reflecting perceptually at the same time on what 
we are perceiving, the process of perceiving may be rich in content, and productive in terms 
of the development of our natural capacities. For example, I may see that grey wagtail over 
there just because we have practised bird-recognition on our ornithological expeditions; and 
my doing so is itself a part of our joint reflective perception. I may get better at playing tennis 
by practising doubles with you, and acquiring an improved sense of where the ball is relative 
to my racquet and yours by seeing it repeatedly coming right at us over the net, and by 
perceiving that I am seeing it that way. I may enjoy music alone by reflective perception of 
what I hear, and have heard; all the more so when we listen together, and I think of us both 
as perceiving the same cadence, as our appreciation of music, how we hear it, develops over 
years of listening together. In ethical cases, too, my sense of moral perception may be 
enhanced by our seeing the situation together; and by doing so over time as our friendship 
matures. Why should we not be able to think of a rich perceptual life together, just as we 
might have a rich shared intellectual life? And when we do, if that life is reflective enough, it 
will focus our attention both on what we see and hear, and on who we are who do so, and 
who our companions are who share or refract our point of view. What is more, it is this very 
reflectiveness that explains our progress—in ornithology, in tennis, in musical appreciation, 
and in doing the right thing. Is it the mischief of sceptical arguments that prevent us from 
seeing Aristotle’s point in the EE—that we can have a genuinely shared life of the eye and the 
ear? ([2012] 2015, pp.363-364). 
On this reading, not only would a learner’s perception of situations be developed through the 
guidance of a more developed agent and her own imitation of that agent, taking on her 
perspective, but in acting together and perceiving together, and reflecting on this, the perceptual 
life of both agents would seem greatly to be enriched. 
4.6.2 IMITATION AND SELF-PERCEPTION 
The final feature of the learner’s imitation I want to bring out concerns the learner’s perspective 
with respect to herself, as she imitates the virtuous agent. I have argued that we should see the 
learner as attending closely both to the virtuous agent and her actions, and attempting to adopt 
the perspective of the virtuous agent and to see the world as she does. Now on the one hand there 
is a sense in which this involves adopting a perspective that is not her own,25 and we might 
moreover think that in trying to adopt another’s perspective and to act as another person would 
act, the learner will see herself precisely as an imitator.  
                                                             
25 In the final chapter of this thesis I will develop an account of how through acting this perspective becomes her 
own, and the learner comes to see things just as the virtuous agent does. 
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And yet in performing the actions that the virtuous agent would, as a response to the 
situations in which she finds herself, the learner will also see herself as the agent of those actions, 
will see these as things that she in fact does, and as the way in which she does in fact respond to the 
situations in which she finds herself. So whilst the actions that she performs are still in a sense 
alienable and are properly speaking the actions of the virtuous agent, we can see how through the 
imitation of a virtuous agent a learner begins to see the world from the perspective of the virtuous 
agent, and to see herself as an agent of virtuous actions. 
As a closing thought, it’s worth reflecting on an important diﬀerence between the role I have 
assigned to imitation in the development of the learner and the role that was assigned by 
Fossheim. Fossheim, as we saw, assigned imitation a role only in the early development of the 
learner, as a means of motivating the learner to engage in the practice of virtuous actions ‘in the 
first place’.26 In this way, imitation is treated in a similar way to the way in which habituation itself 
is treated by some commentators, namely as a discrete and early stage in the learner’s development, 
to be succeeded by more sophisticated forms of education.  
But whilst Aristotle’s remarks in Poetics IV certainly give us reason to think that a learner will 
be engaged in imitative activity from an early age, for imitation is the means by which humans 
achieve their earliest understanding (τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας, Poetics 
1448b7-8), to restrict the role of imitation to the learner’s early practice in this way is, I think, 
mistaken. Just as I am arguing that the habituation process itself, consisting in the practice of 
virtuous actions, should be seen as extending until maturity, rather than as a discrete and early 
stage of a learner’s education, so too should we see the learner’s imitation of the virtuous as 
extending beyond her early eﬀorts at virtuous action. The nature of the learner’s imitative activity 
may of course develop over time, and I suggest in particular that a young learner will be more 
reliant on the presence of a virtuous model in the early stages of her habituation, becoming more 
autonomous and more an author of her own actions as she develops. But in seeing the learner as 
nevertheless engaged in a form of imitation over this time, as I have suggested, we avail ourselves 
of a richer and more enlightening account of her development than that oﬀered by Fossheim. 
With this picture in place, I want to consider in the next chapter how in the course of doing 
the things that a virtuous agent would do, and from her perspective, the learner might come to 
grasp the value of such actions and over time to choose these for their own sake.
                                                             
26 Although he also attempted to show how an imitative model of the learner’s action could better explain the 
eventual development of virtuous choice than those accounts which appealed to the association of pleasures. 
 131 
5 PERCEIVING THE FINE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
At the end of Chapter 3 we examined a recent proposal within scholarship on Aristotelian moral 
habituation, according to which Aristotle’s learner can, and indeed must, act (on occasion) for the 
sake of the ‘noble’ or the ‘fine’ (to kalon), if her habituation is to be successful. The supposition 
was that if a learner can occasionally act for the sake of the fine, then through repeated practice, 
this way of acting can be made more regular until it can be said to be a stable disposition of the 
agent. I argued in response that behind this proposal is a suspect picture both of Aristotle’s 
stability condition (1105a33) and of what happens in the course of the student’s habituation. But 
I argued also that this proposal fails to account for one of the things for which we ought to be 
accounting, namely just how the learner develops this distinctive form of motivation, (that is, 
acting for the sake of the fine and choosing virtuous actions for their own sake). Moreover, I 
argued that this interpretation fails to take seriously the implication of Aristotle’s remark at 
1105b4-5, that it is by doing just and temperate things that this motivational condition (amongst 
others) comes to be met. Both this remark, and Aristotle’s repeated insistence on the importance 
of our doing virtuous things strongly indicate that there is a certain value to be grasped in the 
practice of virtuous actions, and that only having done these and having grasped this value can an 
agent come to choose such actions for their own sake. In this chapter, then, I turn to the question 
of what it is that happens when a learner performs virtuous actions, and what value it is that she 
may come to grasp through such performance.  
My account will proceed via Aristotle’s remarks on the connection between virtuous activity 
and the fine, and I will suggest that it is the fineness of virtuous action that a learner discovers in 
the course of her practice.1 The fineness of virtuous action is something that can be perceived, 
though as I will argue, a certain amount of training is required for an agent to be in a position to 
perceive this value in action. But this, I will argue at the end of the chapter, is just what the 
                                                             
1 Versions of this view can be found in Burnyeat (1980), Achtenberg (2002), Moss (2012), Charles (unpublished 
MS). 
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student’s imitation of a virtuous agent – discussed in Chapter 4 – puts the learner in a position to 
see. In perceiving the fineness of virtuous action I will argue that the learner at the same time sees 
such action as attractive and worth going for, and in this way learns to choose virtuous actions for 
their own sake. 
5.2 CHOOSING FOR THE SAKE OF THE FINE 
We are trying to understand how the student of virtue comes to grasp the value of virtuous action, 
and so how it is that she comes to choose virtuous actions for their own sake. In attempting to do 
so, however, we are faced with the diﬃculty that Aristotle says very little by way of what it is to 
choose an action for its own sake. Perhaps the most natural way of getting at what it is to choose 
a virtuous action for its own sake is by contrast with idea of acting with an ulterior motive: 
performing a generous action in order merely to look good, performing a just action merely out 
of fear of punishment, and so on. Aristotle himself comes close to saying this in his discussion of  
of choiceworthiness in Book X, when he writes that: 
An activity is chosen in its own right if nothing further apart from it is sought from it. Actions 
in accord with virtue seem to be of this sort; for to do fine and excellent things is 
choiceworthy for itself. 
καθ᾽ αὑτὰς δ᾽ εἰσὶν αἱρεταὶ ἀφ᾽ ὧν μηδὲν ἐπιζητεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. τοιαῦται δ᾽ εἶναι 
δοκοῦσιν αἱ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν πράξεις: τὰ γὰρ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα πράττειν τῶν δι᾽ αὑτὰ αἱρετῶν 
(1176b6-8). 
Here Aristotle doesn’t mention ulterior motives, but rather performing something for the sake of 
something else; in acting with an ulterior motive, however, one typically performs the action not 
for its own sake, but for the sake of something else (for the rewards it may bring you, for example.) 
But something is choiceworthy, or chosen (αἱρεταὶ) for itself when it is performed not for the sake 
of something beyond it.  
The passage reveals more than just this, however, for we are also oﬀered a positive 
characterisation of at least some things that are choiceworthy in their own right, namely things 
that are fine (τὰ καλὰ). The connection between choice and the fine is something that Aristotle 
in fact has established much earlier in the work, for he tells us that: 
…there are three objects of choice – fine, expedient2 and pleasant – and three objects of 
avoidance – their contraries, shameful, harmful and painful. About all of these the good 
                                                             
2 Cooper ([1996] 1999, pp.265-266) suggests that the expedient here in fact be understood as the good. Moss 
meanwhile argues that these three objects are all species of the good (2012, pp.209-210). 
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person is correct and the bad person is in error, and especially about pleasure. For this is 
shared with animals, and follows upon every object of choice, since the fine and the expedient 
appear pleasant as well.  
τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν εἰς τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ τριῶν τῶν εἰς τὰς φυγάς, καλοῦ συμφέροντος ἡδέος, 
καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, αἰσχροῦ βλαβεροῦ λυπηροῦ, περὶ ταῦτα μὲν πάντα ὁ ἀγαθὸς κατορθωτικός 
ἐστιν ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἁμαρτητικός, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονήν: κοινή τε γὰρ αὕτη τοῖς ζῴοις, καὶ 
πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν παρακολουθεῖ: καὶ γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἡδὺ φαίνεται. 
(1104b30-1105a1).3  
The fine, as well as the pleasant and the expedient, is an object of choice, and with respect to all 
three of these objects the virtuous agent gets things right. Moreover, the fine, as well as the 
expedient, appears pleasant, and this thought will be of significance in what follows.  
The fine’s status as an object of choice for the virtuous agent is something that comes to the 
fore more so in Aristotle’s detailed discussions of the moral virtues in Books III-IV. Here we learn 
not only that specific characters – the generous or the magnificent agent, say – act for the sake of 
the fine (1120a23-27; 1122b6-10), but that this is a feature of virtuous activity in general: “actions 
in accordance with the virtues are fine and [done] for the sake of the fine (αἱ δὲ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν 
πράξεις καλαὶ καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα)” (1120a23). Indeed, as Richardson-Lear notes, this way of 
characterising the choice of the virtuous agent appears in these books to have replaced Aristotle’s 
talk of choosing virtuous actions for their own sake, which he mentioned only in NE II 4.4 
Now on the one hand, the fact that the fine is an object of choice for the virtuous agent and 
that for the sake of which she acts, might suggest to us a more promising way of approaching the 
question of the virtuous agent’s choice and how this develops. For the concept of the fine oﬀers a 
more concrete way of thinking about the value that the virtuous agent grasps when she chooses 
virtuous actions for their own sake, and I follow Richardson-Lear in supposing that “what makes 
                                                             
3 See also Topics 1.13 105a27-28 and 3.3 118b27-28. 
4 Moss too assumes the equivalence between choosing for the sake of the fine and choosing actions for their own 
sake (2012, p.207). Tuozzo (1995) casts some doubt on the assumed equivalence, and argues against the view that 
“virtuous action has a nature and worth independent of any relation it may have to contemplation” (1995, p.130). 
Tuozzo is concerned that this assumption leads commentators in turn to assume that choosing virtuous action for its 
own sake does not entail choosing it for the sake of contemplation. The question of how the choice of virtuous action 
for its own sake and is related to the choice of virtuous action for the sake of contemplation (see e.g. NE 1145a6-11) is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. In any case, I think Richardson-Lear is correct in raising the following concern about 
Tuozzo’s account: 
Tuozzo’s interpretation, although fascinating, has the unfortunate consequence that insofar as 
virtuous actions are fine they are not chosen for their own sakes. According to Tuozzo, actions are 
noble insofar as they express (virtuous) dispositions that promote the psychic leisure necessary for 
happiness. But since their nobility is entirely instrumental, in what respect are they choiceworthy for 
themselves? (2004, pp.124-5, n.3). 
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actions fine is also (in part) what makes them worth choosing for their own sakes” (2006, p.117).5 
Moreover, the ubiquity of Aristotle’s references to the fine throughout the Ethics means there is 
more material to draw on than Aristotle’s limited reference to the thought that virtuous action is 
chosen for its own sake.  
On the other hand, we might be concerned that this only shifts our task from explaining how 
it is that someone comes to choose an action for its own sake, to explaining how it is that someone 
comes to choose for the sake of the fine. And as Richardson-Lear again notes, we are faced with 
the problem that “it is not at all clear what [Aristotle] means by saying that virtuous action is kalon 
or what motivation he is pointing to when he says that the genuinely good person acts for the sake 
of the kalon” (2006, p.116). 
That Aristotle does not oﬀer any account of the fine, or of aiming at the fine, in the Ethics is 
something that must be admitted right away, and for this reason any attempt at understanding 
the role of the fine in the virtuous agent’s action and development will be, of necessity, somewhat 
speculative. Nevertheless, Aristotle’s various allusions to the fine in his discussion of the virtuous 
agent’s activity do, I suggest, allow for some possible insight into what it is that the student of 
virtue discovers when she practises virtuous actions, and how in so doing she comes over time to 
choose these for their own sake.  
5.3 THE FINE AS A PROPERTY OF VIRTUOUS ACTION 
One important thing that we learn in the course of Aristotle’s discussion of moral virtue and 
action, is that the fine is not merely an object of choice for the virtuous agent, but that it is a 
feature of virtuous activity. This much may already be apparent from the passages quoted above, 
and it is in fact something that Aristotle stresses from the very beginning of the work. In an 
important passage in Book I, Aristotle places great emphasis on the fineness of virtuous activity, 
by way of explaining why the life of the virtuous agent will be the most pleasant and not in need 
of any, as it were, ‘supplementary’ pleasures: 
Moreover, the life of these active people is also pleasant in itself. For being pleased is [a 
condition of] the soul, and to each person what is pleasant is that, in relation to which, he is 
said to be a lover; a horse, for instances, is pleasant to the horse-lover, a spectacle, to the lover 
of spectacles. In the same way, just things please the lover of justice, and in general things in 
                                                             
5 Richardson-Lear goes on to say: “that is to say, goodness and fineness in action are in large part constituted by 
the same property (to anticipate: being well ordered by the human good)” (2006, p.117). Whilst I will refer below to 
some of the features of virtuous actions that render them fine, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider that in 
virtue of which Aristotle regards virtuous actions as good.  
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accord with virtue please the lover of virtues. Now for most people the things that are 
pleasant conflict, because these are not pleasant by nature, whereas to lovers of the fine what 
is pleasant are things pleasant by nature. Actions in accord with virtue are like this, so that 
they are pleasant both to these people and are pleasant on their own.  
ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν καθ᾽ αὑτὸν ἡδύς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἥδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν, ἑκάστῳ δ᾽ ἐστὶν 
ἡδὺ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται φιλοτοιοῦτος, οἷον ἵππος μὲν τῷ φιλίππῳ, θέαμα δὲ τῷ φιλοθεώρῳ: τὸν 
αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῷ φιλοδικαίῳ καὶ ὅλως τὰ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν τῷ φιλαρέτῳ. τοῖς μὲν 
οὖν πολλοῖς τὰ ἡδέα μάχεται διὰ τὸ μὴ φύσει τοιαῦτ᾽ εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ φιλοκάλοις ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ 
φύσει ἡδέα: τοιαῦται δ᾽ αἱ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν πράξεις, ὥστε καὶ τούτοις εἰσὶν ἡδεῖαι καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτάς 
(1099a7-15).  
The connection between the fine and pleasure established in this passage is something to which 
we will return; for the present let this passage stand as evidence of the fineness of virtuous activity.6 
This thought is made more explicit still some lines later when Aristotle writes that: 
…actions in accord with the virtues will be pleasant in their own right. Moreover, these 
actions will be good and fine as well as pleasant; indeed, they will be each of these more than 
anything else is, if the excellent person judges well about these things; and he [does] judge in 
the way we have said. 
…καθ᾽ αὑτὰς ἂν εἶεν αἱ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἡδεῖαι.  ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀγαθαί γε καὶ καλαί, καὶ 
μάλιστα τούτων ἕκαστον, εἴπερ καλῶς κρίνει περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ σπουδαῖος: κρίνει δ᾽ ὡς εἴπομεν 
(1099a21-24).  
So when Aristotle writes that the virtuous agent aims at the fine, or that the virtuous agent acts 
for the sake of the fine, this suggests that there is a quality to the actions she performs, which the 
virtuous agent in some sense grasps and sees as worth pursuing. And this might suggest that the 
place to look for insight into the development of virtuous motivations is in the student’s 
performance of virtuous actions themselves. 
This, certainly, would make good sense of the claims in NE II 4 to which I drew our attention 
in previous chapters; that is, his claims that we come to choose virtuous actions for their own sake 
by doing virtuous things many times (1105b4-5), and that we have no hope of becoming good 
unless we practise virtuous things (1105b11-12). The thought would be that there is a value in the 
actions themselves – an objective value that is there to be discovered – and that the learner 
discovers this in the course of her practice; it is a value, perhaps, that could not be discovered 
without having performed those actions, or so I will argue.  
                                                             
6 A small amount of work may be required to bring this thought out, but that virtuous activity is fine is 
nevertheless the implication of the passage: A type of person takes pleasure in what he is a lover of, and since a lover 
of fine things will take pleasure in those things, this implies that the virtuous actions he takes pleasure in have the 
quality of being fine. 
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We need, however, to go a little more slowly. For in light of our discussion in Chapter 2, and 
the distinction that Aristotle establishes in NE II 4 between virtuous actions, that can be 
performed by both a learner and a virtuous agent, and the virtuously performed actions of the 
virtuous agent, the obvious question that faces us is: what conception of action does Aristotle have 
in mind when he describes virtuous activity and virtuous actions as fine in this passage? Is he 
talking of virtuous actions, that is the things that are done (those acts of agency, identifiable with 
some change or event, and of which the accompanying psychological states of the agent are 
variously determinable), which can be performed by both the virtuous agent and the learner? Or 
is he speaking only of the mature praxis of the virtuous agent – that is, of virtuous action which is 
performed knowingly, for its own sake, and from a stable state?7 In other words, could a learner 
perform fine actions or not, and are we entitled to suppose that there is a value in the things that 
the learner does that she comes to realise in so doing? 
The Book 1 passages quoted above certainly show that, at the very least, the activity of the 
mature virtuous agent is fine, though it is unclear whether these provide any evidence that the 
actions of the learner are fine too. For these passages have their place within a more general 
discussion of the pleasant nature of a virtuous agent’s life, making clear that the mature virtuous 
agent is the focus of Aristotle’s discussion. Immediately prior to the passages quoted, Aristotle 
states that one who is engaged in ‘virtuous activity’ (ἡ κατ᾽ αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια, 1098b31), as opposed 
to one who is, for example, asleep, will necessarily act and act well (πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ εὖ 
πράξει, 1099a3), and his references here to virtuous activity and acting well make clear that he 
means to refer here to the activity of the mature virtuous agent.  
If Aristotle only means to characterise virtuously performed virtuous action as fine, this makes 
it more diﬃcult to see how the concept of the fine could help to shed light both on the virtuous 
agent’s choice of virtuous action for its own sake, and the development of the learner’s disposition 
to choose through her practice. For if fineness is only a quality of virtuously performed action, 
action that involves choosing an action for its own sake, it is not clear what it is that the learner 
would discover in her own performance of virtuous actions which do not yet have this quality.  
When Aristotle introduces the thought that virtuous actions have the property of being both 
fine and naturally pleasant, he uses the locution ‘αἱ κατ᾽ἀρετὴν πράξεις’ (1099a14), a phrase he 
repeats some lines later (1099a21). In contrast with the ‘ἡ κατ᾽ αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια’ of 1098b31, this 
                                                             
7 This passage comes, after all, before the distinction in NE II 4 has been drawn so we must be especially careful 
when thinking about the conception of action that may be in play here. 
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phrase might be taken to refer to the things the virtuous agent does, that is, to the virtuous actions 
themselves, rather than the particular way in which she does these, which is captured by the idea 
of virtuous activity. This however is not conclusive and it will help then to look at other texts to 
see if there is any further evidence that Aristotle conceives of virtuous actions themselves as fine. 
If we turn to Aristotle’s detailed discussions of the individual virtues and the various 
references he makes here to the fine as an object of choice and feature of action, I submit we have 
reason to suppose that for Aristotle fineness is also a feature of virtuous actions themselves, and 
not only actions that are virtuously performed. First, Aristotle’s repeated references to acting for 
the sake of the fine in his discussions of courage, temperance, generosity and magnificence, all 
occur within the context of explaining how the virtuous agent gets her action right, where the 
specification is quite clearly of the thing to be done. So, he writes of the temperate agent that: 
hence the temperate person’s appetitive part must agree with reason; for both aim at the fine, 
and the temperate person desires the right things, in the right ways, at the right times, which 
is just what reason also orders. 
διὸ δεῖ τοῦ σώφρονος τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν συμφωνεῖν τῷ λόγῳ: σκοπὸς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν τὸ καλόν, καὶ 
ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ σώφρων ὧν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε: οὕτω δὲ τάττει καὶ ὁ λόγος (1119b15-18). 
Or again, of the generous agent he writes that: 
for it is more proper to virtue to do good than to receive good, and more proper to do fine 
things than not to do shameful things; and clearly giving implies doing good and doing fine 
action, while taking implies receiving well or not doing something shameful.  
τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν, καὶ τὰ καλὰ πράττειν μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ αἰσχρὰ 
μὴ πράττειν: οὐκ ἄδηλον δ᾽ ὅτι τῇ μὲν δόσει ἕπεται τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ καλὰ πράττειν, τῇ δὲ 
λήψει τὸ εὖ πάσχειν ἢ μὴ αἰσχροπραγεῖν (1120a11-15). 
In the first passage, for the temperate person’s appetites to aim at the fine appears to consist in 
their being for the right things, in the right ways, at the right time; in the second passage, 
meanwhile, Aristotle is clearly concerned with acts of giving and receiving, where giving is 
regarded as the finer action. Both strongly indicate that his focus is on the thing done, on the 
virtuous action itself.  
The connection between the fine and concrete virtuous acts is noticeable in at least two other 
contexts. In Aristotle’s discussion of the virtue of magnificence, he writes that that the magnificent 
agent, when deciding how to spend her money, will “think about the finest and most fitting way 
to spend than about the cost or about the cheapest way to do it (πῶς κάλλιστον καὶ 
πρεπωδέστατον, σκέψαιτ᾽ ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ πόσου καὶ πῶς ἐλαχίστου)” (1122b8-10); this remark 
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strongly suggests that there are ways of spending itself that are fine (that is, ‘magnificent’ ways) 
and which can be contrasted with the kind of spending that would be determined by miserly 
concerns about cost. It might be objected that here the ‘way’ (πῶς) the magnificent agent seeks to 
spend is ‘magnificently’ (where to act ‘magnificently’ would be to act fulfilling the conditions of 
1105a31-33) but again the context of the discussion strongly points to the ‘way’ as having to do 
with the thing that is to be done. In the discussion that follows, Aristotle goes on to give examples 
of the great and fine deeds (ἔργον δὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ καλόν, 1122b16) in which the magnificent agent’s 
excellence is displayed, and lists things like dedications, sacrifices, or providing splendid choruses 
and feasts for the city (1122b19-23). 
Finally, at the close of NE III 7 and his discussion of courage, Aristotle summarises his 
argument thus far claiming that “courage is a mean about what inspires confidence and what is 
frightening in conditions we have described; it chooses and stands firm because that is fine or 
because anything else is shameful (ἡ ἀνδρεία μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ θαρραλέα καὶ φοβερά, ἐν οἷς 
εἴρηται, καὶ ὅτι καλὸν αἱρεῖται καὶ ὑπομένει, ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μή)” (1116a10-12). Once again, the 
connection here between the fine and standing firm serves as evidence that, on Aristotle’s view, 
virtuous actions themselves, and not only virtuously performed actions, can count as fine. 
My suggestion, then, is that it is not only clear that the activity of the mature virtuous agent 
counts as fine, but that Aristotle’s remarks indicate that fineness is a quality of virtuous actions 
themselves, and not only actions that are virtuously performed. As such, it would be possible on 
this view for a student of virtue to perform fine actions. This, I think, also helps to make better 
sense of Aristotle’s claim in NE X 9 that “it is necessary then that character must be present already 
with a kinship to virtue, loving what is fine and hating what is disgraceful (δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἦθος 
προϋπάρχειν πως οἰκεῖον τῆς ἀρετῆς στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ δυσχεραῖνον τὸ αἰσχρόν)” (1179b29-
30). For if fineness was only a feature of virtuously performed action, it is hard to see how the 
learner could at such an early stage love this, and have ‘acquired a taste’ for this (see 1179b15), 
having not yet achieved this end herself. And my further suggestion, then, is that this is the value 
in the virtuous actions that the student performs, that in so performing she comes to grasp. Before 
we examine this idea further, however, let us consider briefly why it is that virtuous actions, even 
when not virtuously performed, may be said to have this quality.8 
                                                             
8 Irwin notes that “we might argue that Aristotle’s silence about the nature of the fine is not a mere oversight but 
an important part of his view. Perhaps the virtuous person can give no further description of what makes an action 
fine, and perhaps Aristotle thinks no further description is to be given; all we can do is rely on the trained perception 
of the virtuous person to find the fine and admirable actions” (1986, p.123). Nevertheless, Irwin submits that 
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5.3.1 THE FINE FEATURES OF VIRTUOUS ACTIONS 
At this point it will be helpful to draw on Richardson-Lear’s insightful discussion of the fine and 
its connection to moral virtue.9 Richardson-Lear begins her examination of the fine with the 
quasi-definition Aristotle oﬀers in Metaphysics XIII 3 where he writes that the fine consists in 
order (τάξις), symmetry (συμμετρία), and definiteness or boundedness (τὸ ὡρισμένον) (Met. 
1078a36-b1). Evidence of each of these features can be found in Aristotle’s discussion of fine things 
within the changeable world, but also she suggests within Aristotle’s discussion of virtuous 
action.10 This, she argues, is particularly salient in his description of the mean in action from NE 
II 6 onwards.  
Order in virtuous actions is displayed in their orientation towards some good (2006, pp.121-
122), whilst the boundedness of virtuous actions becomes apparent when we think of them as a 
mean. This thought, Richardson-Lear suggests, is evident in Aristotle’s claim in NE II 6 that “there 
are many ways of missing the mark (for as the Pythagoreans used to represent it, the bad belongs 
to the unlimited [τοῦ ἀπείρου], but the good belongs to the limited [τοῦ πεπερασμένου]), but 
there is only one way of getting it right” (1106b28-31). Richardson-Lear also helpfully draws our 
attention to the way in which they display a certain symmetry, for, as she writes: 
their parts are scaled to each other proportionately to the task at hand. When a just person 
allocates honours, he balances the rewards in his gift against the merit of the citizens. Or when a 
good-tempered person reacts to mistreatment, he gets angry in proportion to the severity of the 
oﬀense, the intention of the oﬀender, and his own sense of dignity (2006, p.120).  
                                                             
“[Aristotle’s] remarks about the fine, if carefully examined, allow us to form a more explicit view of the property that 
the virtuous person detects” (1986, p.124).  
9 See also Cooper ([1996] 1999). Moss (2012, ch8) follows Richardson-Lear in much of her discussion.  
10 Richardson-Lear argues that these phenomena are bound up with the idea of eﬀective teleological order. 
Evidence that the kalon as ‘order’ or taxis is to be understood in terms of a thing’s arrangement for the sake of its end 
can be found in, for example, the Parts of Animals, where Aristotle claims that all living things, reveal something 
beautiful and elicit pleasure in us at the presence of the fine, because they are organised for the sake of an end (645a21-
6). Richardson-Lear draws our attention also to Politics VII where Aristotle informs us that a fine city is one who size 
is limited by its proper order (1326a33ﬀ ), which she argues should be understood as realised in the city’s fulfilling its 
function.  
Once we see that the fine as order is eﬀective teleological structure, Richardson-Lear argues that we can better 
see how the fine as symmetry and as definiteness also consist in an object’s orientation to its good. Again in the Politics, 
Aristotle argues that something displays symmetry when the size of its parts conduce to its benefit (1284b8-22), and 
in the Politics VII passage referenced above, we can also see that Aristotle is concerned not only that a city is well 
ordered but that its magnitude does not fall below or exceed a certain limit in size, for to do so would negatively aﬀect 
its functioning. For more examples see Richardson-Lear (2004, pp.1246-130; 2006, pp.118-120).  
Warren (2014, Ch.3) discusses order and magnitude in relation to the fine, and the pleasure that attend these, in 
the Poetics.  
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So virtuous actions, considered in terms of hitting the mean, display a certain order, symmetry 
and boundedness. But we might at this point also wish to supplement Richardson-Lear’s account 
with a claim of Aristotle’s in the Eudemian Ethics (one to which Richardson-Lear herself draws 
attention in her (2004) discussion). In this passage Aristotle writes that fine things accord with 
worth (κατ᾽ ἀξίαν) and are fitting or appropriate (πρέπον):11 
Goods are fine when the aim in acting and choosing them is fine. That is why the natural 
goods are fine for the noble man. For the just is fine and this accords with worth; this man is 
worthy of these things. What is fitting is also fine, and these things (wealth, high-born status 
and power) are suitable for him. 
καλὰ γάρ ἐστιν ὅταν, οὗ ἕνεκα πράττουσι καὶ αἱροῦνται, καλὰ ᾖ, διότι τῷ καλῷ κἀγαθῷ καλά 
ἐστι τὰ φύσει ἀγαθά. καλὸν γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον: τοῦτο δὲ τὸ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν: ἄξιος δ᾽ οὗτος τούτων. καὶ 
τὸ πρέπον καλόν: πρέπει δὲ ταῦτα τούτῳ, πλοῦτος εὐγένεια δύναμις (1249a8-10).12 
The connection between the fine and worth and fittingness are made evident in Aristotle’s 
discussion of magnificence. Aristotle introduces the virtue by pointing to the connection between 
magnificence and what is fitting: that magnificence has to do with what is fitting to scale “its very 
name indicates: it consists in spending that is fitting in scale (αθάπερ γὰρ τοὔνομα αὐτὸ 
ὑποσημαίνει, ἐν μεγέθει πρέπουσα δαπάνη ἐστίν)” (1122a22-24). But more revealingly still he 
writes that the magnificent agent, in contrast to both stingy and vulgar agents:  
is like the skilled craftsperson, for he is able to observe what is fitting, and to spend large 
amounts in an appropriate way. For as we said at the start, a state is defined by its activities 
and its objects; now the magnificent person’s expenditures are large and fitting; so too are the 
results, since this is what makes the expense large and fitting to the result. Hence the result 
must be worthy of the expense, and the expense worthy of, or even in excess of, the result. 
And the magnificent person will spend in this way for the sake of the fine, for this is common 
to the virtues.  
ὁ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐπιστήμονι ἔοικεν: τὸ πρέπον γὰρ δύναται θεωρῆσαι καὶ δαπανῆσαι μεγάλα 
ἐμμελῶς. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴπομεν, ἡ ἕξις ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ὁρίζεται, καὶ ὧν ἐστίν. αἱ δὴ τοῦ 
μεγαλοπρεποῦς δαπάναι μεγάλαι καὶ πρέπουσαι. τοιαῦτα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἔργα: οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται μέγα 
δαπάνημα καὶ πρέπον τῷ ἔργῳ. ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἔργον τῆς δαπάνης ἄξιον δεῖ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ δαπάνην 
τοῦ ἔργου, ἢ καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν. δαπανήσει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα: 
κοινὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ταῖς ἀρεταῖς (1122a34-1122b7). 
Not only does the magnificent agent discern what is fitting, but Aristotle makes explicit that it is 
by spending in this way that the magnificent agent aims at the fine.  
                                                             
11 For a diﬀerent account of the fineness of virtuous action, which appeals to its directedness towards the 
common good, see Irwin (1986). For persuasive arguments against Irwin’s interpretation, however, see Richardson-
Lear (2004, 2006) and Cooper ([1996] 1999).  
12 At Topics V 5 he defines the kalon as the fitting (135a13). 
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Aristotle’s discussions reveal, however, that to act in this way and so to perform fine actions is 
extremely demanding. And the demandingness of this picture allows us to make partial sense of 
his claim in NE II 1, that an agent must perform actions well if they are to become virtuous: to 
perform an action in a given sphere well requires, at the very least, that it be performed at the right 
time, to the right person, in the right way, and so forth, and only in meeting these does the action 
count as fine. But when these conditions are met, and the action performed is a fine one, this value 
is something that the agent can perceive; thus contributing to the development of virtue, as I will 
explain.  
5.4 THE FINE AS PERCEPTIBLE  
I have argued thus far that fineness is a property of virtuous action, a property connected, amongst 
other things, with the fittingness of such action. I want now to suggest that in the case of virtuous 
action, the agent’s grasp of the fine is perceptual, and comes about through her performance of 
virtuous actions.  
The features of particular virtuous actions (which have to do with facts about situation, and 
which will in turn include facts about the patient, the agent, and so forth)13 which make them 
fitting, etc. and so constitute their fineness, are features which can be perceived by an agent. But I 
suggest that Aristotle would also grant that the fineness itself of virtuous action can thus be 
perceived.14 This might, perhaps, be a thought that will be diﬃcult for some modern readers of 
Aristotle to comprehend; at least those who operate with a view of perception where what are 
properly perceived are simply sensory properties such as colours and sounds. But Aristotle’s 
                                                             
13 These facts about the agent are not the same facts that determine whether an action is virtuously performed 
or not. I mean here rather facts about the agent such as how much money she has, the relation she stands in to the 
patient and so forth. On this, Brown writes: 
I don't want to deny that there are characteristics of the agent relevant to what the excellent response 
in a given situation will be. To adapt an example from NE IX 2, if A is approached by B for a loan, the 
correct response will depend in large part on whether B formerly lent A money or did A some other 
service. Again, if A sees B insulting C, the appropriate response will depend in part on whether A, B 
and C are related or complete strangers. And obviously whether your conduct counts as generous 
depends on how wealthy you are; as Aristotle says, generosity (to eleutherion) depends on the state of 
the giver, but this is immediately glossed as: it is in accordance with one's wealth (NE 1120b6-9). Such 
facts about agents are indeed relevant, but I suggest it is far more helpful to regard them as parts of the 
diﬀerent situations which merit diﬀerent responses (1997, p.86). 
14 To say that fineness is something that can be perceived is not to say that it is not also something that could be 
grasped by the intellect. Presumably, this is how the fineness of mathematical theorems is grasped. Moreover, it may 
be that we can subsequently form thoughts (in the intellectual sense of thought) about the fineness of virtuous action.   
In the case of virtuous actions, however, I submit that a full appreciation of their fineness (such that this motivates 
an agent, as I will discuss below) is something that requires that the fineness of such actions be perceived, and that 
this comes about through their performance, as I will discuss below.  
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discussions of our perceptual capacity, notably in De Anima, make clear that perception for him 
is rich, and can be of more than narrow sensory properties such as colours and sounds. At De 
Anima II 6 Aristotle categorises the objects of perception as ‘proper’, ‘common’, and ‘coincidental’, 
and in doing so points to the diﬀerence in the way that the perception of colours or sounds and 
perception of objects diﬀer in manner.15 Aristotle writes that “something is said to be an object of 
perception co-incidentally if, for example, that white thing is the son of Diares” (418a20). And as 
Shields, for example, rightly notes of this passage “in so speaking Aristotle is not maintaining that 
it is improper linguistically or otherwise to talk of perceiving [a coincidental object such as] a red 
Jaguar. On the contrary, he is allowing that we perceive such objects, but not in the manner of 
exclusive [that is, ‘proper’] or common objects” (2016, p.227).16 So Aristotle’s conception of 
perception is already as of something richer than the mere perception of properties such as 
colours, sounds or shapes.  
But Aristotle’s various discussions of the fine and the good in both the ethical and 
psychological works reveal moreover that moral properties are things which, for him, can be 
perceived. The virtuous agent, for example, not only perceives her friends, but perceives their 
being and perceives that this is good (τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι αὑτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος, NE 1170b9). In the 
Politics too Aristotle remarks that it is peculiar to humans that they can perceive the good and the 
bad, the just and unjust and other phenomena like this (τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα τοῖς 
ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἴσθησιν ἔχειν)” 
(1253a15-18). So, as Achtenberg puts it: 
Parallel to the common perception of, say, a human being as one or moving is the common 
perception of a thing, person, or state of aﬀairs of some particular sort as good (or beautiful) 
(2002, p.179).  
Indeed, the diﬀerence between this kind of perception and the perception of the proper objects 
of perception is made explicit in a diﬃcult passage towards the end of Book VI: 
                                                             
15 Proper objects of perception are those that are perceived only through one sensory modality, such as colour 
for sight, sound for hearing, flavour for taste (418a11-14). Common objects meanwhile can be perceived through 
more than one sensory modality, and include motion, rest, number, shape and magnitude (418a16-18). 
16 And Shields continues to explain: 
nor does he maintain that one constructs co-incidental objects of perception from perceptual data 
derived from exclusive objects; still less does he imply that one somehow infers the existence of co-
incidental objects from the several perceptions of exclusive objects (2016, p.227). 
From the fact that the latter relation is of being ‘co-incidental’ does not entail that the co-incidental object is not 
something that can be perceived. The co-incidental perception is still a perception (κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ τούτου 
αἰσθάνεται). See also NE 1113a1: “Nor yet do we deliberate about particular facts, for instance, Is this object a loaf? Or, 
Is this loaf properly baked? For these are matters of perceptions (αἰσθήσεως γὰρ ταῦτα).”  
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Phronēsis is of the last thing, which is an object of perception, not of scientific knowledge. 
This is not the perception of proper objects, but the sort by which we perceive that the last 
among mathematical objects is a triangle; for it will stop there too.  However, this is more a 
case of perception than phronēsis, but it is of another form [i.e. than perception of the proper 
objects of perception].  
ἣ δὲ τοῦ ἐσχάτου, οὗ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ᾽ αἴσθησις, οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀλλ᾽ οἵᾳ αἰσθανόμεθα 
ὅτι τὸ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἔσχατον τρίγωνον: στήσεται γὰρ κἀκεῖ. ἀλλ᾽ αὕτη μᾶλλον αἴσθησις 
ἢ φρόνησις, ἐκείνης δ᾽ ἄλλο εἶδος (1142a26-30). 
The perceptibility of the fineness of virtuous action is something that is made clear in at least two 
passages. In Book 1, in the course of his discussion of fortune and misfortune, Aristotle writes that  
But even [in circumstances where the virtuous person suﬀers misfortunes] the fine shines 
through, whenever someone bears many severe misfortunes with good temper, not because 
he feels no distress, but because he is noble and magnanimous. 
ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν, ἐπειδὰν φέρῃ τις εὐκόλως πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας 
ἀτυχίας, μὴ δι᾽ ἀναλγησίαν, ἀλλὰ γεννάδας ὢν καὶ μεγαλόψυχος (1100b30-33). 
The fine, this passage reveals, is something that ‘shines through’ (διαλάμπει), and Aristotle’s choice 
of perceptual language here is revealing. Aristotle again adopts perceptual language at the end of 
the Ethics when discussing the grasp, or lack thereof, of the fineness of virtuous action by those 
who have not been well brought up:  
But [arguments] are unable to turn the many towards what is fine and good. For the many do 
not naturally obey shame but fear; nor do they avoid bad things not because of disgrace but 
because of punishments. For living by passion they pursue their own pleasures and the means 
to obtain them, fleeing the opposing pains, having no idea of what is fine, that is what is truly 
pleasant, having never tasted it. What argument could turn around people like this?  
τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἀδυνατεῖν πρὸς καλοκαγαθίαν προτρέψασθαι. οὐ γὰρ πεφύκασιν αἰδοῖ 
πειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ φόβῳ, οὐδ᾽ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν φαύλων διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας: 
πάθει γὰρ ζῶντες τὰς οἰκείας ἡδονὰς διώκουσι καὶ δι᾽ ὧν αὗται ἔσονται, φεύγουσι δὲ τὰς 
ἀντικειμένας τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡδέος οὐδ᾽ ἔννοιαν ἔχουσιν, ἄγευστοι ὄντες. τοὺς δὴ 
τοιούτους τίς ἂν λόγος μεταρρυθμίσαι; (1179b11-16). 
Importantly, this passage not only indicates that fineness in action is something that can be 
perceived, something which can be ‘tasted’, as it were, but given the context of the discussion 
suggests that only those who have been well brought up, which we know consists in having 
practised virtuous actions, will have acquired this taste for the fine.  The suggestion seems to be 
that this perception is not available to those who have not themselves performed virtuous actions, 
and in having actually performed these actions, perceived their fineness. One may be told that 
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such-and-such action is fine, but without having practised it oneself, one does not ‘taste’ the 
fineness, as it were.17  
It is worth noting that a diﬀerent view of the virtuous agent’s grasp of the fine has been 
proposed by Coope (2012). In the course of explaining why ethical virtue is necessary for phronēsis, 
and why the possession of bad appetites might imply a specifically rational failing in an agent, 
Coope argues that a virtuous agent, but not a self-controlled agent, takes a specifically rational 
pleasure in the fineness of virtuous action, which follows from her having rationally grasped the 
fineness of virtuous action (2012, p.154-157).18 In support of her claim that the virtuous agent’s 
grasp of the fineness of virtuous action is a rational grasp, Coope notes, as per §5.3.1 above, that 
the fine features of virtuous actions are those that make an action count as mean, and that the 
capacity to discern that an action is in accord with the mean is a rational capacity, for it is a 
capacity that Aristotle assigns to the practically wise person as such (2012, p.155).  
The pleasure taken in fine action (which we will discuss presently) Coope thus argues is a 
distinctly rational pleasure, which she takes to be strongly indicated by Aristotle’s remarks on the 
relation between pleasure and perceptual or intellectual activity (2012, p.156). That it is one’s 
rational part that is pleased by the fineness of virtuous action Coope takes to be confirmed, 
moreover, by Aristotle’s remarks on being a self-lover in NE IX 8, in which Aristotle contrasts the 
person who is typically regarded as a self-lover in so far as she gratifies her appetites and in general 
the non-rational part of the soul (1168b19-21), and the person who is properly speaking a self-lover, 
                                                             
17 Something like this thought, is perhaps in the background of Burnyeat’s (1980) discussion: 
you need a good upbringing not simply in order that you may have someone around to tell you what 
is noble and just – you do need that…  – but you need also to be guided in your conduct so that by 
doing the things you are told are noble and just you will discover that what you have been told is true, 
what you may begin taking on trust you can come to know for yourself. ...You can say, perhaps, “I have 
learned that it is just to share my belongings with others”, and mean it in a way that someone who has 
merely been told this cannot, even if he believes it – except in the weak sense in which “I have learned 
such-and-such” means simply that such-and-such was the content of the instruction given by parent 
or teacher (1980, p.74).  
Burnyeat famously stresses the importance of learning to take proper pleasure in virtuous actions, and just how 
to understand the connection between pleasure and the fine which he emphasises has been a matter of much debate 
since the publication of his paper. The implication of Burnyeat’s discussion, however, is that the grasp of the fineness 
of virtuous action – the kind had by the lover of the noble in NE X 9 – is not a grasp that could come about through 
instruction, but only through the practice of virtuous actions.  
I may be told, and may believe, that such-and-such actions are just and noble, but I have not really 
learned for myself (taken to heart, made second nature to me) that they have this intrinsic value until 
I have learned to value (love) them for it, with the consequence that I take pleasure in doing them. To 
understand and appreciate the value that makes them enjoyable in themselves I must learn for myself 
to enjoy them, and that does take time and practice – in short, habituation (1980, p.78). 
18 Richardson-Lear too focuses on intellectual pleasure in the fine (2006, p.131), though she also repeatedly 
emphasises that the goodness and order of mean actions are things that will become ‘apparent’ to an agent.  
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who gratifies her rational part (1168b33-34). She continues to note that “it is by acting finely that 
one cherishes this part of oneself: ‘in doing fine things, he [the good man] will himself be 
benefitted and will benefit others’ (1169a11-13)” (2012, p.157).  
Now, as noted in n.14 above, I do not wish to deny that fineness is something that could be 
grasped by the intellect, nor indeed that the fineness of virtuous action is something of which one 
might ultimately come to have an intellectual grasp.19 The apparently rational pleasure taken in 
the fine by a self-lover proper may perhaps represent a later stage of development, or a distinctive 
feature of a mature agent. But I do not believe the above passages show decisively that the virtuous 
agent’s grasp of the fineness of virtuous action is purely a rational or intellectual grasp, nor that 
the fineness of virtuous action is not something to be perceived.  
Taking Aristotle’s discussion of discerning the mean in action first, whilst the capacity to 
discern mean action is a capacity that is assigned to the phronimos as such, it is worth noting that 
the phronimos is characterised by Aristotle not only as an agent with correct reason, but as we saw 
in the passage quoted above (1142a26-30), an agent with a particular perceptual ability. The 
phronimos is one who, importantly, sees what to do in particular circumstances. As Coope notes, 
of course, Aristotle states that the mean in action is something that is determined by correct 
reason (ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν, 1106b36-1107a2) but again, even if it is the 
case that the mean is determined by correct reason, this does not show that the fineness of virtuous 
action, when actualised, is not something that is perceived by an agent.20 
We have already taken note of Aristotle’s use of perceptual language when describing an 
agent’s grasp of the fine, and in the following section we will see that Aristotle draws an important 
analogy between the virtuous agent’s delight in the fine and the delight that a musical person takes 
in fine melodies; there I draw on the passage to support the thought that in perceiving the fineness 
of virtuous action, a virtuous agent also takes pleasure in such action, but for the present I take it 
                                                             
19 Moss, who also argues that the virtuous agent – and in particular the learner’s – grasp of the fine is perceptual, 
allows too that the fully virtuous agent takes both intellectual and perceptual pleasure in the fine, which like Coope 
she takes to be evidenced by 1168b29-30. She argues, however, that the moral habituee takes perceptual pleasure in 
the fine, and it is this that shapes her character (2012, p.209).  
20 It is worth asking, furthermore, what kind of rational or intellectual grasp of the fineness of virtuous action a 
virtuous agent, and perhaps also a habituee, might have? The question becomes pertinent when we ask why it is that 
simply believing that actions are fine does not appear suﬃcient to motivate an agent towards fine action. Coope 
argues that “if one fails to take pleasure in the exercise of perceptual or reasoning faculties, this must be either because 
the object apprehended is not fine or because one is not properly apprehending it. From this it follows that the failure 
to take pleasure in an action that is in fact fine must always imply a failure properly to grasp its fineness” (2012, pp.158-
159). I will argue in §5.6 below, that this explains why not all agents take pleasure in the fineness of virtuous actions, 
for they either fail to perform fine actions or fail to perceive their fineness. The question in the case of the ‘rational 
grasp’ view is: what does it take to properly grasp, in a rational or intellectual sense, the fineness of virtuous actions? 
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to be important that Aristotle chooses to draw an analogy with a case in which a subject’s grasp 
of the fine is presumably also perceptual. Indeed, the virtuous agent grasps the fineness of, and is 
pleased by, her actions ‘just as’ (καθάπερ) the lover of music is. Had Aristotle wished to emphasise 
the intellectual nature of an agent’s grasp of fine action, he might have chosen a more 
paradigmatically intellectual example.  
We have already seen that, whilst making certain revealing remarks, Aristotle says little 
explicitly about the connection he takes there to be between virtuous action, the fine, and how an 
agent comes to grasp this value; for this reason, as I have already stated, a degree of speculation is 
required. Thus, the speculative picture I propose is as follows: for Aristotle, there are certain 
actions – those which hit the mean and are prepon, etc. – which themselves are fine. By this I do 
not mean simply that the consequences of so acting are fine,21 but that the actions themselves, the 
doing of them, is something that Aristotle takes to be fine. Perhaps we might say, in Aristotelian 
terms, that a potential fineness is actualised in the doing of a fine action or engagement in a fine 
activity. And it is for this reason that perception of the fineness of virtuous action, of the sort 
enjoyed by the lover of the fine in NE 1 8 and X 9, is acquired only through the doing of virtuous 
actions; that is, in their actualisation, eﬀected by the agent of the action. 
Why it is that an agent has to perform virtuous actions herself in order to perceive their 
fineness, as I am proposing, is a diﬃcult question. Again, Aristotle says so little about the 
perception of the fine in virtuous action that any answer will admittedly be speculative. But I 
suggest that it has to do with the fact that these actions, as actions, are not mere changes or events, 
but acts of agency – as I claimed in Chapter 2. It is, perhaps, because the fineness is connected 
with acts of agency that it can only be experienced from the first personal perspective.22  
This raises the question, of course, as to the possibility of perceiving or in any other way 
apprehending fineness in the actions of others. For if the suggestion is that the fineness of virtuous 
action is only something that can be perceived through one’s own performance of such action, 
this would suggest then that it could not be perceived in the action of others. One might think 
                                                             
21 See Coope (2012, p.153, n.25). 
22 Perhaps the perception of the fineness in virtuous action is like the pleasure taken in activities such as skiing 
(to use Burnyeat’s example), activities which we need to engage in ourselves in order to experience what makes them 
pleasant. We might contrast this with the fineness in music, which does not have to do with agency in the same way 
as virtuous action, and thus allows for a listener other than the performer to hear the fineness in that music. There 
may, however, also be a fine quality to playing music, which might thus only be perceptible by the performer – though, 
as I will argue before, this fineness might be something that can be recognised by other observers.  
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that this is in tension with a famous passage that is found within Aristotle’s discussion of 
friendship, where he writes that: 
Now if being happy consists in living and being active; the activity of the good person is 
excellent, and pleasant in itself, as we said at the beginning; what is our own is pleasant; and 
we are able to observe our neighbours more than ourselves, and to observe their actions more 
than our own; and the actions of decent people who are friends are pleasant to those who are 
good, having both [of these attributes, i.e. being good and ‘one’s own’] which are naturally 
pleasant. 
εἰ δὲ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ζῆν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν, τοῦ δ᾽ ἀγαθοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια σπουδαία καὶ ἡδεῖα 
καθ᾽ αὑτήν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον τῶν ἡδέων, θεωρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον τοὺς 
πέλας δυνάμεθα ἢ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων πράξεις ἢ τὰς οἰκείας, αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων δὲ πράξεις 
φίλων ὄντων ἡδεῖαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς（ἄμφω γὰρ ἔχουσι τὰ τῇ φύσει ἡδέα) (1169b30-1170a1). 
Although Aristotle does not mention the fineness of a friend’s action in this passage, it must 
nevertheless be a feature of the decent person’s action, and indeed one of the things that makes it 
naturally pleasant.23 For this reason we might suppose that the pleasure that a virtuous agent takes 
in observing her virtuous friend’s action will be a pleasure in perceiving the fineness of her friend’s 
action. And we might then suppose that this passage undermines my claim that the fineness of 
virtuous action is something that is grasped only through one’s own practice of such action.  
But there are a few important points to note in response. First, whilst we can observe 
(θεωρεῖν) the actions of others, Aristotle does not write here that the fineness of others’ action is 
something that the virtuous agent perceives. It might, perhaps must, be the case that one could 
recognise the fineness of another’s action, but this recognition depends on an original perception 
of the fine, which is perceived from the first personal perspective. When a virtuous agent 
recognises the fineness in another’s action, such action can be an object of pleasure for that agent, 
but the mode of apprehension of the fineness of such action and experience of what I will argue is 
a corresponding pleasure, is diﬀerent. 
If it were the case, however, that in this case a virtuous agent does in fact perceive the fineness 
in her friend’s action, it is worth taking note of another important feature of this example. The 
case in question is the particular case of virtuous friendships, and Aristotle famously tells us that 
a friend is “another self ” (ἕτερον αὐτὸν, 1169b6-7). Furthermore, Aristotle makes clear in the above 
passage that the actions of our friends have the quality of being ‘one’s own’ (τὸ οἰκεῖον). It may be, 
then, that if a virtuous agent is able not only to recognise, but to in fact perceive the fineness of a 
                                                             
23 Moss discusses this passage at length (2012, pp.212ﬀ ) and draws on it as evidence for her view that pleasure is 
experienced in the observation of virtuous actions. I will discuss Moss’ view further in §5.6 below. 
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virtuous friend’s action, that this has importantly to do with the fact that this friend is another 
self, and that the virtuous agent’s perspective on her friend’s action, being that of another self, is 
in a sense first personal rather than third personal.  
Before we examine further the relation between an agent’s grasp of the fineness of virtuous 
action and the pleasure taken in such action, I wish to make one final qualification. I have claimed 
that the fineness of virtuous action is something to be perceived, and something that is perceived 
in the very performance of virtuous actions but that should not be taken to suggest that an agent 
could not remember the fineness of virtuous action, nor anticipate this in future actions. Again, 
Aristotle’s remarks on memory strongly suggest that a virtuous agent must be able to do this,24 
and in the following chapter I will also argue that through our capacity for phantasia, we are able 
also to envisage the prospect of fine activity too. As we will see, given the close relationship for 
Aristotle between perception and phantasia, that something is first perceived and later 
remembered or anticipated is perfectly compatible with the picture painted so far, and indeed just 
what we should expect. So what, then, is it that happens when a learner perceives the fineness of 
virtuous action in the course of her moral habituation? 
5.5 PLEASURE IN PERCEIVING THE FINE  
We saw in Aristotle’s discussion in NE I 8, quoted in §5.3 above, that the virtuous agent takes 
pleasure in the fine, and this is a thought to which I now want to return. One might wonder if 
this simply means that the things that a virtuous agent takes pleasure in simply happen to be fine 
things, that she loves fine things only extensionally, and various commentators have sought to 
explain how a learner can be brought to take pleasure in fine actions.25 In Chapter 3 we surveyed 
a number of attempts to explain the training of the learner’s motivational capacities by appeal to 
                                                             
24 In his discussion of friendship and self-suﬃciency in NE 9.4, Aristotle informs us that the virtuous agent will 
enjoy spending time on his own, since he is able to enjoy his pleasant memories: 
Someone like this wants to spend time with himself, for he does this with pleasure. And the memories 
of what he has done are pleasing and his anticipations of what is to come are good; and those sorts [of 
memories and anticipations] are pleasant. Moreover, he has plenty of things to contemplate in his 
mind. And he shares his suﬀerings and his pleasures with himself in particular, for the same thing is 
always painful or pleasant and is not pleasant at one time but not another; for, in a word, he is without 
regret (συνδιάγειν τε ὁ τοιοῦτος ἑαυτῷ βούλεται· ἡδέως γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ· τῶν τε γὰρ πεπραγμένων 
ἐπιτερπεῖς αἱ μνῆμαι, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐλπίδες ἀγαθαί, αἱ τοιαῦται δ’ ἡδεῖαι. καὶ θεωρημάτων δ’ εὐπορεῖ 
τῇ διανοίᾳ. συναλγεῖ τε καὶ συνήδεται μάλισθ’ ἑαυτῷ πάντοτε γάρ ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ λυπηρόν τε καὶ ἡδύ, καὶ 
οὐκ ἄλλοτ’ ἄλλο· ἀμεταμέλητος γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν) (1166a23–9).  
For a discussion of this passage, and the pleasures and pains of memory, see Warren (2014, Ch 7). 
25 Burnyeat (1980), Engberg-Pedersen (1983), Broadie (1991), Cooper ([1996] 1999), Achtenberg (2002), 
Grönroos (2007); Achtenberg (2002) and Moss (2012) as we will see argue for a tighter connection between one’s 
perception of something as fine, and the pleasure one takes in that thing.  
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the power of repetition either to render things pleasant that were once painful, or to establish 
associations between existing pleasures and virtuous actions. There, these accounts were 
considered as examples of ‘mechanical’ accounts of the learner’s habituation, in which no appeal 
is made to the engagement of the learner’s various cognitive capacities in her development. But 
we can see more clearly now another reason that these accounts have been found unsatisfactory. 
For they fail to account for the particular pleasure that Aristotle makes clear a virtuous agent takes 
in virtuous action (see esp. NE 1174b14-16), a pleasure that clearly has to do with its fineness. 
Moreover, they oﬀer no explanation of how a learner might then come to choose virtuous actions 
for their own sake, since her pleasure has little to do with the nature of virtuous action itself.  
But Aristotle’s remarks on the connection between pleasure and the fine suggest that a 
virtuous agent’s pleasure in fine actions is not merely extensional; his characterisation of virtuous 
agents as lovers of the fine (οἱ φιλοκάλοι) at 1099a13 strongly implies that it is the fine, qua fine 
that they take pleasure in. Indeed, recall the passage from NE X 9 quoted above, in which Aristotle 
contrasts the many who do not obey shame, but fear. These he contrasts with the well brought up 
who have been habituated into “enjoying and hating finely… loving what is fine and objecting to 
what is shameful (πρὸς τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ μισεῖν… στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ δυσχεραῖνον τὸ 
αἰσχρόν)” (1179b25-31). That those who rejoice in fine things are contrasted with those who do 
the right actions on account of fear and not on account of shame, strongly suggests that pleasure 
of the former is taken in the very fineness of their actions, and not that they take pleasure in actions 
that only so happen to be fine.26 
Indeed, Aristotle writes that the things that please a lover of the fine are pleasant by nature 
(τοῖς δὲ φιλοκάλοις ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ φύσει ἡδέα, 1099a13), and moreover that actions in accordance 
with the virtues are pleasant in their own right (…καθ᾽ αὑτὰς ἂν εἶεν αἱ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἡδεῖαι, 
1099a14-15). We can put this together with Aristotle’s remarks about objects of choice in NE II 3, 
where he claims that both “what is fine and what is expedient appear pleasant as well (καὶ γὰρ τὸ 
καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἡδὺ φαίνεται)” (1105a1). The strong implication of these passages then is 
that the perception of something as fine is, for Aristotle, pleasant, and to see it as attractive.  
Indeed, this is supported in the analogy Aristotle draws between the delight that people take 
in fine music and the delight the virtuous agent takes in virtuous action. He writes that: 
The virtuous agent’s activity will be most continuous, it will also be pleasant in itself, as it 
must be for the blessedly happy person. For the virtuous agent, insofar as he is virtuous, 
                                                             
26 See also Moss (2012, p.208).  
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delights in actions in accordance with virtue, and is disgusted by those that come from vice. 
Just as the musical person is pleased by fine melodies and pained by bad ones.  
ἔσται οὖν ἡ ἐνέργεια συνεχεστέρα, ἡδεῖα οὖσα καθ᾽ αὑτήν, ὃ δεῖ περὶ τὸν μακάριον εἶναι: ὁ γὰρ 
σπουδαῖος, ᾗ σπουδαῖος, ταῖς κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν πράξεσι χαίρει, ταῖς δ᾽ ἀπὸ κακίας δυσχεραίνει, 
καθάπερ ὁ μουσικὸς τοῖς καλοῖς μέλεσιν ἥδεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς φαύλοις λυπεῖται (1170a7-11). 
To perceive a piece of music as fine is to find it pleasant, and this is just what Aristotle takes to be 
the case in the case of virtue too. Interestingly, the connection between pleasure in fine actions 
and music is something that Aristotle exploits in the education programme of the Politics, where 
musical education is identified as a means of teaching and habituating students to judge correctly 
and to delight in virtuous characters and noble actions (μανθάνειν καὶ συνεθίζεσθαι μηθὲν οὕτως 
ὡς τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ἤθεσι καὶ ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν, Pol. 1140a15-18).27 
In this respect, perception of something as fine is similar to one’s perception of something as 
good, which Aristotle informs us, e.g. at NE 1170b10, is a perception that is pleasant in itself (ἡ 
δὲ τοιαύτη αἴσθησις ἡδεῖα καθ᾽ ἑαυτήν). Indeed, Aristotle in the Rhetoric points to a connection 
between the fine and the good, writing that: 
The fine is that which being chosen in itself is worthy of praise or which being good is pleasant 
in that it is good. If this is the fine, then virtue must necessarily be fine, for, being good, it is 
worthy of praise.  
καλὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ὃ ἂν δι᾽ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν ὂν ἐπαινετὸν ᾖ, ἢ ὃ ἂν ἀγαθὸν ὂν ἡδὺ ᾖ, ὅτι ἀγαθόν: 
εἰ δὲ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ καλόν, ἀνάγκη τὴν ἀρετὴν καλὸν εἶναι: ἀγαθὸν γὰρ ὂν ἐπαινετόν ἐστιν 
(Rhet. 1366a33-35). 
Whilst the fine and the good are different concepts for Aristotle, he nevertheless sees them as 
closely connected, and the pleasure taken in fine things as being intimately connected with our 
perception of their goodness.28 Space does not permit anything like a full examination of the 
connection between the fine and the good, but some remarks of Richardson-Lear’s may again be 
helpful to draw on. Richardson-Lear notes that by explaining our pleasure in fine action in terms 
of its goodness, Aristotle could have in mind either of the following two thoughts: “Either the 
goodness of a fine thing, X, causes it to be pleasant; or A takes pleasure in X because A thinks X 
                                                             
27 Compare Aristotle’s talk of discerning (τὸ κρίνειν) here with his claim in DA that aisthēsis can discern (κρίνειν) 
what is receives (425a22). 
For further discussion of musical education in Aristotle, see Cagnoli Fiecconi (2016).  
28 For further discussion, see Richardson-Lear (2006). Moss argues at length for the claim that pleasure is the 
perception of something’s goodness in Chapter 2 of her (2012), and connects this discussion with the pleasure of 
perceiving the fine in her Chapter 8. 
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is good” (2004, p.133). And Richardson-Lear rightly, I think, acknowledges that Aristotle may 
well think both: given that pleasure is, for him, the apparent good (see e.g. EE 1235b27, MA 
700b29), a thing’s goodness may also cause it to seem that way too. But he may also be seeking to 
emphasise that fine things are pleasant because they seem to those who perceive them, to be good. 
Richardson-Lear suggests in any case that “the experience of one’s actions as beautiful is, we might 
say, the mode of the virtuous person’s apprehension of their goodness” (2006, p.117).  
On this view, then, it is not the case that the learner is trained – through repetition or 
association, say – to find virtuous actions pleasant and then to perform these on account of the 
pleasure that these will bring.29 Rather, the learner, when she performs virtuous actions (in the 
way detailed below) and discriminates these as fine, will then take pleasure in these actions, for to 
perceive something as fine is to find it attractive.30 The learner’s pleasure in eﬀect registers the 
value that she perceives. And I submit that it is on account of the value that the agent perceives in 
virtuous action, which is registered in the pleasure she experiences, and not because she hopes to 
secure some pleasure, that the agent is then motivated to perform such actions.31 
                                                             
29 As noted above, such accounts fail to explain how a learner thus comes to choose such actions for their own 
sake, for their pleasure is unconnected to the value of such action. 
30 An account of the connection between pleasure taken in fine activity and desiring to so act is currently being 
developed by David Charles (unpublished MS). Charles appeals to his (2006) reading of the following passage in DA 
10, in which he argues that for Aristotle to see something as pleasant is the same as desiring it: 
Perceiving is like saying alone or thinking [of something]. But when it is pleasant or painful, [the soul] 
as if making an assertion or denial, pursues or avoids [the object]. To enjoy and be pained is to be active 
with regards to the perceptual mean in respect of what is good or bad as such. And this is what 
avoidance and pursuit are when actualised. Nor is the capacity for desire and for avoidance diﬀerent, 
neither from each other nor from the capacity for perception, although they diﬀer in what they are. 
(μὲν οὖν αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅμοιον τῷ φάναι μόνον καὶ νοεῖν· ὅταν δὲ ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν, οἷον καταφᾶσα ἢ ἀποφᾶσα, 
διώκει ἢ φεύγει· καὶ ἔστι τὸ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τὸ ἐνεργεῖν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, 
ᾗ τοιαῦτα. καὶ ἡ φυγὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις τοῦτο ἡ κατ᾿ ἐνέργειαν, καὶ οὐχ ἕτερον τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν καὶ φευκτικόν, 
οὔτ᾿ ἀλλήλων οὔτε τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ· ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι ἄλλο) (DA 431a8-15, trans. Charles).  
Just as there is no diﬀerence between discriminating something as pleasant or disgusting and being attracted to it or 
repelled by it, Charles argues too that discriminating the fine as pleasant and taking pleasure in it are the same activity. 
And to take pleasure in it, will be, according to his (2006) picture, to be attracted to it. (Cf. Coope, 2012, p.159, n.34). 
31 Indeed, Aristotle’s discussion of the diﬀerent kinds of pleasures that attend diﬀerent kinds of activities in X 5 
indicate that the pleasure that attends (perceptions of ) fine activities, qua fine, is a pleasure diﬀerent in kind to the 
bodily pleasures which attend eating and drinking, and so on. Aristotle writes: 
Since activities diﬀer in degrees of decency and badness, and some are choiceworthy, some are avoided, 
some neither, the same holds of pleasures; for in accordance with each activity is its own proper 
pleasure. And so the pleasure proper to an excellent activity is decent, while the one proper to a base 
activity is wretched; for appetites for fine things are praiseworthy and appetites for shameful things 
are blameworthy. And in fact the pleasure in an activity is more proper to it than the desire for it. For 
the desire is distinguished from it in time and in nature; but the pleasure is close to the activity, and so 
little distinguished from it that there are disputes as to whether the activity is the same as the pleasure.  
(διαφερουσῶν δὲ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἐπιεικείᾳ καὶ φαυλότητι, καὶ τῶν μὲν αἱρετῶν οὐσῶν τῶν δὲ φευκτῶν τῶν 
δ᾽ οὐδετέρων, ὁμοίως ἔχουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί: καθ᾽ ἑκάστην γὰρ ἐνέργειαν οἰκεία ἡδονὴ ἔστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῇ 
σπουδαίᾳ οἰκεία ἐπιεικής, ἡ δὲ τῇ φαύλῃ μοχθηρά: καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἐπαινεταί, τῶν δ᾽ 
αἰσχρῶν ψεκταί. οἰκειότεραι δὲ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αἱ ἐν αὐταῖς ἡδοναὶ τῶν ὀρέξεων: αἳ μὲν γὰρ διωρισμέναι 
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I argued above that the fineness of virtuous actions lies in the actions themselves;32 that is, it 
lies in the doing of these. And my claim, as such, is that in doing virtuous actions – by doing what 
the virtuous agent would do – a learner will perceive the fineness of such action, and in doing so 
will find it attractive. Importantly, she finds it attractive and takes pleasure in it because she has 
perceived its value; she does not find it attractive because she takes pleasure in it. On this view, 
then, a learner does not need to be trained to take pleasure in fine action as on the views discussed 
above and in Chapter 3; where training is required, however, is in being so positioned as to 
perceive the fineness of virtuous action. 
5.6 TRAINING TOWARDS PERCEIVING THE FINE 
I have argued so far that fineness is an objective property of virtuous actions, there to be discovered 
in the performance of such actions, and that when it is perceived, an agent will thereby find such 
actions attractive and see them as worth going for. We may wonder, then, why we don’t see more 
agents being struck by the fineness of virtuous action and in being so struck, seeing such action as 
worth going for? For the many do not enjoy virtuous actions, as Aristotle makes clear; why have 
these people not discovered the fineness of virtuous action and its accompanying pleasure? 
The first thing to note is that performing virtuous, and so fine, actions is an extremely 
demanding task. This is made clear in both the discussion of the mean in action and in Aristotle’s 
discussions of the individual virtues. It is “hard work to hit the mean (τὸ μέσον λαβεῖν ἔργον)” 
(1109a25); it is “no longer for everyone, nor is it easy (οὐκέτι παντὸς οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον)” (1109a28-29), 
and for this reason “doing these things well is rare, praiseworthy and fine (τὸ εὖ καὶ σπάνιον καὶ 
ἐπαινετὸν καὶ καλόν)” (1109a29-30). The demandingness of virtuous action is such that not all 
agents manage to perform such actions, and thus do not manage to perform fine actions – there 
is no fineness in their action to be perceived. 33  
It is in this respect that we can begin to see how the learner’s imitation of a virtuous character 
model crucially enables her development. As I argued in the previous chapter, one of the things 
that such imitative activity enables is for the learner to successfully perform virtuous actions, by 
attending carefully to the precise nature of her model’s action, and attempting to act in just the 
                                                             
εἰσὶ καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις καὶ τῇ φύσει, αἳ δὲ σύνεγγυς ταῖς ἐνεργείαις, καὶ ἀδιόριστοι οὕτως ὥστ᾽ ἔχειν 
ἀμφισβήτησιν εἰ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια τῇ ἡδονῇ) (1175b24-33). 
So the pleasure that attends perceptions of fine action will be a diﬀerent kind of pleasure to that of eating, say.  
32 Of course, an action’s being virtuous and so fine is dependent on features of the situation and so forth; it is not 
the case that ‘sharing’ simpliciter is fine, but rather when this is the fitting thing to do, etc. 
33 Cf. Coope (2012, p.158-159).  
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same way in the relevant situations. Both the knowledge and practice of virtuous action aﬀorded 
by imitation allow a learner to perform actions that are fine, and thus make it possible that she 
will perceive the fineness of this action and hence find it attractive. Those who do not have 
virtuous character models, or who imitate vicious agents, and so forth, will not have this 
opportunity available to them.  
But it is not only the case that a learner needs to achieve the diﬃcult task of performing 
actions that are in fact fine in order to perceive this quality in her actions, for I submit that even 
though the property is there to be discovered in such actions, it is not the case that it will be 
perceived on all occasions. We saw above that an important feature of fine things, and so of mean 
actions also, is that they are prepon – fitting, or appropriate. And as such, I submit that in order to 
be able to perceive the fineness of the virtuous actions she performs, the learner needs to recognise 
those features of the action, and the situation to which it is a response,34 that make it prepon.35 I 
submit that if a learner were simply to copy the actions of the virtuous agent, without attending 
to the features of the situation to which the virtuous agent is (or would be) responding, she would 
not thus be in a position to perceive the fittingness and the fineness of that action. But by seeing 
just what it is about the situation that calls for that precise action, and in then performing the 
action, the learner is able to perceive the fittingness and the fineness of her action, and so 
experience the pleasure in so acting. 
Note that this is a diﬀerent requirement on the learner’s successful practice than Jimenez’ 
requirement that the learner already act for the sake of the fine. On Jimenez’ view, the learner’s 
acting well required that she – somehow – act for the sake of the fine (with no explanation of how 
she first comes to grasp the fineness of virtuous action and to be motivated by this); on my view, 
                                                             
34 As noted in n.13 above, ‘situation’ may also include facts about herself.  
35 Achtenberg (2002) proposes a similar though in important ways diﬀerent account of the fineness of virtuous 
actions and the development of a learner’s capacity to perceive this fineness which appeals to idea of their being parts 
of a larger whole. Achtenberg likens this appreciation of virtuous actions to the appreciation of the actions which 
constitute skiing. Actions such as leaning back, or speeding up are constitutive of skiing, and “through actually skiing 
one has new insight into various actions… one sees them as part of larger wholes in which they have new and increased 
value. One sees them, in other words as beautiful” (2002, p.155). Likewise, she argues, “specifically while engaging in 
appropriate practices, one begins to perceive aspects of those practices as constituents of or means to development or 
fulfillment and, thus, as beautiful or good” (2002, p.156). Achtenberg, however, goes on to talk of certain virtuous 
actions in terms of their being means to further goods, in a way that is perhaps misleading. 
There is surely some truth to the thought that a learner will come to see the constituent parts of actions as part 
of a bigger whole – the handing over of her toys as part of the generous action of sharing, say – and indeed, that over 
the course of her practice the learner will start to see these virtuous actions also as part of the bigger whole of a well-
lived life. But Achtenberg appears to overlook the importance of the fittingness of virtuous action that Aristotle’s 
remarks in EE suggest we should take seriously, and her talk of seeing actions as means to further goods might lead 
us to overlook Aristotle’s central insight that these things have an intrinsic value.  
CHAPTER 5 - PERCEIVING THE FINE 
 
 154 
the learner’s acting well consists in her getting the actions right and her attention to the morally 
relevant features of the situation and her action (aﬀorded by her imitation of a virtuous character 
model), which in turn is a condition of her perceiving the fineness in her action.  
In Chapter 3 we looked at examples of two agents whom Jimenez regarded as problematic and 
who were part of her motivation for proposing the account that she does, namely, the mechanical 
learner and the learner with a vicious motive, both of whom she supposes would surely be 
unsuccessful in their habituation. I believe that my view can account for these concerns. We saw 
in Chapter 3 that an agent who acts mechanically, and whose cognitive capacities are not engaged 
in the course of her practice, will not be in a position to acquire either the knowledge of virtuous 
action or to develop the perceptual and deliberative capacities that are required for mature 
virtuous activities. We can now add to this thought that such an agent will not have the requisite 
awareness of the situation in which she is acting and fittingness of her action, needed to perceive 
the fineness of virtuous action and so to value it.  
But we can also similarly explain why an agent with a vicious motive will be less likely to 
succeed in perceiving the fineness in virtuous action. The point is not that one needs to be well 
motivated in order to perform a genuinely virtuous action. It is rather that an agent with a vicious 
motive will typically be attending to the wrong features of the situation when she acts. Such an 
agent may intentionally share her belongings say, and perform a fine action, but if she is motivated 
to do this by the prospect of the rewards she will gain, and if her attention is focused strongly on 
these and not, say, the delight that her sharing brings to the recipient, she may not perceive the 
fittingness and the fineness of that action. An agent’s vicious motivations will aﬀect, I submit, the 
features of a situation to which she attends. Indeed, it may also be the case that a vicious agent is 
motivated to focus on certain features and not others; the stingy agent who does not want to part 
with money is motivated not to attend to the people who are in need, for example.  
This need not be taken to imply that on any occasion that an agent performs a virtuous action 
with an ulterior motive she will be unable to perceive the fineness of that action – it will, I take it, 
be a matter of how much that motive diverts her attention or not from what are in fact the 
important features of the situation. There may also be cases in which an agent performs an action 
with an ulterior motive, focusing on certain features of the situation (the rewards she will gain, 
say), but in performing the action, other features of the situation become apparent to her (they 
‘shine through’ perhaps), such as the delight that her generous action brings to its recipient, and 
when these become apparent to the agent, she may then perceive the fineness of her action.  
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I have emphasised the importance of a learner’s attentiveness to the nature of her action and 
the morally important features of the situation to which it is a response, in order to be in such a 
position as to perceive the fineness of her action and to find it thus attractive. And it is in this 
respect that the account of the learner’s imitation of a virtuous model proposed in Chapter 4 
becomes most relevant. There, I argued that in imitating a virtuous agent, a learner will not only 
attend closely to the nature of the agent’s actions and the situations in which she acts, but that she 
will also be required to (imaginatively) inhabit the virtuous agent’s perspective and to attempt to 
see situations in the way that she does. In doing so I claimed that she simultaneously achieves two 
things. First, she is enabled to move from a view of the world that is structured around her 
immediate appetites, to seeing new features of situations as what matters and as calling for a 
certain response. And in doing so it will not only be the case that she will not simply pursue the 
course of action that leads to the satisfaction of her appetites, but it will also be the case that when 
she performs the virtuous action, her attention will not be diverted in the ways described above.  
Second, and more importantly, in adopting the virtuous agent’s perspective, she will be 
actively attending to the features of the situation that matter and to which the virtuous action is 
a fitting response, and thus be enabled to perceive the fineness of virtuous action. In short, by 
imitating a virtuous agent, by adopting her perspective, attending closely to the nature of her 
action, and acting in such a way herself, the learner is positioned so as to perceive the fineness of 
such action, and in doing so to find it attractive. In this way, then, we can see a further significance 
to the priority that Aristotle appeared to grant to the virtuous agent in NE II 4.  
Of course, having said that this appreciation of the nature of virtuous action, and its 
fittingness with respect to the situations which call for it, is eﬀected through the imitation of a 
character model, this need not be taken to imply that the learner is alone in this process nor that 
she will not require help in coming to see what the virtuous agent does. As I argued at the end of 
Chapter 4, a learner – particularly in the early stages of her development – may require some 
active guidance from a mature agent. It may take, in certain circumstances, another person or 
persons pointing to a feature of the situation, something about another person, something about 
themselves, and so on, for a student to see what is important.  
5.7 MOSS AND SELF-PERCEPTION 
I want to end this chapter by briefly comparing this view with a similar view developed by Moss 
(2012). Moss too stresses the importance in moral habituation of perceiving the fineness of 
CHAPTER 5 - PERCEIVING THE FINE 
 
 156 
virtuous action and the pleasure that attends this perception. (She argues persuasively too for the 
perceptual nature of our grasp of the fineness of action). For Moss, however, this pleasure is taken 
not in the doing of virtuous actions, but in the observation of them, and she draws on Aristotle’s 
discussion of the pleasure of virtuous friendship in NE X 9 (discussed in §5.4 above) in support 
of this contention (2012, p.212). In the case of the learner’s own action, Moss argues that what she 
takes pleasure in is her perception of herself as performing a fine action (2012, p.213ﬀ ).  
My account, so far, has not made it a requirement of the learner’s perception of fineness, or of 
her pleasure in this, that she has this kind of second-order awareness of herself as performing a 
fine action. I have argued, however, that the perception of fineness in action is achieved from the 
first personal perspective, and have argued moreover that the mere doing of an action is not 
suﬃcient for the perception of fineness; an awareness of the nature of action and the morally 
important features of the situation (which might include facts about the agent herself ) will be 
required to perceive this.  
Nevertheless, this does not rule out the possibility that Moss’ account might also be true of 
the learner as she develops, and in particular as she becomes aware of herself as the agent of 
virtuous actions in the way I described towards the end of the previous chapter. The learner at this 
stage may not only perceive the fineness of the virtuous actions she performs, but the fineness of 
herself as performing those actions. As Moss rightly notes, Aristotle claims that the things which 
please the virtuous agent are “decent and his own” (ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ οἰκείας, 1170a3).  
We can add to this a further thought about the mature virtuous agent. We saw clear evidence 
in §5.3 that the activity of the mature agent (i.e. her virtuously performed, virtuous action) is fine 
and pleasant, and it is plausible that Aristotle would maintain that virtuous activity is more fine 
than the activity of a learner. Both will perform fine actions, which have the same moral value, but 
in so far as the mature agent also acts knowingly, chooses these actions for their own sake and acts 
from a stable state, Aristotle would claim that this activity is more fine than the activity of the 
learner who performs fine actions but not yet in this way. And moreover, that this activity will be 
more pleasant (1174b18-20). Putting this together with Moss’ picture, it is plausible then that the 
mature agent will have a second order awareness not only of herself as performing fine actions, 
but of herself as engaged in fine activity, and this will be attended by the most pleasure of all. 
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6 ACTION AND AFFORDANCES 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter I argued that it is through the performance of virtuous actions that a 
learner comes to perceive the value of such action – that is, its fineness – which makes such action 
worth choosing for its own sake. Aristotle’s remarks on the intimate connection between pleasure 
and the fine strongly suggest that when an agent perceives the fineness in virtuous action, she 
thereby perceives it to be attractive in a distinctive way and worth going for. We thus have the 
beginnings of an account of how the very practice of virtuous actions could eﬀect a change in the 
motivational states of a learner, such that over time she comes to choose virtuous actions for their 
own sake, as Aristotle’s remarks in NE II 4 indicate is the case.  
In this chapter I want to develop this picture further, and add further detail to the account of 
how the learner’s practice of virtuous actions can shape her perceptions and desires, in such a way 
that over time she comes to meet the conditions of virtuously performed action. We have already 
seen an indication in the previous chapter of the intimate relation Aristotle sees between one’s 
perception of activities and situations, one’s pleasures and one’s desires; the intimacy of this 
relation will become more apparent still in this chapter. Moreover, in coming to appreciate the 
intimate relations between these phenomena and, indeed, our actions, I hope to add some colour 
to the thought alluded to at the end of Chapter 3, that the conditions of virtuously performed 
action are not met piecemeal or in a sequence of discrete stages, but through the joint training of 
these various capacities eﬀected through (guided) practice.  
As a route into developing this picture, I want to turn away from Aristotle’s ethical writings 
and towards the psychological works, taking as a starting point Aristotle’s remarks on the 
production of action in De Motu Animalium and De Anima. In these, Aristotle points to the need 
for the operation of at least one of our discerning faculties (that is, of perception, phantasia, or 
thought) and of one form of orexis (comprising epithumia, thumos and boulēsis)1 for the 
                                                             
1 Prohairesis meanwhile, is referred to both as ‘desiderative thought’ (orektikos nous, NE 1139b4-5), and as 
‘thinking desire’ (orexis dianoētikē, NE 1139b4-5) or ‘deliberative desire’ (orexis bouleutikē, NE 1139a23).  
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production of voluntary action, but he also appears to assign a particular role to phantasia in what 
he calls the ‘preparation’ (παρασκευάζει, MA 702a17) of desire. Whilst Aristotle oﬀers little 
further information as to the role he envisages for this capacity here, a number of insightful 
attempts have been made in recent literature to account for this role. In examining both Aristotle’s 
remarks on phantasia, and some of the accounts of its role in the preparation of action that have 
been oﬀered in recent literature, we can shed further light not only on the issue of how perception, 
desire and other capacities contribute to the production of action, but how it is that through 
acting we can also shape these capacities.  
6.2 ACTION, DESIRE AND PHANTASIA  
We are seeking to understand how an agent’s desires and way of seeing things can be transformed 
through the practice of virtuous actions. I suggested in my opening remarks that we should turn 
our attention towards Aristotle’s discussions of desire and action, located in his psychological 
works, but before we do so I want to say a brief word about the scope of the following discussion.  
In what follows, I am not concerned to develop an account of desire, for Aristotle, simpliciter. 
Aristotle’s remarks on desire occur within a variety of contexts, both ethical and more narrowly 
psychological, and are often made within the context of discussing diﬀerent phenomena 
(locomotion, deliberation, akrasia, and so on). Thus, remarks made in one context may not be 
intended to apply to all cases of desiring or phenomena that Aristotle includes under the general 
heading ‘orexis’.2 Certainly, I am concerned only with desires as related to action, and not those 
desires that are, as it were, not action-prompting. The following discussion is not intended to 
apply, for example, to phenomena such as hopes or idle wishes,3 though that is not to say that 
aspects of this discussion could not be relevant to understanding such phenomena. Indeed, the 
account that I eventually develop is intended specifically to apply to cases of virtuous action, and 
not action per se (though again, that it is not to claim that it could not apply to cases of non-moral 
action, and indeed I will develop my account by drawing on various non-moral examples). 
                                                             
2 A fairly comprehensive analysis of Aristotle’s various discussions of desire can be found in Pearson (2012).  
3 Aristotle claims that we can hope for things that cannot be secured through our own agency, but these are not 
things that we could for example choose (see NE 1111b23-24). I hope, for example, that Donald Trump will be 
impeached, but this is not something that I can choose. We can also wish for things we know either to be impossible 
(see NE 1111b22–23, EE 1225b32–3), or to be concerned with things that have happened in the past (see NE 1139b6ﬀ ), 
neither of which can be objects of choice for Aristotle. I wish that I could fly, or that Donald Trump had not won the 
2016 election, but again these are not things I can choose, or which could motivate me to act. 
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With these restrictions in scope noted, both as regards Aristotle’s own remarks on desire and 
my own concerns in discussing these, we can turn to Aristotle’s discussions of voluntary action in 
De Motu Animalium and De Anima. As stated in my introductory remarks, Aristotle in De Motu 
6 is clear that all cases of (voluntary) action presuppose orexis and the operation of at least one of 
the discerning faculties (that is, perception, phantasia or thought) (MA 700b17-24). But in 
Chapter 8 Aristotle appears to make the further claim that forming an action-prompting desire 
requires having some suitable phantasia: 
For the aﬀections suitably prepare the organic parts, desire the aﬀections and phantasia the 
desire; and phantasia comes about either through thought or through perception. 
τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὀργανικὰ μέρη παρασκευάζει ἐπιτηδείως τὰ πάθη, ἡ δ᾿ ὄρεξις τὰ πάθη, τὴν δ᾿ ὄρεξιν 
ἡ φαντασία· αὕτη δὲ γίνεται ἢ διὰ νοήσεως ἢ δι᾿ αἰσθήσεως (MA 702a17-19).4 
A related claim is made in De Anima III 10, where Aristotle writes that: 
In general, as has been said, in so far as the animal is capable of desire, so far is it capable of 
self-movement; and it is not capable of desire without phantasia. And every phantasia is 
either rational or perceptual. In the latter, then, the other animals share also. 
ὅλως μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ᾗ ὀρεκτικὸν τὸ ζῷον, ταύτῃ αὑτοῦ κινητικόν· ὀρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ 
ἄνευ φαντασίας· φαντασία δὲ πᾶσα ἢ λογιστικὴ ἢ αἰσθητική. ταύτης μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα 
μετέχει (DA 433b27-30). 
Both passages establish a central and, one might think, a necessary role for phantasia in desire that 
leads to action; unfortunately, Aristotle does not oﬀer any further discussion that makes clear just 
what the role is that he envisages. The question of the envisaged role for phantasia has thus, 
understandably, attracted a fair amount of attention from scholars, not merely for the sake of 
understanding Aristotle’s account of action and desire, but because of the centrality of these 
notions within Aristotle’s ethics more generally.5 I submit, indeed, that by thinking about the role 
that he may envisage for phantasia in these cases – what it is that phantasia enables us to do, why 
in particular this capacity might be required to ‘prepare’ desire that generates action, and so on – 
we are oﬀered a fruitful way of thinking about Aristotle’s conception of desire as it relates to 
action. From §6.4 onwards I will examine and then add to a number of recent attempts to account 
for the role of phantasia in desire and action; first, however, it will be necessary to say a little about 
Aristotle’s capacity of phantasia: what is phantasia, and how does it operate?  
                                                             
4 Translations of De Anima are based on Shields (2016), and De Motu on Nussbaum (1978), with modifications.  
5 This issue is taken up, amongst others, by Modrak (1987), Whiting (2002), Lorenz (2006), Moss (2012), 
Johansen (2011). 
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6.3 PHANTASIA: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
Oﬀering a comprehensive, and perhaps even coherent, account of Aristotle’s capacity of phantasia 
is a familiar diﬃculty faced by scholars of Aristotle’s moral psychology; a diﬃculty that owes 
primarily to the fact that Aristotle oﬀers little by way of positive characterisation of the capacity 
in his psychological works.6 In the only chapter of the Aristotelian corpus devoted exclusively to 
the topic of phantasia, Aristotle’s analysis proceeds by way of contrast with our capacity for 
perception on the one hand, and belief on the other; indeed, it is not clear that Aristotle intends 
even to oﬀer an analysis of phantasia here, rather than merely to distinguish it from these other 
two capacities.7 Moreover, Aristotle discusses it in connection with, and holds it in some sense 
responsible for, a wide range of psychological phenomena. We have already seen that in De Motu 
it is cited as a cause of locomotion, but we discover in further texts such as De Memoria and De 
Insomniis, as well as De Anima III 3, that phantasia is invoked to explain such other phenomena 
as memory, dreams, after-images, hallucinations and perceptual-illusions.8 
Some things, however, are clear. Phantasia has its root in the verb φαντάζεσθαι, ‘to appear’, 
and is importantly connected with the way in which things appear to a being.9 It is possessed not 
                                                             
6 Most commentators accept that phantasia for Aristotle is a distinctive capacity, but it remains a further question 
whether it should also be considered a faculty in its own right. In favour are, amongst others, Lorenz (2006), Moss 
(2012), Schofield (1978); against, Wedin (1988). For discussion of the relation between the phantastikon and the 
aisthetikon, see especially Whiting (2002).  
7 Hence, perhaps, why he speaks of ‘delineating’ (διορίσαντας) phantasia, rather than of oﬀering an account of 
it. He is marking the boundaries of phantasia, perception and thought, rather than oﬀering an account of its essence.  
Schofield (1978), and later Osborne (2000), argue that he distinguishes between the three capacities for the sake 
ultimately of upholding the distinction between perception and thought, denied by some of his predecessors. In the 
opening lines of DA III 3, Aristotle states that one of the characteristics of mind is that it thinks (νοεῖν), judges 
(κρίνειν) and perceives (αἰσθάνεσθαι), but he immediately acknowledges that some pre-Socratics took thinking and 
perceiving to be identical (427a22), implying that his original division of the activities of the mind cannot be upheld. 
As Aristotle goes on to show from 427b6, however, thinking and perceiving cannot be the same thing, since (i) they 
are not extensionally equivalent and (ii) perception, unlike thought, is always true. If his intention in III 3 is indeed 
to defend the distinction between perception and thought, this must involve an explanation of how his predecessors 
could come to be so confused about the two. It is for this reason that he is interested in phantasia, for its role in 
relation both to thought and perception can lead to a confusion of the two faculties Hence he must show here that 
phantasia and perception, and phantasia and thought are not the same and therefore that the distinction between 
thought and perception can indeed be upheld. For further discussion, see Schofield (1978, pp.271-2). 
Most recently, Shields has suggested that Aristotle acknowledges that “he owes his readers some proof of our 
even having such a capacity or faculty, and he thinks that such a proof intimately involves distinguishing imagination 
from some other capacities to which some might be inclined to reduce it” (2016, p.275). 
8 In light of these latter discussions, certain commentators have been tempted to construe phantasia as the 
capacity for non-paradigmatic sensory experiences (Schofield, 1978). See Moss (2012, p.53) for a compelling argument 
against characterising phantasia in this way. In any case, phantasia’s role in relation to such experiences – with the 
exception of memory and anticipation – will not be our focus. 
9 Most commentators agree that we ought not to understand ‘the appearance of things’ as mere appearings; that 
is, the kind of appearing which is opposed to how things are in the world. For whilst there are of course cases in which 
the way that things appear to the subject do not faithfully represent the way that things are (e.g. DA 428b4), these 
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only by humans but almost all non-rational animals too.10 It is a close relative of perception, and 
is said not to be possible without perception (428b11). Perhaps the most substantial 
characterisation of phantasia is to be found in Aristotle’s discussion of its relation to perception: 
Since when something has been set in motion, something else is moved by it, and since 
phantasia seems to be a sort of motion and not to come about without perception, but rather 
to occur in things which are perceiving and to be of those things of which perception is, and 
since motion comes about from the actuality of perception, and this is necessarily similar to 
the perception, this motion will be neither possible without perception, nor could it belong 
to things which are not perceiving; and it is possible for what has phantasia both to act and 
be aﬀected in many ways and in accordance with it, and for it to be either true or false. 
Ἀλλ᾿ ἐπειδὴ ἔστι κινηθέντος τουδὶ κινεῖσθαι ἕτερον ὑπὸ τούτου, ἡ δὲ φαντασία κίνησίς τις δοκεῖ 
εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως γίγνεσθαι ἀλλ᾿ αἰσθανομένοις καὶ ὧν αἴσθησις ἐστίν, ἔστι δὲ 
γίνεσθαι κίνησιν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ταύτην ὁμοίαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τῇ 
αἰσθήσει, εἴη ἂν αὕτη ἡ κίνησις οὔτε ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως ἐνδεχομένη οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανομένοις 
ὑπάρχειν, καὶ πολλὰ κατ᾿ αὐτὴν καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν τὸ ἔχον, καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ 
(428b10-17).  
Phantasia is a movement, resulting from a perception, occurring in beings who perceive and is like 
perception. It can be either true or false,11 and is something in virtue of which beings can act, and 
be aﬀected. This is reiterated in the final lines of DA III 3, where Aristotle concludes that: 
Because instances of phantasia persist and are similar to perceptions, animals do many things 
in accordance with them, some because they lack reason, e.g. beasts, and others because of the 
occasional shrouding of reason by passion, or sickness, or sleep, e.g. humans. 
καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐμμένειν καὶ ὁμοίως εἶναι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, πολλὰ κατ᾿ αὐτὰς πράττει τὰ ζῷα, τὰ μὲν 
διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν νοῦν, οἷον τὰ θηρία, τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐπικαλύπτεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἐνίοτε πάθει ἢ νόσοις 
ἢ ὕπνῳ, οἷον οἱ ἄνθρωποι (429a4-8). 
                                                             
do not exhaust all forms of appearance. Rather, it is supposed that the connection between phantasia and the verb 
phainesthai is intended to bring out the sense in which an object must appear to the subject in a certain way.  
10 There is a long history of dispute as to which animals Aristotle denies phantasia. At DA 428a10-11 Aristotle 
writes that “Perception is always present, but not phantasia. But if they were the same in actuality it would be possible 
for all beasts to have phantasia, and it seems that this is not so, e.g. the ant or bee, and the grub (οἷον μύρμηκι ἢ μελίττῃ 
ἢ σκώληκι). It has been suggested by Torstrick that the text be amended to “οἷον μύρμηκι μεν ἢ μελίττῃ, σκώληκι δ’ου”, 
and that we should thus take Aristotle to be contrasting bees and ants who do have phantasia, with grubs who do not. 
The suggestion is supported by evidence from Themistius (De Anima, 90, 6) who includes ants and bees in the list of 
animals who have phantasia. Lorenz (2006, p.139), argues that this conjecture fits better with Aristotle’s claims about 
bees elsewhere: in the Metaphysics Aristotle attributes memory to bees (980a27-b25), and Aristotle maintains in De 
Memoria that the capacity for memory requires the capacity for phantasia. Shields also accepts this reading in his 
commentary and translation of De Anima (2016, p.57; p.283) 
11 Whilst perceptions for Aristotle are always true, he argues that phantasiai are for the most part false (DA 
428a11-12); here, we may suppose that he takes ‘true’ to mean ‘represents something’ (and ‘false’ the opposite). 
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Importantly, this passage not only anticipates Aristotle’s discussions in DA III 9-10 and De Motu 
Animalium, in which phantasia is invoked in the explanation of animal action, but appears to cite 
the fact that phantasmata persist and are similar to perceptions as reason for phantasia’s eﬃcacy.12 
Whilst there has been considerable disagreement about the nature of phantasia and how it 
functions, broadly two dominant views have emerged within scholarship of the last forty years. 
On one view, which finds support in Nussbaum’s (1978) influential discussion, phantasia is 
regarded as an interpretive capacity, in virtue of which we see objects as objects of a certain sort.13 
On this view, when a subject perceives an object in her environment, she properly perceives, for 
example, its colour and its shape, whilst its presentation as an object of a certain sort is possible 
only thanks to the activity of phantasia. Yet whilst phantasia is clearly capable of representing 
objects as objects of certain sorts,14 the interpretive account of phantasia has been largely rejected 
on the grounds that it attributes to phantasia a role which it seems perception on its own is capable 
of performing. Whilst Nussbaum has attempted to show that certain remarks of Aristotle’s might 
be taken to indicate that perception is, on his view, a passive faculty,15 and as such that a further 
faculty is required to explain the agent’s selective fastening-onto certain aspects of her 
environment, as others have noted, the weight of evidence suggests that Aristotle regards 
                                                             
12 We will return to this thought in §6.5.1 below. 
13 Nussbaum writes:  
The use of phantasia in action-contexts, and its broad connection with phainetai throughout Aristotle 
suggested to us that phantasia is the faculty in virtue of which the animal sees his object as an object 
of a certain sort, so that we can say that the perception has for him some potentially motivating 
content. …Phantasia, then, is the animal’s awareness of some object or state of aﬀairs, which may well 
prove to be an object of desire. It can serve both to present the object of desire initially, and, later, to 
specify the object at hand as what is desired (Nussbaum, 1978, pp.255-61). 
Osborne too identifies one of four roles she takes to be played by phantasia as the ability “to construe some 
currently available perceptual field in the light of familiar forms previously encountered, so that it presents itself to 
the attention as a set of discrete objects of interest (thus allowing for what we call ‘seeing as’)” (2000, p.262). An 
interpretive account is considered in Ross, though Ross denies that this is Aristotle’s deliberate view and observes that 
“usually phantasia is described as operating only after the sensible object is gone” (1949, p.143). 
14 See the example of the Sun appearing a foot across at DA 428b. Our seeing the Sun as a foot across in this 
example must be the product of phantasia (or else the example does nothing to distinguish phantasia and doxa), and 
the example shows that phantasia is capable of presenting measures of size (‘a foot across’), as well as presumably shape 
and colour – and indeed, of identifying an object as a certain kind (‘the Sun’). See Osborne (2000) for discussion of 
this passage in connection with the notion of ‘seeing as’.  
15 The passivity of perception is indicated, Nussbaum suggests, by passages such as DA 428a11-12, where Aristotle 
claims that aisthēsis is always accurate whilst phantasia can be false, emphasising in her view the mechanical, 
reproductive side of aisthēsis in Aristotle’s theory. One might appeal for further evidence of passivity to Aristotle’s 
wax analogy, which is used to illustrate the manner in which the sense organ is aﬀected by the perceptible form of the 
object without the matter (DA 424a17), that is, just as a piece of wax receives the imprint of a seal without its matter. 
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perception as on the whole active and discerning (see esp. DA 425a22; MA 700b21) and capable 
of presenting objects as objects of certain sorts.16  
In place of the interpretive account, the now dominant view emphasises instead the causal 
connection between perception and phantasia (Caston 1996, 1998; Everson, 1997; Lorenz, 2006; 
Johansen, 2012, Moss, 2012). As DA III 3 reveals, Aristotle characterises phantasia as a change 
produced by the actuality or function of perception, a claim reiterated at Insomn. 459a17-19. In 
Insomn. II and III, Aristotle adds further detail, explaining that in perception, it is the sensible 
objects (aisthēta) corresponding to each sense that produce perceptions in us (459a24-25). 
Specifically, these objects cause a stimulation or movement – an aisthēma – in the relevant sense 
organ (460b28-30), and when this movement travels to, and acts upon, the central sense organ, a 
sensory experience is produced.17 Yet as we also saw at 428b10, Aristotle holds that a change or 
movement can also produce further changes; thus the initial stimulation of the sense organ can 
give rise to a further change; this further change being phantasia. 
Given this close relation between phantasia and perception, it is generally supposed that 
phantasia will thereby share the same content as perception, and is thus likewise rich in content.18 
This would appear to be supported by Aristotle’s remark at DA 428b27 which makes clear that 
phantasia arises from each kind of perception (proper, common and coincidental), and not just 
the proper objects of perception. Since phantasiai are similar to perceptions, but can persist 
(ἐμμένειν, 428a4) beyond the initial sensory experience and in the absence of the perceptual 
object, it is therefore supposed that a central function of phantasia is to present to a subject 
perceptual content either when they are not perceiving, or in the absence of the relevant sensory 
object. It is a capacity for having experiences very like perceptions of actual objects, but 
experiences which, in not being directly caused by perceptual objects, can thus occur in the 
absence of such objects.19  
We can add to this a few details that have importantly been emphasised by scholars. First, as 
we have seen, Aristotle allows that phantasiai can be false, in the sense that they can misrepresent 
                                                             
16 As we have already seen in the previous chapter (§5.4), Aristotle’s discussion of the coincidental objects of 
perception strongly indicates that perception is capable of presenting perceived objects as objects of certain sort (DA 
418a21-24). 
17 For further discussion of the experience of perception and the role of the central organ, see Caston (1998, 
p.274ﬀ ) and Everson (1997, p.141-148). 
18 Whiting (2002, p.194) suggests that since perception in rational animals is richer than in non-rational animals, 
rational animals have more sophisticated and powerful forms of phantasia.  
19 Phantasia’s liberation from what is present, and its potential to be directed towards what is future, will be of 
importance with regards to understanding its role in desire and the production of action, as we will see.  
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phenomena, and Aristotle in De Insomniis oﬀers an account of how phantasiai can become 
distorted in the face of disturbance. But this passage has also been appealed to, notably by Lorenz 
(2006, pp.152-157), as evidence for the thought that, in the absence of disturbance, Aristotle must 
take it that phantasia not only preserves perceptual content, but can preserve it in an appropriately 
ordered way. Given this, Lorenz argues, it is reasonable to suppose that phantasia is capable of 
representing complex phenomena such as events and processes, and indeed ‘situations’.  
It is worth noting too that phantasia appears capable of presenting objects in diﬀerent 
temporal modes, for we can represent things through phantasia as being past, and also as future. 
Aristotle’s discussion of emotion in the Rhetoric strongly indicates that phantasia is responsible 
for the cognitive content of emotions,20 and we discover there, for example, that fear is a future 
directed emotion, in which the imminent (μέλλοντος) evil (Rhet. 1182a20-1) that is feared must 
be seen as future and close at hand (Rhet. 1182a25). Conversely, memory – which likewise relies 
on phantasia – is of the past (Mem. 499b15); when a person exercises their memory they always 
say “in their mind that they have heard, or felt, or thought this before” (Mem. 449b23-24). And 
since memory belongs to the perceptual part of the soul, and exists in creatures not possessed of a 
rational soul, the recognition of a thing as past cannot be a function of thought. Interestingly, 
these passages not only oﬀer evidence of phantasia’s being such as to present things in diﬀerent 
temporal modes, but suggest that an object’s temporal mode of presentation will in part determine 
whether a given phantasia will have a given eﬀect. 
A final feature of phantasia that is worth emphasising, before we turn to consider its role in 
the formation of desire and action, is that it can be evaluative. As a matter of fact, there are two 
ways in which we might call it evaluative. On the one hand, phantasia appears to be capable of 
representing evaluative properties; it can represent objects as pleasant or painful, or good or bad. 
Aristotle refers throughout the ethical and psychological works both to the ‘apparent good’ 
(φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν) and the ‘apparently pleasant’ (φαινόμενα ἡδέα) (see e.g. Rhet. 1369b20, 23) 
which are taken (e.g. by Moss, 2012, p.7) as evidence that the properties of goodness and pleasure, 
and their opposites, can be represented through phantasia.21 
                                                             
20 For an alternative view, according to which the cognitive content of emotions aﬀorded by doxa, see esp. Dow 
(2009). For an overview of the doxastic vs. phantastic debate, and a convincing defence of the view that the cognitive 
content of emotions is provided by phantasia, see Moss (2012, ch4). This indeed is now accepted by Dow (2013). 
21 It might of course be argued that such references to the ‘apparently pleasant’, like the ‘apparent good’, are 
intended to mark a contrast between what is truly pleasant and what merely seems pleasant to a subject, but the 
context of Aristotle’s discussions, notably in the Rhetoric suggest that he regards the apparently pleasant as something 
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On the other hand, certain of Aristotle’s remarks indicate that phantasia itself can be pleasant. 
We see evidence of this in Aristotle’s discussion of memory and anticipation in the Rhetoric, both 
of which require the engagement of our capacity of phantasia for: 
if to be pleased consists in the perceiving of a certain pathos, and phantasia is a certain weak 
perception, then a phantasia of what is remembered or what is hoped will attend both the 
man who remembers and the man who hopes. If this is so, it is clear that there is pleasure both 
for those who remember and for those who hope, since there is perception. Therefore, of 
necessity all pleasant things must either be present in perception, or past in recollection, or 
future in hope. 
Ἐπεὶ δ᾿ ἐστὶ τὸ ἥδεσθαι ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαί τινος πάθους, ἡ δὲ φαντασία ἐστὶν αἴσθησίς τις 
ἀσθενής, κἂν τῷ μεμνημένῳ καὶ τῷ ἐλπίζοντι ἀκολουθοῖ ἂν φαντασία τις οὗ μέμνηται ἢ ἐλπίζει. 
εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡδοναὶ ἅμα μεμνημένοις καὶ ἐλπίζουσιν, ἐπείπερ καὶ αἴσθησις. ὥστ᾿ 
ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ ἡδέα ἢ ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι εἶναι παρόντα ἢ ἐν τῷ μεμνῆσθαι γεγενημένα ἢ ἐν 
τῷ ἐλπίζειν μέλλοντα (Rhet. 1370a27-35).22 
Memory and expectation, being not of the present, but the past and future respectively, operate 
on the basis of phantasia; phantasia, itself being based on perception, allows us to experience the 
pleasure or pain that accompanied the original perception, albeit perhaps in a weaker form. If to 
drink some wine is pleasant, then it may well be the case that to remember or anticipate drinking 
some will be pleasant was well.23 That phantasia can, and often does, represent evaluative qualities 
will prove to be important in what follows.  
                                                             
represented through phantasia. Fear, for example, is defined as a painful feeling produced by a phantasia of an 
imminent evil causing great destruction or pain (ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ, Rhet. 1382a21).  
22 See also Physics (247a7-14). Moss suggest that this and the Rhetoric passage should be read in conjunction with 
the Aristotle’s discussion in De Motu of the heatings and chillings which accompany pleasurable and painful pathē: 
for confidence, fears, sexual excitement, and other bodily aﬀections, painful and pleasant, are 
accompanied by heating and chilling, in some cases of a part, in others of the whole body. Memory and 
anticipation, using things of this kind as likenesses, are now to a lesser degree, now to a greater, 
responsible for the same things (θάρρη γὰρ καὶ φόβοι καὶ ἀφροδισιασμοὶ καὶ τἆλλα τὰ σωματικὰ λυπηρὰ καὶ 
ἡδέα τὰ μὲν κατὰ μόριον μετὰ θερμότητος ἢ ψύξεώς ἐστι, τὰ δὲ καθ᾿ ὅλον 5τὸ σῶμα· μνῆμαι δὲ καὶ ἐλπίδες, 
οἷον εἰδώλοις χρώμεναι τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὁτὲ μὲν ἧττον ὁτὲ δὲ μᾶλλον αἰτίαι τῶν αὐτῶν εἰσίν (702a2-7). 
When phantasia reproduces a pleasurable or painful, heating and chilling experience in memory or expectation, Moss 
takes it that the result is itself pleasurable or painful, heating and chilling. This is the material counterpart of the 
Physics and Rhetoric claims that memory and expectation are themselves pleasant or painful. 
23 It is worth noting, though, that while it is possible for phantasia involved in memory and anticipation to 
produce the same kinds of eﬀects as were or would be produced if the subject were undergoing an actual perception 
of an object, there is evidence from other passages that there is at least not a necessary connection between the 
experience of a past pleasure or pain, and the recollection of that experience (or indeed, the anticipation of a like 
experience). First, as we saw in DA III 3 in the course of distinguishing phantasia and belief, Aristotle writes that: 
when we come to believe something terrible or frightening we are correspondingly aﬀected right 
away…but in the case of phantasia, we are just as if we had seen the terrible or audacious things in a 
picture. (ἔτι δὲ ὅταν μὲν δοξάσωμεν δεινόν τι ἢ φοβερόν, εὐθὺς συμπάσχομεν, […] κατὰ δὲ τὴν φαντασίαν 
ὡσαύτως ἔχομεν ὥσπερ ἂν οἱ θεώμενοι ἐν γραφῇ τὰ δεινὰ ἢ θαρραλέα) (427b17-24). 
The passage is mistakenly taken by intellectualist interpreters of Aristotle’s account of emotion to indicate that only 
beliefs and not phantasiai can aﬀect a subject in the way required of emotions, but it does show that phantasiai do 
not in all cases produce the same aﬀective response that a perception of such an object would.  
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6.4 TWO PICTURES OF PHANTASIA IN THE ‘PREPARATION’ OF DESIRE 
Whilst Aristotle oﬀers little information about the role that he envisages for phantasia in the 
‘preparation’ of desire and action, most commentators have tended to suppose that its role will 
have to do with the presentation to the subject of suitable goals. But just what is involved in this 
is a matter of some disagreement. Nevertheless, two broad (and not necessarily incompatible) 
roles for phantasia in the preparation of desire and action have been emphasised in recent 
literature, and we will examine these now.  
6.4.1 PHANTASIA AND THE PRESENTATION OF PLEASURE 
It is generally agreed that for something to be an object of desire requires that the subject sees it 
as somehow attractive. Indeed, in both the ethical and psychological works Aristotle explicitly 
identifies the good or the apparent good as the objects of desire, at least in their most general 
specifications (DA 433a27-29; NE 1113a23-24). The apparent good, he claims, ranks as a good (τὸ 
φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθοῦ χώραν ἔχειν), and so does the pleasant, this being an apparent good 
(καὶ τὸ ἡδύ· φαινόμενον γάρ ἐστιν ἀγαθόν) (MA 700b28-9).  
Elsewhere Aristotle explicitly states that the object of epithumia (appetitive desire) is pleasure 
(DA 413b23‐24; 414b1‐6) and later in De Motu Aristotle again ties pleasure closely to that which 
initiates movement, identifying the objects of pursuit and avoidance in the sphere of action as the 
pleasant and the painful (Ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τῆς κινήσεως τὸ ἐν τῷ πρακτῷ διωκτὸν καὶ 
φευκτόν […] τὸ μὲν γὰρ λυπηρὸν φευκτόν, τὸ δ᾿ ἡδὺ διωκτόν, 701b33-36).24 Given the close 
connection between pleasure and desire, many commentators have thus supposed that the role of 
phantasia in the preparation of desire and the production of action is either to present to the 
subject some pleasure, or to associate, as it were, objects with pleasure in some way.  
Within the current debate, one of the first commentators to argue that phantasia is necessary 
to associate objects with pleasure is Modrak. Modrak argues that whilst the apprehension by a 
subject of a desired object might occur through perception, phantasia or thought, “phantasia 
seems to focus desire on a particular object in a way in which neither perception nor thought does. 
                                                             
24 Whiting notes an important diﬀerence between plants, which do not of course possess desire, and animals, 
which is that animals, unlike plants need to move in order to take nourishment (animals are not automatically 
nourished by things to which they are more or less permanently attached): 
So they need something to motivate them. This is the role played by pleasure and pain, which are 
essentially motivational states, states that simple animals are moved either to sustain or to end and that 
complex animals – capable of representing them in imagination – are also moved either to bring about 
or to avoid” (Whiting 2002, 173). 
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Phantasia provides the ‘something else’ that explains the agent’s choice” (1987, p.96). Taking the 
example of a piece of fruit appearing pleasant to a hungry bird, Modrak supposes that: 
if we are to explain the association of gustatory pleasures with an object presented through 
other sense modalities, we must appeal to information not immediately present to the senses; 
the most likely source of this information would be past experience. In bringing past 
experience to bear on present perceptions, phantasia would play the role of memory in the 
modern sense, namely the utilisation of previously acquired information (1987, p.97). 
On this view, the mere perception of an object is not suﬃcient to render it an object of desire; the 
object needs to be associated with certain relevant sorts of pleasure, by virtue of which it appears 
as something choiceworthy, and this task is performed by phantasia. 
Yet whilst many have welcomed Modrak’s insight that phantasia plays an important role in 
the presentation of what is pleasant and painful in a way which thus suitably prepares desire, 
scholars have nevertheless been critical of the particular account she oﬀers,25 and this criticism is 
worth noting. The criticism, in short, is that Modrak appears to attribute to phantasia a role that 
it is reasonable to suppose could be filled by perception, and for this reason does nothing to show 
why phantasia should be required to perform the task she describes.26 For Aristotle’s discussion of 
perception strongly indicates that perception on its own can present an object as pleasant or 
painful. At 413b23-24 Aristotle tells us that “where there is perception, there is pain and pleasure, 
and where these, there is of necessity appetite” (ὅπου μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις, καὶ λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή, 
ὅπου δὲ ταῦτα, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἐπιθυμία), and shortly after that “and that to which perception 
belongs, to this belongs also pleasure and pain, as well as both the pleasurable and the painful” (ᾧ 
δ᾿ αἴσθησις ὑπάρχει, τούτῳ ἡδονή τε καὶ λύπη καὶ τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ λυπηρόν, 414b4-5).27 Why, then, 
                                                             
25 See for example Moss (2012, p.55), Johansen (2012, p.212). 
26 As an aside, it is unclear whether this criticism of Modrak is entirely fair, since it is not clear that she is 
maintaining that phantasia is required to present the pleasant or the painful in all cases, or only in those where the 
relevant pleasures and pains are not present to perception. There are certainly parts of Modrak’s account which, if taken 
in isolation, might imply that she takes the association of objects with pleasure to be achievable only by phantasia, for 
example in the claim that “Phantasia provides the ‘something else’ that explains the agent’s choice” (p.96), or in her 
analysis of MA 702a16-19, which she claims that Aristotle:  
describes a two-part cognitive process. Aisthêsis or noêsis presents an object, and phantasia elaborates 
on that object, reinterpreting it in the light of anticipated pleasures and pains. This description secures 
a place for phantasia even in cases where a diﬀerent cognitive faculty presents the object (1987, p.97).  
The ‘securing’ of a role for phantasia would imply that she takes only phantasia to play this role. And yet, her example 
of a bird’s selection of a piece of fruit, and her demand that an explanation be oﬀered of how gustatory pleasures come 
to be associated with an object presented through other sense modalities, might equally indicate that she takes 
phantasia to be necessary not for the presentation of pleasure to a subject per se, but the presentation of pleasure in 
cases where the pleasure is not present to the relevant sensory modality. If the latter is the case, then her account is 
not so diﬀerent from the qualified accounts oﬀered by subsequent commentators.  
27 Of course, it might be argued that the connection Aristotle draws in these passages between perception and 
pleasure and pain is dependent on the presence of phantasia (a suggestion with prima facie support in the fact that 
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should phantasia be thought to ‘focus desire on a particular object’ in a way perception does not, 
if perception too can present an object as pleasant or painful? 
I draw our attention to this particular criticism not so much to detail the success or failings of 
a particular commentator’s account, but to bring into view a popular strategy that has been 
adopted among recent commentators for maintaining Modrak’s insight that phantasia may play 
a role in the presentation of objects as pleasant, whilst granting that the presentation of pleasure 
can be achieved through perception alone. The strategy, in short, has been to suggest that Aristotle 
assigns this particular role to phantasia in a more limited range of cases. When Aristotle seems to 
imply that phantasia is necessary for the formation of desires that lead to action, it is suggested 
that he has in mind cases where an animal must move to secure its goal; cases, that is, where the 
object of desire is not present to perception, or at least the relevant sensory modality.28 When a 
subject is in direct perceptual contact with an object – when they are tasting the fruit, say – they 
experience pleasure, and so are motivated to continue eating (or alternatively, if they are in direct 
perceptual contact with an unpleasant object, they experience pain and so aversion, as a result of 
which they cease to eat). But when the fruit is at a distance, or not in the subject’s perceptual field 
at all, there is no strict perception of pleasure to motivate the subject to pursue the fruit. Since, 
however, phantasia can operate in the absence of perceptible objects and independently of what 
is presently given to perception, it is able to represent the relevant object (whether perceived or 
imagined) as pleasant; in this way the subject is motivated to pursue that object.29  
Modrak, as we have seen, speaks of the association of certain objects with pleasure, and the 
‘reinterpretation’ of such objects in light of pleasures (n.26 above); Whiting, and others, typically 
                                                             
the claim is 413b23 is preceded by the claim that if a subject has perception, they then have phantasia and desire 
(413b22-23)). Yet since Aristotle maintains that there are animals with perception, but without phantasia, he is not 
licensed to say that it follows from there being perception that there is pleasure and pain, if the pleasure and pain in 
fact depend on the presence of phantasia. Thus we do better to take him at his word when he writes that from 
perception there is pleasure and pain. 
For a persuasive exposition of the perception of evaluative properties see Chapter 2 of Moss (2012, pp.22-47). 
28 For in both De Anima III 10 and De Motu Animalium 8, it is suggested that Aristotle is not engaged in the 
project of analysing desire per se, nor of accounting for action in general, but specifically of accounting for the 
production of locomotion (DA 432a15-18), (nor any locomotion, but specifically locomotion for the sake of 
something (τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, 700b15)). By contrast when Aristotle speaks of the connection between desire and perception 
– implying that certain forms of pursuit and avoidance arise simply from perceptions of something as pleasant or 
painful (431a8-16) – no mention is made of locomotion. 
Those who take seriously the apparent restriction of Aristotle’s account include Lorenz (2006), Johansen (2012) 
and Moss (2012). Cf. Pearson (2012). 
29 Moreover, Moss argues, because there is no thinking without phantasmata (see 431a14-17), phantasia must be 
involved even when the goal is apprehended by thought. 
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speak of the ‘representation’ of objects as pleasant (2002, p.173).30 But it is worth noting a slightly 
diﬀerent way in which phantasia has been thought to motivate by virtue of its potentially 
evaluative nature, and that is by being itself pleasurable or painful, just like perception. This is the 
view that has recently been proposed by Moss, who writes that:  
If actually tasting the water was pleasurable, then so too will be the memory of tasting it, or 
the anticipation of tasting some more. Here Aristotle is following Plato’s characterisation of 
expectations (or ‘hopes’ - ἐλπίδες) in the Philebus: they are pleasures of the soul in which we 
‘pre-enjoy’ (προχαίρειν) some future pleasure (Phil. 39d4ﬀ.) […] Crucially the idea is not – 
or not just – that we expect that something will be pleasant, or remember that it was pleasant. 
Rather, the expecting or remembering is itself pleasurable (Moss, 2012, pp.58-9). 
On Moss’ account, since phantasiai are similar to the perceptions from which they arise, she takes 
it that they will not only preserve the content of such perceptions, but their aﬀective component 
too; that is, they will preserve the heatings and chillings which accompany perceptions of pleasure 
and pain (MA 702a1). And it is in this way, she argues, that phantasia is motivating. For when an 
animal experiences a phantasma of an object which it has perceived as pleasant, that phantasma 
will itself be pleasant, and so produce the heating that causes the limbs to contract and the animal 
to move towards the object (2012, p.60). 
Whilst it might appear to be a strength of this interpretation that it connects Aristotle’s 
psychological account of motivation with his physiological account of movement, there are 
certain explanatory challenges facing this account which do not arise, or are less problematic, for 
the ‘representational’ view, and which in the absence of further explanation, may thus give one 
reason to prefer the ‘representational’ account over the ‘aﬀective’. For Aristotle’s example at DA 
427b21-24 of the imagined frightening scene that does not move us, unlike the real thing, would 
seem to present a case in which the aﬀective component is not preserved and re-presented, though 
Moss’ remarks implied that the aﬀective component of evaluative perceptions was always 
preserved and re-presented. Why then do such imagined situations appear not to be accompanied 
by a feeling of pain, and so motivating? In her later discussion of the passions, Moss suggests that 
there are two ways of reconciling this passage with the putative evidence that evaluative 
appearances are essentially passion inducing: 
Possibly, Aristotle’s point is that we do feel some fear, as he arguably thinks we do when we 
look at a frightening picture (or when we remember something terrible). Alternatively, the 
idea might be that when we actively, deliberately entertain appearances (when the exercise of 
                                                             
30 See also Lorenz (2006) and Johansen (2012). 
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phantasia is ‘up to us’), we are not subject to them in the same way as we are when they simply 
strike us (2012, p.94). 
In the context of our own discussion, then, Moss could either argue that contrary to what the 
passage might be thought to indicate, the aﬀective and supposedly motivating component of an 
evaluative perception is always preserved and re-presented to a subject, but in such cases it is much 
weaker and thus not motivating. Or else, she might argue that this component is not re-presented 
to subjects when the phantasma is deliberately conjured; the question then, of course, would be 
why this is so. We might reasonably expect an explanation of how it is that the aﬀective 
component comes apart from the other representational components of the subject’s phantasia, 
and why it is that when a phantasma is deliberately conjured the aﬀective component is not re-
presented to the subject.  
One might, of course, wonder whether such cases present a problem for the representational 
account too. For one might ask: if the frightening scene is represented as painful, why then is it 
not motivating? Yet this would only be problematic if the representation of pain was taken to be 
suﬃcient to motivate (as Moss appears to suppose that pleasurable or painful aﬀects are), and this 
then helpfully brings us to a criticism (raised by Moss herself ) that can be levelled at any account 
which identifies the motivating role of phantasia entirely with its ability to present non-present 
pleasures to a subject. For as Moss writes:  
It is diﬃcult to see how merely representing an object or action to oneself – even representing 
it in a pleasurable, desire-inducing way – can suﬃce to render it a goal. What makes the 
pleasurable phantasiai which count as representations of goals any diﬀerent from pleasurable 
memories, or hallucinations? It seems that Aristotle needs the idea of diﬀerent modes of 
presentation: presenting something as future and attainable, rather than as past, for example, 
or as a mere fantasy. This looks like a real gap in the account I have attributed to Aristotle 
(2012, pp.62-63). 
As Moss’ remarks indicate, through phantasia we can have evaluative memories and hallucinations 
of various kinds of objects, but these of course are not motivating. And this appears to be a 
problem for anyone who takes the only role for phantasia in the preparation of desire and action 
to consist in the presentation of pleasure, for such accounts cannot explain why in some cases the 
presentation of pleasure is motivating and in others it is not. It seems, as Moss notes, that what is 
required is an idea of something like diﬀerent modes of presentation, where motivating phantasiai 
would be presented under the mode of future and attainable, perhaps, whilst memories, for 
example, would be presented under the mode of past, and as such as impracticable (NE 1139b6ﬀ). 
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Interestingly, Moss writes that: 
this too may well be a gap that could in principle be filled by a suitably expanded or fleshed-
out conception of phantasia. But once again, the evidence seems to suggest that Aristotle 
neither noticed this gap nor intended to fill it with phantasia (2012, p.63).  
Because, on her view, the role of phantasia in desire and action is simply to present non-present 
pleasures to a subject, she takes it that Aristotle himself is faced with this explanatory gap. And 
yet it is not clear that this explanatory gap is as much a problem for Aristotle as it is a problem for 
Moss’ interpretation of him.   
Aristotle’s various discussions of the prakton telos (MA 6; DA III 10), and its connection with 
the possible and attainable and so on (DA 433a30;31 cf. NE 1111b22–24; 1139b5-13), do suggest that 
Aristotle recognised that there must be more to a subject’s apprehension of an object of desire 
than its being pleasant for this to motivate her to act. And as we have already seen in the foregoing 
discussion – and will see further in the discussion to come – Aristotle’s account of phantasia is 
suﬃciently rich to account for these diﬀerent modes of presentation. His conception of phantasia 
is thus suﬃciently rich that the role he envisaged for it in motivating action could lie in its ability 
to represent evaluative content, not currently given to perception, under a particular mode of 
presentation. I believe, indeed, that this is something that other commentators have recognised 
too, in particular those who have attributed to phantasia a role in the presentation of ‘prospects’, 
which we will discuss shortly 
Before we turn to these views, however, it is important to recognise that Moss is led to suppose 
that Aristotle is saddled with an explanatory gap, and would need a ‘fleshed out’ conception of 
phantasia to bridge it, because she herself works with a rather limited conception of phantasia. 
Moss seeks to explain the role that phantasia plays in desire entirely in terms of what she calls a 
‘Basic Conception’ of phantasia, which she argues is exhausted by the following three claims: 
(1) Phantasia always arises from perception – that is, every episode of phantasia is based in 
some way on an episode of perception; …(2) Phantasia is independent of perceptible objects 
in a way that perception is not, for one can have a phantasia of something not present to 
perception; …(3) Phantasmata are similar to the aisthêmata from which they arise, and 
                                                             
31 In DA III 10 Aristotle oﬀers some clarification as to what he means by ‘τὸ πρακτὸν’, explaining that “the 
practical is that which is possible and can be otherwise” (πρακτὸν δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, DA 433a30), 
which we might take to suggest that the objects of action prompting desires are things within the realm of possibility, 
unlike the objects of idle wishes, which we saw can be things that are impossible. The presentation of the prakton telos 
as an object of thought in De Motu 6 indicates moreover that the telos need not simply be something within the realm 
of the possible, but that it be apprehended by the subject as such. 
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therefore have similar psychological eﬀects – and thus a phantasia of an object is very like the 
actual perception of that object (2012, p.52-53).  
Claims (1) - (3), Moss argues, “exhaust the features that Aristotle consistently and explicitly 
attributes to phantasia” (2012, p.53), and she accuses other commentators of ‘going beyond the 
text’, when they attribute to phantasia functions which go beyond those captured by these claims. 
By ‘consistently’ I take it that Moss here means ‘repeatedly’ (or even ‘always’), rather than ‘being 
consistent with other claims’. And yet the fact that a feature is not in this sense ‘consistently’ or 
entirely explicitly attributed to phantasia is not a reason to suppose it does not form part of 
Aristotle’s conception. As we noted earlier, many of Aristotle’s discussions of phantasia are driven 
by other concerns, and it should not be surprising then that certain functions of phantasia are 
referred to in some places and not in others, or that given the purpose of a given discussion, certain 
functions are simply alluded to rather than made explicit. It seems, then, that Moss’ account of 
phantasia is overly restrictive, and in turn leads her to suppose that the only role Aristotle could 
have envisaged for phantasia in desire and action is in the presentation of previous perceptions of 
pleasures to a subject.   
6.4.2 PHANTASIA AND ENVISAGING PROSPECTIVE SITUATIONS 
Recognising, perhaps, that action motivating desires must be of things that are future and 
attainable a number of commentators have suggested that phantasia’s role in the preparation of 
desire and action might lie in its ability to present to a subject particular prospects (see esp. Lorenz 
(2006), Johansen (2012), and Pearson (2012)).  
Johansen, for example, argues that “what triggers desire [is] a projection or anticipation of 
pleasure and pain” (2012, p.212), and continues later to remark that “phantasia is here the 
representation of perceptual information in the mode of the possible, in the mode of what is 
doable” (2012, p.216). Lorenz, whose account we will discuss shortly, characterises this activity as 
the ‘envisaging’ of prospects, and we might suppose that what is important about envisaging or 
anticipating, rather than saying remembering, or merely imagining, something is that to envisage 
or anticipate is precisely to present that thing as future and possible.  
Aristotle’s discussions of memory and hope (Mem. 449b27) reveal these to be ways of 
respectively representing things in the mode of the past and of the future,32 and again as we saw 
                                                             
32 Johansen writes on this point: 
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in §6.3, Aristotle’s discussions of various emotions in the Rhetoric reveal that the various contents 
presented – of dangerous things, perhaps – are also presented in the mode of future, or of the past, 
depending on the emotion. Indeed, in the case of anger, Aristotle makes clear that the revenge 
that the subject desires be apprehended as possible (1378b1-4), showing again that phantasia can 
present things in the mode of the possible. Importantly for the account that I develop in §6.5 
below, what is anticipated here is a possible action (τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι, 1378b2). 
Thus we might suppose that to be motivated we cannot simply represent some object as 
pleasant (or in a pleasurable way, as Moss puts it), but we need rather to envisage the relevant 
pleasure or pleasurable object, and in doing so to present it to ourselves as future and possible.  
There is an important question, however, as to what the content of such envisaging is. 
Johansen, as we saw above, writes of a projection into the future of pleasure or pain, and indeed I 
take it that all commentators who endorse a role for phantasia in the envisaging of prospects take 
it that the subject will either represent some future prospect as in some sense pleasant (or painful), 
or that her anticipation of some future prospect will be accompanied by a feeling of pleasure (or 
pain). In either case, however, there must be something that the subject envisages, and we find an 
account of this in Lorenz (2006).  
On Lorenz’ view, phantasia plays a role in presenting to a subject the prospective situations 
which in acting they bring about: 
Given that it is animal locomotion that [Aristotle] is meaning to explain, he must have in 
mind the formation of purposes that motivate animals to engage in locomotion, as when a 
lion forms the purpose of eating a stag that it sees somewhere in its environment. Forming 
such purposes always, or at least typically, involves accomplishing the cognitive task of 
envisaging a prospective situation, one that does not currently obtain and that may, as a 
matter of fact, never come to obtain. I shall refer to this task as envisaging prospects (2006, 
pp.130-131). 
Since perception is of the present and of present things (Mem. 449b13-15), it is unable to represent 
these prospective situations towards which an animal’s action is directed, for these do not yet 
obtain. But phantasia, as we know, is not tied to the present or to present objects in the way that 
                                                             
phantasia here appears as a mode of sensory projection: it is an anticipated sensory experience which 
serves to trigger desire. Elsewhere (Mem.449b27) Aristotle refers to the role of phantasia in hope 
(elpis), the anticipation of a future good based on a phantasma. Aristotle sees hope as a sort of future-
related analogue to memory: where memory involves the use of a phantasma as a representation of the 
past, hope projects a phantasma as a representation of the future. Both contrast with perception which 
is only of the present and requires the presence of a per se perceptible object. Hope may involve a 
specific attitude not generally implied by desires for the future, but it shares this much with desire, the 
occurrence of a phantasma as a representation of a future state (2012, p.213).  
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perception is, and given this, it is possible for phantasia to present the prospect of, for example, 
eating the stag, that is not currently given to perception.33 
Moss accuses Lorenz of going ‘beyond the text’ in his above suggestion, and argues that he is 
faced with the burden of showing: “first that Aristotle has in mind a crucial role for phantasia 
which he nowhere mentions, and second that phantasia even in lower animals is capable of 
representing something as complex as ‘situations’” (2012, p.56). But the speculative nature of the 
account is acknowledged by Lorenz (2006, p.128), and since Aristotle does not make explicit the 
role he envisages for phantasia in desire and action, we have already seen that a certain degree of 
speculation is precisely what is required. Moreover, as we will see, Lorenz does produce evidence 
to support both these conjectures, some of which we have already noted earlier in this chapter.34 
The ability to envisage prospects may strike us as cognitively sophisticated, and as such only 
attributable to humans, but Lorenz argues that evidence that even non-human animals are capable 
of envisaging prospective situations can be found in Aristotle’s discussion of the virtue of 
moderation at NE III 10. Here, Aristotle is concerned to show that the proper objects of 
temperance are taste and touch, being the proper objects of pleasure for beasts, but to show the 
latter, he has to explain away the apparent pleasure beasts take in sights, sounds and smells. By way 
of explanation he writes: 
For hounds enjoy not the smell of hares, but devouring them; but the hare’s smell made the 
hound perceive it. And a lion enjoys not the sound of the ox, but eating it; …Similarly, what 
pleases him is not seeing or finding ‘a deer or a wild goat’, but that he will have a meal. 
οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῖς ὀσμαῖς τῶν λαγωῶν αἱ κύνες χαίρουσιν ἀλλὰ τῇ βρώσει, τὴν δ᾽ αἴσθησιν ἡ ὀσμὴ 
ἐποίησεν: οὐδ᾽ ὁ λέων τῇ φωνῇ τοῦ βοὸς ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐδωδῇ: […] ὁμοίως δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἰδὼν ἢ εὑρὼν 
ἔλαφον ἢ ἄγριον αἶγα, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι βορὰν ἕξει (1118a18-23). 
Sights, sounds and smells are at best only incidental objects of pleasure to non-human animals, 
for whilst a lion may appear to take pleasure in the sight of a stag, it is in fact the prospect of a 
meal that he delights in. What this passage indicates for our purposes, however, is that the lion is 
able to envisage such prospects as eating a meal, and that these motivate him to act.  
                                                             
33 If, by contrast, a lion was currently engaged in eating the stag, and experiencing the pleasure of this activity, 
there would be no need to envisage the prospect of eating, since it already obtains: the lion will simply continue to 
eat. Cf. Pearson (2012, p.41ﬀ ) who argues that even in such cases, the envisaging of prospects is required. 
34 Indeed, it is not clear that the claim that locomotive desires must involve the envisaging of prospects through 
phantasia is any more speculative than Moss’ claim that phantasia preserves the aﬀective component of perception 
and motivates animals by producing an actual pleasurable experience. Nor, as I will argue in §6.5.1 below, is it clear 
that Moss’ own account does not assume that a desiring subject must envisage prospects in some sense. 
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This account requires, of course, that phantasia be able to represent things like situations; but 
we have already seen in §6.3 that this it can do. Lorenz adds to this the thought that phantasia is 
capable of representing appropriate situations too, and does so by appeal to Aristotle’s discussion 
of the relation between sensory aﬀections in De Memoria. In Mem. II, Aristotle sets out the 
conditions under which recollection (as opposed to mere remembering) is possible, writing that: 
Acts of recollection happen because one change is of a nature to occur after another. If the 
changes follow each other of necessity, clearly a person who undergoes the earlier change will 
always undergo the later one. But if they follow each other not of necessity but of habit then 
for the most part a person will undergo the later one. […] Whenever we recollect, then, we 
undergo one of the earlier changes, until we undergo the one after which the change in 
question habitually occurs. And this is exactly why we hunt for the successor, starting in our 
thoughts from the present or some something else, and from something similar, or opposite, or 
neighbouring. By this means recollection occurs. For the changes connected with these things 
in some cases are the same, in others are together, and in others include a part, so that the 
remainder which one underwent after that part is small. 
Συμβαίνουσι δ᾿ αἱ ἀναμνήσεις ἐπειδὴ πέφυκεν ἡ κίνησις ἥδε γενέσθαι μετὰ τήνδε· εἰ μὲν ἐξ 
ἀνάγκης, δῆλον ὡς ὅταν ἐκείνην1 κινηθῇ, τήνδε κινηθήσεται· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀλλ᾿ ἔθει, ὡς ἐπὶ 
τὸ πολὺ κινηθήσεται. […] ὅταν οὖν ἀναμιμνησκώμεθα, κινούμεθα τῶν προτέρων τινὰ κινήσεων, 
ἕως ἂν κινηθῶμεν μεθ᾿ ἣν ἐκείνη εἴωθεν. διὸ καὶ τὸ ἐφεξῆς θηρεύομεν νοήσαντες ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν ἢ 
ἄλλου τινός, καὶ ἀφ᾿ ὁμοίου ἢ ἐναντίου ἢ τοῦ σύνεγγυς. διὰ τοῦτο γίνεται ἡ ἀνάμνησις· αἱ γὰρ 
κινήσεις τούτων τῶν μὲν αἱ αὐταί, τῶν δ᾿ ἅμα, τῶν δὲ μέρος ἔχουσιν, ὥστε τὸ λοιπὸν μικρὸν ὃ 
ἐκινήθη μετ᾿ ἐκεῖνο. (Mem. 451b10-21, trans. Sorabji, emphasis mine).35 
The changes or movements in recollection to which Aristotle is referring are phantasmata, and 
the order between these, he tells us, obtains either through necessity or by habit, and habitual 
associations are formed typically on the basis of relations such as similarity, opposition and 
proximity.36 A few lines later, Aristotle reemphasises his point that the relations that obtain 
between things are reflected in our phantasiai of those things: 
For the changes follow each other by habit, one after another. And thus whenever someone 
wishes to recollect, he will do the following. He will seek to get a starting point for a change 
after which will be the change in question. And this is why recollections occur quickest and 
best from a starting point. For as the things are related to each other in succession, so also are 
the changes. And whatever has some order, as things in mathematics do, is easily remembered. 
                                                             
35 Importantly whilst this passage appears within the discussion of recollection, Aristotle also addresses the 
phenomenon of being reminded of something without seeking to recall it. This then shows that such associations can 
be brought to bear without having consciously to work to retrieve some piece of information; we can perceive an 
object and without conscious eﬀort, we can be presented with the appropriate phantasiai. 
36 As Lorenz notes, Aristotle does not here address the question of how habituation and these patterns of 
association are interrelated. One the one hand, we might suppose that such patterns of association arise from 
habituation – we are, for example, used to hearing thunder after seeing lightening – but we might also think that 
where such relations obtain between suitable things, that this can facilitate or even bring about the formation of 
habits of association.  
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τῷ γὰρ ἔθει ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ κινήσεις ἀλλήλαις, ἥδε μετὰ τήνδε. καὶ ὅταν τοίνυν ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι 
βούληται, τοῦτο ποιήσει· ζητήσει λαβεῖν ἀρχὴν κινήσεως, μεθ᾿ ἣν ἐκείνη ἔσται. διὸ τάχιστα καὶ 
κάλλιστα γίνονται ἀπ᾿ ἀρχῆς αἱ ἀναμνήσεις· ὡς γὰρ ἔχουσι τὰ πράγματα πρὸς ἄλληλα τῷ ἐφεξῆς, 
οὕτω καὶ αἱ κινήσεις. καὶ ἔστιν εὐμνημόνευτα ὅσα τάξιν τινὰ ἔχει, ὥσπερ τὰ μαθήματα (De Mem. 
451b28-52a2).37 
Putting this together with the passage before, Aristotle’s claim appears to be that where things are 
similar, opposite or proximate to one another, these tend to be represented or called to mind 
either together or in immediate succession. And this claim, Lorenz concludes, together with 
Aristotle’s discussion of sequences of orderly representations in De Insomniis, clearly shows that 
phantasia is such as to be able not only to represent things as complex as ‘situations’, but also to 
represent situations appropriate to whatever object is present to the animal. 
Before I go on to propose my own development of this view, it will be important to note that 
on Lorenz’ account, the envisaging of prospects is pleasant. He claims for example that the lion of 
NE III 10 is pleased by the envisaged prospect of food (2009, p.131) although he does not explain 
in what way the envisaged prospect is pleasant: whether, that is, the eating that is the content of 
the prospect is something that is represented as pleasant, as per Whiting’s account, or whether the 
envisaging is pleasant in some other way, as per Moss’. Certainly an account which maintains that 
phantasia is required for a subject to envisage suitable prospects is compatible with the thought 
that what is represented is also represented as pleasant; what is represented as pleasant is the 
envisaged situation. This will be important in the account I will now develop. 
6.5 PHANTASIA AND PLEASANT AFFORDANCES 
I want now to propose a development of the view presented above, intended specifically to apply 
to the case of virtuous action (although I believe the account will apply also to many cases of action 
outside the moral sphere). Lorenz, as we have seen, emphasises in his account the need for a 
subject to envisage prospective ‘situations’, but what I wish to draw attention to is the dynamic or 
practical nature of what must be envisaged, at least in the case of virtuous action (but also in a 
great many non-moral cases). For in cases of virtuous action, it is not simply the case that an agent 
performs a virtuous action with a view to securing some further end or with the hope that some 
further desirable situation will obtain; rather, the action is her end, and what she desires is to 
                                                             
37 That whatever has order (ὅσα τάξιν τινὰ ἔχει) is easily remembered is particularly pertinent in light of the 
account of the fine in the previous chapter and its connection with order (taxis); fineness, in so far as it displays order, 
would seem to be something easily remembered. 
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perform the action. The virtuous action would seem to be the object of her desire. My proposal, 
then, is that in the case of virtuous action, an agent must be able to envisage not any old 
prospective ‘situation’, but specifically the actions or activities that are aﬀorded by the objects in 
the environment or situations in which she finds herself;38 actions or activities that, importantly, 
are envisaged as fine, and so attractive. And my suggestion is that this is made possible thanks to 
phantasia.  
Insofar as I maintain that phantasia enables subjects to envisage prospects my account is 
similar to Lorenz’, and perhaps the kinds of practical prospects are amongst the ‘situations’ that 
Lorenz has in mind when he claims that phantasia enables a subject to envisage prospective 
situations.39 But the practical nature of what must be envisaged in many circumstances is not at 
the fore of Lorenz’ discussion, and it is my particular emphasis on this and the application of the 
account to cases of moral action that distinguishes my view. Insofar as what is envisaged must be 
envisaged as pleasant, my account retains the insight discussed in §6.4.1 above, that phantasia 
plays an important role in the presentation of pleasure to a subject when this pleasure is not 
immediately present. Where my account is diﬀerent is in specifying that what must be presented 
as pleasant is a prospective action or activity  
I want to approach this proposal first by way of what I think is a misunderstanding of Lorenz’ 
account on the part of Moss. For in showing how one might mistakenly interpret Lorenz’ account, 
and likewise my own, I can better bring into view the picture I am proposing. Moss, in concluding 
her account remarks that: 
phantasia can also supply the means to a given end – that is, can supply what corresponds to a 
‘premise of the possible’. But this cannot be what makes phantasia necessary for action, for that 
role can be played by perception or thought as well. …Much of what Lorenz attributes to practical 
phantasia makes sense of its instrumental role, and shows why in many cases perception will not 
suﬃce for this role while phantasia can fill the gap. Lorenz argues further, however, that phantasia 
is necessary for this role – that perception cannot guide animals in acting appropriately to achieve 
their goals. If he is right, we should conclude that Aristotle should have had a theory about how 
                                                             
38 This use of the term ‘aﬀordance’ finds its origins, within contemporary psychology, in Gibson (1979). 
39 Lorenz writes: 
It should also be possible to have phantasiai (for instance) of being in some state or other, of performing 
some action, and of enjoying an experience. There is, then, good reason to accept that Aristotle 
conceives of phantasia so that it is cognitively powerful enough to enable a subject to apprehend what 
one might, speaking loosely, refer to as situations—performing an action, say, or enjoying an experience 
(2006, p.136, my emphasis).  
Lorenz shows too that phantasia can represent both ‘types of actions’ (e.g. ‘stag-eating’), and particular prospective 
actions (say, ‘making a meal of the stag over there’). 
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animals figure out how to realise their goals, and moreover that had he had such a theory 
phantasia should have played a central role in it (2012, p.62).  
Moss seems to take Lorenz to be stipulating that a subject must be able to envisage prospective 
situations on the grounds that this is required in order to guide her action, and that the role he 
attributes to phantasia is really to be understood as presenting the ‘premise of the possible’ – what 
it is that the subject must do in order to achieve her end. One might think that this is also how 
we should understand the role I am attributing to phantasia, in claiming that it presents to a 
subject certain action possibilities aﬀorded by the situations in which she finds herself. But my 
claim is that these prospective situations or action possibilities do not simply guide the subject in 
achieving some further end; they are rather, if envisaged as pleasant, or in general as attractive, the 
end that is to be achieved. Phantasia, in presenting either prospective situations or my aﬀorded 
actions, presents to the subject that which is her end, namely a pleasant situation or action.   
We can get closer to this idea still by reflecting on an often unacknowledged oddity about 
those accounts discussed in §6.4.1 above, namely that they do not make clear just what it is that is 
represented as pleasant, or in Moss’ case, in a pleasurable way. Although the account I propose is 
intended to apply primarily to the case of virtuous action, it will be helpful to begin with the non-
moral cases that these commentators discuss, before turning to the case of virtuous action.  
It is commonplace in discussions of desire to talk of ‘objects’, when discussing what a desire is 
for, where an ‘object of desire’ might belong to one of a number of ontological categories. But 
many discussions of Aristotle’s conception of desire, and in particular those accounts which 
emphasise the importance of the presentation of pleasures to a subject, tend – perhaps 
unintentionally – to focus in their discussion on physical objects, and in a way which I will suggest 
amounts to a rather odd picture of desire and pursuit.40 
                                                             
40 The focus on physical objects is revealed in Nussbaum’s discussion and in particular her reflection on the 
meaning of Aristotle’s use of the term ‘orexis’. This, she notes, has its root in the verb ‘oregesthai’ (‘to reach out for’, ‘to 
grasp at’), and Nussbaum argues that in choosing this word, Aristotle means to indicate that all forms of orexis, 
whether rational or non-rational, involve: 
a reaching out for something in the world, grasping after some object in order to take it to oneself. Both 
human and other animals… have in common that they stretch forward, so to speak, towards pieces of 
the world which they then attain or appropriate (2001, p.275-6, my emphasis).  
Now, Nussbaum is right to claim that Aristotle’s use of orexis strongly implies a directedness towards an object, 
but her characterisation of orexis as a reaching out for ‘a piece’ of the world might lead to an overly narrow focus on 
physical objects as objects of desire. Pearson criticises the narrowness of Nussbaum’s picture, writing that her: 
characterisation of orexis as a reaching out for something in, or a piece of, the world so that one can 
take, attain, or appropriate it for oneself, is actually rather more restrictive than it should be. This 
characterisation will fit cases in which the creature is motivated to eat some food it encounters, for 
example, or grab hold of something valuable, such as money (cf. NE 7.4.1148a25), but orexis can extend 
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Take, for example, Modrak’s discussion of “the association of gustatory pleasures with an 
object presented through other sense modalities” (1987, p.97), in which the example of such an 
object was a berry, given to perception, which when associated with gustatory pleasure is rendered 
an object of desire. Here ‘the berry’ is assumed to be the object of desire. But whilst it may be 
commonplace to talk of physical objects as pleasant and as objects of desire, there is in fact 
something a little odd in saying that a berry, for example, is what is ‘to be pursued’. For what, we 
might ask, is it to ‘pursue’ a berry? What we surely find pleasant in the berry case, is tasting or 
eating the berry; what it is to ‘pursue’ the berry, is just to eat it. But here the eating is surely not 
some ‘means’ to the berry; rather, eating-the-berry is just what the creature desires to do. Of 
course, in some cases this may also be a means to a further end – relieving hunger, say – but either 
way, the creature’s goal is not ‘the berry’ as such. It is rather a particular berry-involving activity.41  
The problem with those accounts, then, that attributed to phantasia a role only in the 
representation of objects as pleasant (or presentation to the subject of pleasures) – where the 
objects in question are physical objects – is that it is not clear how simply to represent a physical 
object as pleasant is in itself suﬃcient for that creature to have before them some suitable goal. 
This is not to say that a further step is needed beyond, say, the representation of an object as 
pleasant for it to be desired, rather it is to say that to talk of either perceived or imagined physical 
objects as those which are represented as pleasant, is to mistake what must be represented as 
pleasant. For it is, I submit, the eating of the berry (or the resulting lack of hunger) that is pleasant, 
and what is desired.42 Indeed, as Aristotle writes in De Motu 7, we are ‘beings who desire to act’ 
(τῶν δ᾿ ὀρεγομένων πράττειν) (701b1).   
                                                             
more widely than such contexts. In addition to being for pieces of, or things in, the world in this way, 
orexeis can also, more simply, be for processes; whether bodily, as with sex or eating, or for mental 
activities, as with the pleasure of learning (e.g. NE 3.1. 1111a31). Orexeis can also be for states or 
conditions, such as health (NE 3.1.1111a31, NE 3.3. 1111b27–28) or honour (NE 7.4 1148a26); for events, 
such as victory (NE 7.4.1148a26); and for states of aﬀairs, e.g. that one’s wine does not go oﬀ (NE 
8.2.1155b29–31), or ‘to rule all mankind’ (EE 2.10.1225b33–34). (2012, p.20). 
Pearson is right to point to the variety of phenomena that can count as orekta, but he is does not go far enough in 
criticising Nussbaum’s view. For as I will argue below, it is somewhat misleading to say that our desires can be for 
‘pieces of or things in the world’, at least without some qualification. 
41 Or take again the case of some cool water, that is represented as pleasant. To a thirsty creature, the water is 
pleasant to drink; to a hot creature, it is pleasant to bathe in. It is not pleasant, or an object of desire, itself, but only 
in connection with a particular activity.  
42 Aristotle repeatedly points to the connection between pleasure and actions and activities. See esp. NE 1104b4-
5; 14-15.  (This is not, however, to say that pleasure could not also be taken in the obtaining of states of aﬀairs, or in 
things like ‘being honoured’, and so forth).  
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My suggestion, then, is as follows. When we perceive a physical object, thanks to phantasia 
we can also ‘see’ – in a broad sense of the term43 – that object as aﬀording certain actions or 
activities, which we might apprehend as either pleasant or painful. When we are presented with 
the object or situation that aﬀords these activities, unless we are currently engaged in the relevant 
activity, the activity will be not present to perception. But thanks to my previous perceptions of 
performing such actions or engaging in such activities in connection with the object or situation 
in question, and thanks to phantasia and its ability to preserve such perceptual content and 
represent it at a later stage, I am able to envisage these action possibilities, aﬀorded by the object 
or situation. Depending on whether my previous perceptions of the actions or activities were of 
their being pleasant or painful, I see these aﬀorded actions as such, and thus as to be pursued or 
avoided. Because I have had many pleasant experiences of drinking red wine, I see the glass of red 
wine as aﬀording the pleasant activity of drinking; because I have played card games, but not 
enjoyed them, I see a pack of cards as aﬀording such games, though I see these as unpleasant and 
objects of avoidance.44   
It must be admitted right away that this is a speculative account of what is involved in the 
presentation of suitable objects of desire and the prompting of action. But support for this view 
can be gleaned, I submit, from a number of passaged, one of which we have already examined, 
namely Aristotle’s discussion of the hound or lion’s pleasure taken in the prospect of eating hares 
or stags. This I submit, provides support for the thought that our ‘view’, as it were, of objects or 
situations is in part constituted by the actions or activities they aﬀord: in sighting a deer, a lion is 
able to apprehend that he will have a meal (ὅτι βορὰν ἕξει), or as we might also put it, the prospect 
of eating. Strong evidence too can be found in Aristotle’s example of desiring to drink in De Motu 
7, in which he writes: “I must drink”, says appetite. “This is drink”, says aisthēsis, phantasia or nous; 
at once he drinks (ποτέον μοι, ἡ ἐπιθυμία λέγει· τοδὶ δὲ ποτόν, ἡ αἴσθησις εἶπεν ἢ ἡ φαντασία ἢ ὁ 
νοῦς· εὐθὺς πίνει)” (701a32-3). Frequently the ‘τοδὶ δὲ ποτόν’ is translated as ‘this is drink’, but note 
                                                             
43 Where this involves both perception and phantasia. Frede makes an insightful remark in her paper, to the 
eﬀect that “because phantasiai can be separated from their origin, this means they can give us a coherent picture of a 
situation that transcends the immediate perception” (p. 285, my emphasis). Frede’s paper is more generally associated 
with the Interpretive View of phantasia, but this remark is nevertheless interesting in light of the view I put forward. 
44 Conversely, my brother sees a glass of wine as aﬀording an unenjoyable activity of drinking, and a pack of cards 
the pleasant or enjoyable activity of card games. 
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that the ‘ποτόν’ may also be translated as ‘drinkable’, suggesting that what is before the agent 
aﬀords the activity of drinking.45  
So whilst there may be a great many cases in which a subject apprehends a state of aﬀairs as 
pleasant and so desires to bring this about, I am suggesting that there are a great many cases too in 
which what is apprehended as pleasant and so desirable is an action or activity that is aﬀorded by 
a particular object or situation, and that phantasia enables us to apprehend this action. It is this 
particular picture of desire and action that is most relevant to the context of virtuous action, where 
an agent must desire to engage in some action. My proposal is that a virtuous agent, when 
confronted with particular objects or situations, sees these as aﬀording particular actions or 
activities – that is, virtuous actions, or activities – which having been perceived in the course of 
her habituation to be fine, she perceives to be attractive, and so to be pursued. These attractive 
aﬀordances are presented through phantasia, and provide an agent with suitable goals in the 
situations in which she finds herself. They arise, however, thanks to her previous perceptions of 
performing such actions (in relevantly similar circumstances) and her perception of their fine and 
pleasant nature.  
Before we put the findings of this chapter together with those of the previous, and look 
further at the developmental account, I want first to respond to one more potential criticism of 
the above account; a criticism that is levelled by Moss against Lorenz, and which owing at least to 
similarities between our accounts, might be seen to apply to mine as well. 
6.5.1 MOSS’ CRITICISM: ADDING CONTENT 
In motivating her own account of the contribution of phantasia to the production of desire, which 
identifies this contribution with the presentation of pleasurable aﬀect, Moss makes a general 
criticism of a number of the foregoing accounts, which, she writes: 
                                                             
45 One might want to insist that ποτόν should simply be read as the noun ‘drink’, rather than the adjective 
‘drinkable’, but even if this is so, it is telling that in this example Aristotle has chosen a noun associated with the verb 
‘to drink’, rather than choosing an alternative such as ‘water’ or ‘liquid’, as he does elsewhere (e.g. De Insomn. 461a14). 
If ποτόν is to be taken as ‘drinkable’, however, does the passage not then suggest that the aﬀorded activity of 
drinking is then something that can be perceived when one is presented with an object, since this is ‘said’ by 
perception, phantasia or thought? I believe, however, that this passage can be made consistent with my account if we 
accept, as I believe Aristotle would, that perception can apprehend “this is drinkable” (or “this is something that is 
being drunk”) when the subject is drinking. In the majority of cases, however, the action will not be presently 
performed, and so phantasia is required to present the pleasurable aﬀordance of drinking. 
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hold that phantasia contributes to locomotion by adding some content to what we get from 
perception, and yet this is precisely what Aristotle’s own account seems to deny’ (2012, pp.56-
7, my emphasis).  
In Nussbaum’s case the ‘added content’ is the apprehension of an object as an object, in Modrak’s 
it is the apprehension of the object as sweet and pleasant, and on Lorenz’, Moss presumably takes 
the added content to be the envisaged ‘situation’. 
In support of the thought that Aristotle’s own account denies that phantasia motivates by 
‘adding some content’ to what we get from perception, Moss appeals to one of Aristotle’s 
concluding remarks towards the end of DA III 3, where he writes that “because phantasiai remain 
and are similar to perceptions (διὰ τὸ ἐμμένειν καὶ ὁμοίας εἶναι), animals do many things in 
accordance with them” (429a4-6). Moss argues that: 
Aristotle’s claim here is that phantasia contributes to animal action just by preserving and 
reproducing perceptions – not by interpreting them, or synthesizing them, or in other ways 
going beyond what perception on its own could do were it being actually exercised on the 
appropriate object at the moment (2012, p.56).  
It is because phantasiai are similar to perceptions that animals are motivated by them; thus, she 
implies, we cannot suppose that phantasia motivates by adding some content to perception, for if 
it did, it would not be ‘because’ phantasiai remain and are similar to perceptions that they 
motivate. In proposing that phantasia contributes to locomotion by presenting prospective 
situations, Moss suggests that Lorenz’ account appears also to maintain that the contribution of 
phantasia consists in adding content to perception and so, she claims, ought to be resisted; I take 
it that she would level the same criticism at the account I have developed above. 
And yet as I have attempted to show, without appeal to certain content – content which given 
the absence of the relevant perceptible is currently unavailable to perception, but which can be 
represented through phantasia thanks to its ability to represent things that are not currently being 
perceived – it is diﬃcult to account for a subject’s apprehension of suitable goals, when she is not 
currently engaged in the relevant activity. How, if at all, can we reconcile the above with Moss’ 
claim that phantasia cannot motivate by ‘adding content to perception’?  
The solution, I believe, is to distinguish between two senses of ‘adding content to perception’, 
only one of which, I submit, is in potential conflict with Aristotle’s remarks at 429a4-6. There is 
one sense of ‘adding content to perception’ where the content that is added is content that 
perception is itself incapable of presenting; content that is thus strictly non-perceptual. So on 
Nussbaum’s view, the additional non-perceptual content would be the presentation of an object 
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as an object of a certain sorts, which she takes to be content that is never available to perception 
but which can be provided by phantasia. We have of course already seen that Nussbaum is 
mistaken in thinking that perception cannot present objects as objects, but I take it that Moss’ 
argument is that even if Nussbaum were correct, this view would conflict with the claim that 
because phantasiai are like the perceptions they preserve, animals are motivated by them.  
But there is another sense of ‘adding content to perception’, where the content ‘added’ is not 
content that could never be available to perception, or is in some way non-perceptual. Rather, the 
‘added’ content is perceptual content that is not currently supplied by perception. On the view I 
am defending, both perception and phantasia have the same intentional objects and share the 
same content. Indeed, we saw on the causal account that the content of phantasia is derived 
originally from perception, and under diﬀerent conditions (when a given object is directly present 
to the relevant sensory modality, say), such content could be supplied by perception. The sense in 
which phantasia ‘adds content’ to perception on this view is diﬀerent from the one above, for it 
does not suppose that such content is diﬀerent in kind from perceptual content. The point, rather, 
is that where that content cannot on a given occasion be supplied by perception, it can instead be 
supplied by phantasia.  
It is worth emphasising that actions and activities are things which, for Aristotle, can be 
perceived, and are thus amongst the perceptual content that can be preserved and represented 
through phantasia. In NE IX 9, for example, Aristotle uses as an example someone who in seeing 
also “perceives that he sees, and one who hears that he hears, and who walks that he walks (ὁ δ᾽ 
ὁρῶν ὅτι ὁρᾷ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὁ ἀκούων ὅτι ἀκούει καὶ ὁ βαδίζων ὅτι βαδίζει)” and continues “in the 
case of other activities there is something that perceives that one is engaged in them (καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν 
ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἔστι τι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ὅτι ἐνεργοῦμεν)” (1170a31-32).46 And in De Memoria we 
are provided with the example of an action that is remembered, and so presented through 
phantasia: one remembers for example that one “did something or other the day before yesterday 
(οἷον ὅτι τρίτην ἡμέραν ὁδήποτε ἐποίησεν) (453a1).47 Actions and activities are perceptible.  
Now, if we can perceive actions and activities, and such content can be preserved and 
represented by phantasia when the relevant actions or activities are not currently being perceived, 
this is perfectly consistent with the idea that ‘because phantasiai remain and are similar to 
                                                             
46 As we saw in Chapter 4 (§4.6.1) he also speaks of observing a friend’s actions, which are easier to observe than 
one’s own. Here the verb is θεωρεῖν (1169b33) but we might suppose that in such cases Aristotle believes that a virtuous 
agent will perceive her friend’s actions. 
47 Sorabji discusses the recollection of actions in his (1972, p.98). 
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perceptions, animals do many things in accordance with them’, since what phantasia preserves and 
represents is the content of previous perceptions. And thus if either my account or that of Lorenz 
are taken to suggest that phantasia contributes to the formation of desires by ‘adding content’ to 
perception, it is only in this second sense. For what are re-presented by phantasia are previous 
perceptions of situations or activities, when those situations or activities do not currently obtain. 
And these, when apprehended as pleasant, provide the subject with goals to pursue.48  
Interestingly indeed, whilst Moss does not make clear what kinds of objects are to be 
represented as pleasant, or represented in a pleasurable way, some of her remarks suggest that she 
may implicitly assume a picture not so dissimilar to my own. Moss, recall, contrasts a case in which 
“an animal is in perceptual contact with something pleasing – actually tasting water, for example” 
(2012, p.62, my emphasis), where she feels pleasure and hence desire to keep going, with a case in 
which she is not engaged in drinking the water, but in which “in remembering or anticipating or 
imagining the pleasant taste of water, the animal is having a pleasurable phantasia of it” (2012, p.62, 
my emphasis), and so desires to pursue this. Notice that the content of the phantasia appears to 
be the activity of tasting the water, which on Moss’ account is experienced as pleasant; and insofar 
as the content of the phantasia is an activity, which is either experienced as or represented as 
pleasant, Moss appears implicitly to assume a picture not unlike like my own.  
6.6 HOW ACTING CHANGES OUR PERCEPTIONS AND DESIRES 
In the final part of this chapter I want to focus on the case of virtuous action to continue the task 
began in the previous section, of connecting this picture with the picture developed in the 
previous chapter, and to tell a story of the transformation of an agent’s perceptions and desires 
through the practice of virtuous actions.  
In the previous chapter, I oﬀered an account of part of what happens when an agent practises 
virtuous actions. Such actions, I argued, are fine and through their performance an agent perceives 
this quality. I argued too that to perceive something to be fine, is at the same time to find that 
                                                             
48 One might perhaps wonder whether the suggestion made earlier, that phantasiai in desires that motivate action 
are motivating because what is presented is presented in the mode of the future and the possible, might conflict with 
the claim at DA 429a4-6, since something’s being future and possible is not perceptual content. One might suppose 
then that part of what does the motivating is then some non-perceptual content. But I suggest that we do not need 
to see the ‘future’ or ‘possible’ qualities of aﬀorded actions as part of the content of what is presented through 
phantasia; these are rather the modes of presentation of the perceptual content presented through phantasia. As I 
suggested above, envisaging can be regarded as the mode of presenting something as future and possible, but these 
qualities do not need to enter as the content of what is presented. 
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thing pleasant - indeed, pleasant in a quite particular way (1175b24-29). The pleasure a subject 
takes in something she has discriminated as fine registers the value that she perceives, and so to 
perceive something as fine is to find it attractive, and desirable. Thus by practising virtuous actions 
an agent comes to perceive their fineness and to desire to perform such actions. This pleasure and 
desire are importantly connected with the quality of such actions that makes them choiceworthy 
for their own sake.  
In putting this together with our examination of phantasia and its relation to perception in 
this chapter, we can already see how having come to perceive the value of virtuous action, to see it 
as attractive and taking pleasure in its performance, thanks to phantasia these value perceptions 
will be preserved and can be represented at a later stage. But in light of the discussion in the second 
half of this chapter, we can see now that that is not all that happens. For in practising virtuous 
actions, and through attending to the objects or situations in connection with which these actions 
were performed, the agent comes to see such objects and situations as aﬀording these virtuous 
actions in the future, aﬀordances which are apprehended as attractive and to be pursued.49 
The picture I have been developing, in both the moral and non-moral case, is one in which 
our ‘view’ of objects and situations, as it were, is shaped by the way in which we act –  indeed how 
we habitually act. Through acting we discover the actions that objects or situations aﬀord, and 
come then to see such objects and situations as aﬀording those actions in the future; these actions 
become part of our ‘view’ of those objects. We come to see the world, as it were, in terms of the 
actions and activities that it aﬀords, and this is something that comes about through acting. 
I gave the example earlier of a glass of wine aﬀording drinking, and it might strike us as obvious 
that this is part of our ‘view’ of a glass of wine; but note how for a small infant the activity of 
drinking does not form part of their view of the wine. It aﬀords smearing or splashing perhaps. 
Or take the infant with a crayon in hand who discovers that white walls aﬀord the opportunity 
for drawing, whilst for an adult who has learned not to draw on walls, they do not aﬀord this 
activity. Indeed, our view of the actions aﬀorded by objects or situations can become increasingly 
sophisticated and fine grained (both wine and water aﬀord drinking, but only the latter aﬀords 
gulping, whilst the former aﬀords pleasant sipping; the bottle of wine is also seen as aﬀording the 
                                                             
49 Given the close connection with the picture I am oﬀering and that developed by Lorenz, I submit that much 
the same textual support (presented throughout this chapter) can be appealed to, in order to show how things as 
actions can be both perceived and preserved and represented through phantasia, and how these can be presented in 
connection with the appropriate objects or situations.  
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pleasant activity of drinking in the evening, say, and not early in the morning, and so on). The 
more experience one has, the more one brings to bear when confronted by future situations.  
The previous chapter sought to oﬀer some explanation as to what happens when an agent 
practises virtuous actions, and how it is that in so acting her desires and other states are 
transformed, as Aristotle indicates that they are. There, we saw that the performance of virtuous 
actions is necessary in order to perceive their value, and that in perceiving this value such actions 
become desirable. Here we see a further importance in performing virtuous actions, for in 
performing these actions we discover, and are able to see in the future, the attractive action 
possibilities that various objects and situations aﬀord. By repeatedly performing virtuous actions 
we transform our view of objects and situations, and at the same time transform our desires, and 
emotions too.  
In petting a once scary-seeming dog, say, in learning not to back away from him, that he is 
gentle and likes to be petted, and so on, the young learner comes to see the dog not as an object of 
fear, from which she runs away, but as something approachable, that will not harm her, and with 
which she can interact. This is an early stage in the development of courage, and as the learner 
imitates a virtuous character model and is guided in her action, learning to stand firm in more and 
more (appropriate) situations, (whilst treating with care dangerous things), she comes to see like 
objects and situations as ones with respect to which to stand firm in the future. Moreover, in 
having discovered the fine quality of such action, she will see such aﬀordances as attractive and 
worth going for too. 
Or take again, a young learner who learns to share her toys with her younger brother. In doing 
this, she comes to see her toys as things to be shared (rather than to be secreted away), and like 
situations in the future as aﬀording the activity of sharing, which she has perceived to be fine and 
attractive. These aﬀordances, and this particular pleasure of fine action, are indeed things that a 
child who has never shared will not apprehend in like circumstances: she will simply see the toys 
as things to keep to herself, and the notion of parting with them as unattractive. Again, as the 
learner is guided by and imitates the virtuous agent in more situations, extending sharing to food 
or to money, she again sees more and more varied situations as aﬀording the opportunity for fine 
action, and in continuing to act in this way, she begins to develop the virtuous of generosity.  
I want to end by drawing our attention to two important features of this account. First, note 
the importance on this view of how an agent herself acts with respect to a particular object or 
situation in terms of constituting her view of such objects and situations, and the desires she has. 
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An agent might, for example, see that other people do not run away from spiders, and indeed 
believe that spiders ought not to be fled from, but if she still flees from spiders herself, spiders will 
still appear to her as something from which she runs away. If this picture of phantasia, and the role 
that our own actions play in the constitution of our view of things is correct, it oﬀers a fuller 
explanation – in conjunction with the argument of Chapter 5 – of Aristotle’s insistence that 
“without performing [just and temperate] actions, no one has the remotest chance of becoming 
good” (1105b11-12). We need to perform virtuous actions ourselves, not only to perceive their value 
and so for them to become possible objects of desire, but also in order to see situations as aﬀording 
such action possibilities; for us to be presented, that is, with such desirable goals as we navigate 
the world.  
Second, note how closely connected, on this account, are the agent’s perceptions, pleasures, 
grasp of value, desires, emotions, knowledge of what to do in situations, and so on. And note 
further how it is that through (imitative and guided) action all of these can be developed. On this 
picture, these various capacities, these forms of knowledge, and so forth, are not developed 
independently of each other, or in a sequence of discrete stages, but rather together and 
simultaneously, over time. By acting, and doing so in an attentive way, we come to perceive certain 
values, we discover particular pleasures, our view of the world becomes enlarged, our knowledge 
of how to act is developed, our desires are transformed – and all of these things are achieved 
together. On this account, then, the student of virtue does not acquire knowledge of what to do, 
then learn to choose such actions for their own sake, and then have this become something stable. 
The agent’s knowledge, choice and stable character are all interconnected and emerge through the 
simultaneous development of various capacities, eﬀected by her practice of virtuous actions. 
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CONCLUSION 
Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics oﬀers an attractive picture of human flourishing, on which 
our flourishing importantly depends on our activity as moral beings and so is achievable through 
our own agency. His account of how we come to realise this activity equally stresses the 
importance of our own agency and activity in eﬀecting our development; the way in which we 
act, he argues, determines how we develop. This thesis has been an attempt to understand this 
developmental process, and just how it is that through performing virtuous actions we develop as 
virtuous agents and come to realise the virtuous activity on which flourishing depends.  
I have argued for a picture of the learner’s habituation that takes seriously the thought that a 
learner, whilst performing virtuous actions, does not yet act virtuously, but that through the 
practice of such actions she comes over time to meet the conditions of virtuously performed 
action, and thus to realise mature virtuous activity. I have argued that we should conceive of the 
learner as engaged in the imitation of a virtuous character model, and that in taking seriously the 
imitative nature of her activity we are oﬀered a way of explaining how her practice of alienable 
actions can result in the strict authorship of such actions that characterises the virtuous agent. The 
imitative model allows us to see the learner’s action as not radically discontinuous with that of the 
virtuous agent, whilst maintaining an important distinction between the two forms of action, and 
indeed respecting the priority that Aristotle accords to the activity of the virtuous agent.  
By imitating a virtuous character model, I argued that a learner will attend closely to the 
nature of her model’s action and the situations to which this is a response, and in so doing will 
begin to acquire both knowledge of virtuous actions and to develop the various discriminatory 
skills that are required for mature virtuous activity. More importantly, however, in imitating the 
virtuous agent and not just her actions, the learner will be required to adopt the perspective of the 
virtuous agent and to see situations in the way that the virtuous agent does. I argued that in doing 
this the learner is thus enabled to perceive the value of virtuous action which makes it worth 
choosing for its own sake. This value is its ‘fineness’, which I argued the learner perceives in the 
course of performing virtuous actions. The fine is an objective property of virtuous actions, there 
to be discovered and which, when perceived, an agent will also find attractive; the value that the 
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agent perceives is registered in a distinctive pleasure she takes in such action. In perceiving the 
fineness of virtuous actions, the learner will find these attractive and see them as worth going for. 
Thus we see the origins of the virtuous agent’s disposition to choose virtuous actions for their own 
sake, and how this is developed precisely through the performance of such actions, as Aristotle 
informs us is the case. To perceive the fineness of virtuous actions, however, requires more than 
that a learner merely performs these; she needs also to attend to the nature of the action and the 
morally important features of the situation to which it is a fitting response. And this, I argued, is 
precisely what is aﬀorded by her imitation of a virtuous agent.  
In the final chapter I developed this picture further and explained, by appeal to Aristotle’s 
capacity of phantasia and its role in desire and motivating action, how it is that our view of objects 
or situations is shaped by the way in which we act. By acting in certain ways and perceiving these 
ways of acting as attractive, thanks to the operation of phantasia an agent comes to see situations 
as aﬀording certain (virtuous) actions or activities, apprehended as fine and so attractive. Thus she 
desires to act in these ways in the situations in which she finds herself.  
The picture I present, then, is one on which the learner’s perceptions, imagination, memories, 
expectations, pleasures, desires, and no doubt also beliefs, are shaped by the way in which she has 
acted. These capacities and their development, indeed, can be seen as intimately and dynamically 
related. An agent’s perceptions, pleasures and phantasiai ‘prepare’, as Aristotle puts it, her desires, 
and motivate her action; but equally we saw that a learner’s motivational states, in so far as they 
will influence what it is she attends to when engaging in a certain course of action, will thus 
influence what she is able to perceive and the pleasures that are thereby available to her. Having 
come to appreciate the way in which these various capacities are dynamically related and how 
through their joint development these together result in the realisation of virtuous agency and 
activity, we should be in a position to see two things.  
The first is that the development of the learner’s knowledge of virtuous action and her 
motivation – and, indeed, her stable state – are not eﬀected through distinct processes in the way 
that some imagine. On certain views of the learner’s habituation, it is supposed either that the 
learner will first need knowledge of virtuous action, and then to develop her motivational states 
(and subsequently to achieve stability), or that these will be developed through distinct processes. 
But on my view, the learner’s knowledge of virtuous action which is developed through, and in 
part constituted by, her trained perception of virtuous actions and situations (where what the 




but also of its value, that is, its fineness) is not developed through a distinct process, nor can it be 
divorced from the agent’s motivation to perform those actions for their own sake. In coming to 
appreciate the nature of virtuous actions and their fineness, the learner at the same time comes to 
find these attractive and to be motivated to perform these actions for their own sake.   
The second thing we are now in a position to appreciate, is that it is less than clear that the 
development of capacities that are classified respectively as non-rational and rational, can only be 
influenced by correspondingly non-rational or rational modes of learning. We saw at the outset 
how many traditional accounts assume that only non-rational processes can aﬀect non-rational 
capacities – that advice or explanations could not influence a subject’s desires, perceptions, and so 
forth, whilst rational capacities can be developed only through rational or intellectual means.  
On the picture I have presented, through the practice of virtuous actions a learner will at the 
same time develop beliefs about such action, and indeed, we might suppose that in this way the 
learner may begin to develop her practical rationality. But we have als0 seen how the promptings 
and explanations of a guide, and her own reflections, can not only produce beliefs in the learner, 
but direct her attention and in this way influence the development of her perceptions, pleasures 
and desires. Promptings and reflection, then, would seem to be able to contribute to the 
development of capacities that belong to the non-rational part of the soul, whilst through acting 
and perceiving, it would seem too that we can develop beliefs, belonging to the rational part of 
the soul. The assumption of a strict isomorphism between the nature of capacities and the means 
by which they can be developed would seem in this way to be undermined.   
I want to end by reflecting on one last feature of the account I have proposed. I began this 
thesis by noting the attractiveness of Aristotle’s picture of flourishing and our development as 
moral agents, which I attributed in part to its emphasis on our own activity and agency in 
determining how well our lives go. Barring the role of misfortune and certain external goods, our 
flourishing and moral development are not things that happen to us, but which we eﬀect through 
our own action. Both, indeed, must be enacted. But in emphasising the importance of one’s own 
agency and activity, we should not lose sight of the fact that, as I have presented it, the activity of 
moral development is also a social activity. The learner requires the presence of mature virtuous 
agents on whom to model herself and her action, and to guide her actions and her attention. It is 
precisely thanks to the guidance of others and her inhabiting of another’s perspective that the 
learner comes to discover the true nature of virtuous action and the value that resides in this. The 
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